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Advancement of Loyola Law School, including
the ability to sustain our educational mission,
achieve academic productivity and impact,
advance student and faculty recruitment on a
national and international level, and increase
academic peer recognition, is dependent upon
the growth of our institutional endowment.

Funds raised over the last 30 years have helped
to establish one of the most technologically
advanced, and architecturally interesting and
inspirational campuses anywhere in the country.
This achievement warrants the pride of all alumni. Now our emphasis must shift to increasing
the endowment. It is a simple fact that private
legal educational institutions must rely heavily
on the philanthropy of their alumni.

The endowment fund is prudently managed
with five percent of its annual investment
yield applied to academic programs, including
the support of faculty and scholarships.
Allowing the institution to build for the
future, it becomes a powerful fund. A generous
endowment will provide for less dependence
on current tuition revenues and allow for the
recruitment and retention of faculty, the creation
of nationally recognized academic programs,
the reduction of class sizes, and increased
support for student scholarships.

Discussions welcomed:
Kenneth Ott · Assistant Dean for Development
213.736.1025

Faculty Recruitment
Development of Core Academic and
Research Programs in law and technology,
international law, corporate and business law,
entertainment/sports law, and advocacy

Financial Aid and Scholarship Resources

The time for expanding our endowment resources
has arrived. Contributions made to Loyola today
will have an impact in as little as five or six years
and beyond. By developing our endowment, we are
providing both for immediate needs and for the
long-term future of Loyola Law School. Alumni,
law firms, community corporations and foundations
are invited to make pledges of support to endow
faculty positions, academic programs and scholarship
resources through annual support, or through the
process of estate, planned giving and charitable
gift philanthropy.
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HEIDI MATZ '03, the editor of the
LOYOlA lAWYER and creative director
for publications at Loyola Law School
for the past three years, celebrates at the
2003 commencement festivities.
Congratulations Heidi !

0

ver the past three years, many of you have heard me speak about the significant
juncture at which our law school now finds itself. For the last 25 years, we have
been building the physical dimension of our law school by acquiring property and
constructing facilities. With the dedication last year of the Girardi Advocacy Center,

we are now in the envious position of being able to enter a new stage in our institutional
growth, a stage in which our focus will be on people, not property and buildings. I am pleased
to report that we have "turned the corner" and have begun the lengthy process of enriching

Turning

our already robust academic program. Let me highlight a few of these enrichments:
·:·

We have successfully established an LL.M. Program in Taxation under the leadership
of Professors Ellen April! and Theodore Seto. This graduate program offers first-rate
tax education through our permanent faculty and our high-caliber adjunct faculty.
Our applicants continue to be talented and academically accomplished-and are
growing in numbers.

·:·

The Fritz B. Burns Foundation endowed the Dean's Chair at Loyola Law School, The Fritz
B. Burns Dean and Professor of Law Chair. The Foundation's continued generosity spearheads
our efforts to secure 3-5 endowed faculty chairs over the next few years.

•••

Under the direction of Professor Laurie Levenson, we have established the Loyola Center
for Ethical Advocacy. This program allows us to expand the course offerings in the area
of advocacy. Additionally, thanks to the sponsorship of the law firm of Mannatt, Phelps
& Phillips, the Center will sponsor an annual Trial Institute that will present leading
lawyers from around the country discussing cutting edge issues and techniques in trial
practice. The Center will also support a "Litigator-in-Residence" for several weeks each
year who will bring a wealth of experience-honed skills to campus, and who will mentor
students intending to be civil litigators.

·:·

We now also sponsor annually-with the law firm of Greene, Broil let, Pan ish & Wheeler-the
National Civil Trial Competition. This competition, administered by Professor Susan Poehls,
involves fourteen of the top trial advocacy teams from law schools around the country.
The teams compete at our law school. Last year's inaugural competition was a tremendous
success, and we are convinced this will become the premier trial advocacy competition each fall.

·:·

We have successfully implemented a long-term plan to reduce the size of the incoming day
class each year. Thus far, we have reduced the incoming day class from 345 to 320. This
reduction leads to smaller first-year class sizes and a lower student-faculty ratio, thereby
enhancing our ability to improve the instructional program.

The
Corner

By David W Burcham '84
Fritz B. Burns Dean
and Professor of Law

We are indeed excited, as we know that we have just begun. Over the next several years,
we will undertake several additional academic initiatives.
·:·

We are working to broaden our already successful program in Law & Technology that we
offer in conjunction with Cal Tech. We hope to obtain permanent funding for this program
to support the faculty resources necessary to insure the program's continued success.

•••

We plan to establish an Institute for Corporate and Business Law. Our goal is to expand both
theory-based and skills-based course offerings in Corporate/Business Law and to secure
funding for a fully endowed faculty chair in this area.

·:·

We plan to hire two new faculty members each year over the next three years. These new
faculty members will be recruited nationally. They will be selected based on their potential
to strengthen our existing programs as well as their potential to add to Loyola's growing
national reputation .

Our goal underpinning all of these efforts is to provide the next generation of lawyers with
the finest legal education possible within the rich Loyola Law School tradition. Thank you for
your continued support in our efforts. •!•
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Loyola's
Girardi Advocacy Center
Opened September 23, 2002
(See page 65)

•
ECONOMY •
Has it Affected Loyola Alumni?
By Genevieve Wong

For the legal community, 2003 has been a mixed bag-a good year for some, a bad one for
many, and a mediocre year for the ones in between. The financial picture remains obscure
if not depressed. law firms are merging and closing, state budgets are cutting back, and
the stock market is latent. At the same time, the country's low interest rates are
opening numerous doors. The economy appears to have frozen. Nobody seems to agree
on the same forecast, except to say that we are currently in an early hibernation.

THE GOOD

s

he gains by Los Angeles' largest law firms
mimick the generally strong performance of
large firms nationwide. The Los Angeles Business
Journal reports that revenues at six of the
county's biggest law firms totaled $2.5 billion in 2002, a 13
percent jump from 2001. Equity partners at Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher brought home $1.18 million last year,
while equity partners at O 'Melveny & Myers hit the
$1 million mark for the first time. Many analysts credit
these increases to strong litigation and bankruptcy
practices in addition to cost-cutting measures, slashing of
associate salaries, and converting partners from equity
to non-equity status.

~
0

"
~ The prominent firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
~ Walker decided to cope us ing a different strategy.
--"~ " I can't imagine anybody not being worried. In some
~ sense, we worry because there are new challenges on a

=

yearly basis . We knew that we would have to work very
hard to ensure success," said Anton Mack, the
managing director of recruiting for the firm.
The first thing on the firm's agenda was improving client
service. "At a time when business is tighter, we felt we
had to give the best service that we possibly could,"
Mack said of the corporate clientele. "That way, clients
would come back. That would also draw in more
clients." The firm then took a bolder step toward
diversifying and expanding its practice. Last year, the
firm doubled the size of its Latin America practice .
Just this March, a new office was opened in San Diego.
Paul Hastings is also looking to establish itself in
Shanghai, China.
While big firms worked hard to preserve their corporate
clients, attorneys specializing in the bankruptcy field found

it much easier to weather the storm. Lawyer Alan Tippie '79
of SulmeyerKupetz saw a small increase in business.
"It has created more business opportunities for all the
professionals in the insolvency field," said Tippie, who
works in the bankruptcy sector. "Accountants, liquidators,
and auctioneers are all seeing an increase." Although many
of the major corporations are headquartered on the East
Coast, Tippie's firm has helped liquidate 60 to 70 dot-coms.
He added that the economy is not always the cause of a
financial failure. "Mismanagement is another cause. When
it's coupled with a bad economy, we get an increased
number of financial failures. It doesn't disappear when the
economy isn't doing well."

S

maller firms also do not seem to be experiencing
a downturn in business. "I don't know of too many
small practices that are doing poorly," said Ron
Berman '70. His 20-lawyer firm, Berman, Berman &
Berman, has been steadily growing in the past decade. The
firm recruits an average of two to three lawyers a year.
P. Christopher Ardalan '00, who heads Ardalan &
Associates, believes that attorneys will always be m
demand, especially at a "consumer firm" such as his.

THE BAD
Without a doubt, the economy is negatively impacting
those in the real estate, technology, and public sectors.
Regardless of the economy, patent attorney Wesley
Monroe '90 began to see that his business was headed for
a slowdown in the middle of 2001. "The biggest thing
that has affected our business is the amount of work
from start-up companies. That's largely dried up," said
Monroe, who practices at Christie, Parker & Hale.
"In the go-go days of the late nineties, we had a lot of
business from start-ups. Right now, there's not a lot
of that going on."
The main reason behind the "slowdown" is the Y2K
phenomenon. "The technology bubble has burst. People
spent lots of money on information technology and it
kind of pumped up the technology bubble. That fever
stopped, however, and that's what led us to having a harder fall. It was not an easy letdown," said Monroe, who
believes that the country was in a small recession before
9/11 hit. "We were starting to rebound and then 9/11 put
an end to our recovery."
Monroe has also noticed that his clients are simply
maintaining a more frugal position, "but they recognize

"In the go-go days of the

late nineties, we had a lot
of business from start-ups.
Right now, there's not
a lot of that going on."
Ardalan handles mostly family, criminal, and divorce law
cases. "I don't feel the economy has chilled," Ardalan said.
He cites an increase in his family law cases. "A lot of times
upsets in the economy cause tremendous economic hardships.
That causes marital problems and that may or may not
lead to a divorce. The spouse may stop paying child support,
for example. There will always be a need for a lawyer."
However, Ardalan points out that a war sometimes causes
people to rethink filing lawsuits. "Fear may create inaction,"
he warns. "One is bound to ask himself some serious
questions: 'If so many things are happening in the world,
why would I want to file a lawsuit and create more
personal problems for myself right now?"'
IHl•IN LAWYERl6

that IP is a long-term asset and that cutting corners will
have negative connotations when the economy comes back
to life." Two years ago, a merger brought 10 attorneys into
the practice. A year ago, 20 left. Fifty remain.
Few attorneys believe that the economy will dip lower than
the recession that occurred in the nineties.
"The recession in real estate during the early nineties was
created by owners and landlords who built too much
commercial space. This recession is more tenant-driven,"
said Christopher Reising '96, of Cushman Realty
Corporation. The difference, Reising notes, is in the
circumstances. "The real estate business is a transactional
business. People make fewer transactions when they're
worried about what's going to happen," he said. "During
the nineties we had a bunch of landlords without tenants.
This time, landlords built buildings with tenants in hand
and a year's worth of rent. But over the last two years,
landlords have found all that income is drying up."

Even though Reising and Monroe see themselves in a
standstill economy, many in the public sector fear that the
economy is turning for the worse. Brenda Shockley ' 71,
who runs Community Build, a non-profit that provides
education to at-risk youth in Los Angeles, says she may
have to begin layoffs for the next fiscal year. "I'm frightened," she said. "The issues we represent barely get
addressed when the economy is robust. When things are at
risk, the philanthropic community tightens up and our
government funding gets cut." Many of her donors have
lost a tremendous amount in the stock market. Private
foundations from which Shockley had previously received
funding have advised her to seek other sources. The discretionary funds from the Governor's Office, that enabled
her to run a youth program, have disappeared. "We're not
okay. I have 32 full-time employees and no new grants,"
Shockley said. "Right now, people are just cautious."
n an internal memo, the Los Angeles District
Attorney's office anno unced in March that it might
be laying off some of its approximately 2,000
lawyers. "They've talked about closing hospitals.
Sooner or later, they'll talk about cutting healthcare
or laying off county emplo yees," said Assistant
District Attorney Robert Grace '87 of the county's
$2 billion shortfall.

Few attorneys believe
that the economy will
dip lower than the
recession that occurred
in the nineties.

the American Bar Association (ABA), the average number
of applications to ABA-approved law schools has risen by
18.5 percent. Law schools are seeing applications at a
record level, and with good reason. A Juris Doctor may not
guarantee employment, but it does guarantee a useful skill.
"I've never regretted going to law school. It's a skill that
I practice everyday," says Brenda Shockley, who stopped
practicing law almost 20 years ago.
Skill aside, new lawyers will face stiffer competition for the
right jobs. Los Angeles has a particularly saturated legal
job market, as there are five law schools-Loyola,
Pepperdine, Southwestern, UCLA and USC.

"We have rising costs of living. California has an increasing
population but decreasing revenue," Grace notes .
"However, we do have a stronger economy than most
states." Grace believes the economy will "bo unce back" in
"two or three years."
He still holds reservations about the second commg of
the recession. "We had a period in the 1980s that was
pretty bad. It was pretty bad during the whole Reagan
Administration. Everybody who was in their early twenties
during that time knows what I'm talking about."

THE JOB MARKET

There is only one sensible solution: good grades. "In
good times and bad, the answer depends on what you
study and where yo u rank," said Graham Sherr, the
dean of Career Services at Loyola . "The legal market is
a food chain, and it cares about where you went and
what you do there. "
The most preferred law student to recruit into summer
programs is still the second-year. Many consider firstyears to be inexperienced, according to Sherr. "Employers
like to hire students between their second and third year,
with an eye toward extending them an offer. Employers
want to live with yo u before marrying."

This past academic year, 133,800 people took the LSAT,
a 22.7 percent increase from the year before. According to
7i!•f'tii·1LAWYERI

herr observes that the economy has led to a contraction
in hiring, which he believes is hurting the top
students, particularly those in the top 10 to 15
percent. These students are the cream of the crop
and the target of big firms such as Jones Day, Paul Hastings
and O'Melveny. The good students may be coerced into
taking less prestigious jobs.
While hiring in the public sector has gone down, hiring
in the private sector remains stable. "I do see that many
law firms are cutting back [in terms of recruitment],"

"Build a network.
So much of this life
in terms of job hunting
is getting lucky... "

states Lynne Traverse, the manager of legal recruiting for
Bryan Cave, which consists of 830 lawyers and 17 offices
worldwide. Traverse maintains that for a big firm, hers has
always been "conservative" in the recruiting realm. "We're
very careful with our numbers. We don't go with a large
number in our summer program. If we have them commit
to us, we want to hire them," she said. "It's great to say we
have 10; let's choose five. We don't do it that way." This
year, Traverse helped recruit three new lawyers to the Irvine
office, six to Phoenix, and four to Santa Monica.
News of the poor economy has stimulated students into
being so aggressive that it has made hiring very difficult for
Mack. "We have had to be more selective as to who would
make the callbacks," said Mack, who has seen a 24 percent
i!o$'4•1ULAWYER]8

increase in the number of applicants. He has also observed
a record-number of students showing up at his firm's 22
recruiting receptions.

THE BOTTOM LINE'? PASS THE BAR
AND YOU'LL EVENTUALLY BE HIRED.
"Typically we've had 95 to 97 percent of our graduating
class employed within nine months of graduation," Sherr
said of his crop of Loyola grads.
Until he knew the results of his Bar exam, Roger Backler
'02 remained apprehensive. Backler, who ranked fourth
out of 96 in the evening division, took the Bar in February
and had no job offers. "Nothing had happened," said
Backler of the firm he worked at until May. "It's a small
firm and they just don't have openings." Backler stresses
that the firm had been incredibly supportive of him and
had provided him with good legal experience.
In addition to studying, Sherr advises students to be active
in the community through volunteer and pro bono work.
"Build a network," he said. "So much of this life in terms
of job hunting is getting lucky once, inspiring one person
to take an interest in you. [Volunteering] is a wonderful
light to be seen in."

If all else fails, Ardalan suggests forging your own path.
"When I did my clerkship at a big firm, I realized that it
would take a number of years before I could get courtroom experience," Ardalan recalls. "I wanted instant
gratification." Upon graduation, Ardalan set up his own
practice. Within a year, he won a $1.2 million settlement
for a client. He smiles, recalling the moment. "There was
no greater thrill."
ew can predict how the economy will impact
the legal sector for the remaining months of
2003. Until transactions resume, things will
remain static for the legal sector, particularly
lawyers dependent on real estate and large corporate
accounts suffering from the stock market backlash.
Those reaping the benefits of the economic downturn
still stride clothed in caution. Many hope that time will
be able to restore confidence. •!•
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RISING Consumer Debt,
DEEP Economic Trouble
and

BAD Legislation

By Daniel S. Schechter, Professor of law

Because of the inevitable lag time that

first time in history. Relatively little of the money
generated by this "tax" stays in the United States;
most of it flows overseas, and some of it flows to
nations that are known to use oil revenue to support
terrorism. The oil tax will provide an additional
drag on the economy. If the oil-producing states
(perhaps even including Russia) retaliate against us
for waging war on Iraq, supply may dwindle rapidly,
and prices could approach $3 per gallon. The tourism industry, along with the airlines, would be devastated. For the rest of us, just driving to work will
drain our wallets.

accompanies publication, you are reading
this article in the latter half of 2003. I am
writing it in March of 2003, during the buildup to the war in Iraq. By the time this article
hits the newsstands, I hope that most or all
of my predictions are laughably incorrect.
But I fear that we are in for a devastating

•

In the wake of the war, we can expect a renewed wave
of retaliatory terrorism, both at home and abroad, as
disaffected groups seek revenge. Obviously, those acts
of terrorism will not help the economy very much.

•

The Bush Administration is vigorously advocating
deep additional tax cuts, primarily benefiting the
wealthiest corporate and individual taxpayers, and
those tax cuts appear likely to pass in some form. The
Administration justifies those tax cuts on the theory
that they will stimulate additional spending, thus
jump-starting the economy; but the beneficiaries of
the tax cuts are those taxpayers who are least likely
to spend each additional dollar of discretionary
income. (Under the familiar Keynesian concept of
" marginal propensity to consume," lower-income
consumers spend almost every penny of extra income .
Wealthier people don't.)

economic storm that will trigger a flood of
consumer bankruptcies.
THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES
•

The threat of war has already begun to discourage
investment in business expansion and in capital spending. The overall economy, which had shown signs of
recovery from the post-9/11 slump, appears to be
heading for a "double dip" recession, and the second
dip might be worse than the first.

•

Oil prices have just begun to spike, imposing a huge
extra "tax" on virtually every aspect of the economy.
Gasoline prices are nearly over $2 per gallon for the
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A

lthough the economic impact of the tax cuts is
doubtful, their only certain effect will be to increase
the federal deficit to its largest level in history. In
turn, the federal government will have to borrow
additional money by selling bonds. And in turn, that borrowing will divert the purchasers of those bonds away from other
competitive debt instruments, such as corporate bonds. The
net effect of an increased demand for borrowed funds is to
increase interest rates. Those increased interest rates will
percolate throughout the economy, affecting new fixed
mortgages, all adjustable mortgages, and credit card debt.
•

•

Within California, we are also facing historically huge
deficits. In the absence of substantial additional taxes
(which appears unlikely ), we will have to cut spending
and increase borrowing, in the form of municipal
bonds. The spending cuts will inevitably mean a
decline in public services, especially health care and
education. As the business climate deteriorates, we can
expect a continuing erosion of the employer base.
All over the nation (and especiatly in California), housing
prices are at record levels, especially in terms of the
ratio between prices and median income. As the economy continues to deteriorate, mortgage defaults will
inevitably increase; but if interest rates go up at the
same time (as seems likely), the housing bubble may
pop with a loud noise. When mortgage rates increase,
demand for existing housing drops, as fewer people

really takes a sharp downturn, consumer spending will
surely dry up, leading to additional economic contraction
and job losses. Many consumers have used credit cards to
finance their ongoing spending; interest rate increases
would only exacerbate their debt service obligations.
Putting together all of the plausible events described in the
preceding "parade of horribles," I predict that we are going
to see an unprecedented tsunami of consumer bankruptcies,
probably shortly after Christmas of 2003.

HERE COMES THE BILL
Judging by the current composition of Congress, it appears
that the next wave of bankruptcies will be governed by the
"Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2003," which should be enacted soon and which
should go into force on January 1, 2004.
(For purposes of this article, we have to select an acronym
for this legislation, but "BAPCPA" just isn't good enough.
It's unpronounceable, and it looks like a Russian nickname.
"Bankruptcy Reform Act"? That also gives rise to an unacceptable acronym. Since the current version of the legislation
is about 150 pages long in 10 point type, perhaps " Big
Bankruptcy Bill" or "The Bill" would be adequate. )
The Bill is a disaster, in my opinion. I am not an expert in
consumer insolvency, but I have been involved in the Bill at

The net effect of an increased demand for
borrowed funds is to increase interest rates.
qualify for mortgages. Housing prices move at the
margin: if the supply of houses for sale is constant, but
the pool of available buyers shrinks, prices wi ll drop.

•

•

If home prices and va lu es drop sharply, many
recently purchased homes will be "underwater"; i.e.,
the mortgages will exceed the values. Historically, that
phenomenon greatly increases the frequency of mortgage
defaults, as discouraged borrowers walk away from
their homes. Lenders are then forced to foreclose and
must dispose of excess inventory. In turn, widespread
dumping of foreclosed properties reinforces the
downward spiral of the market.
Even though we have been in a recession for several
years, consumer debt is still (paradoxically) at historically
high levels; one would have expected that consumer
spending would have fallen by now. But if the economy

several different stages of its long march through Congress,
and it is astonishingly one-sided . It was drafted primarily
by credit card companies, which have been stung by
instances of bankruptcy abuse, in which some credit card
customers have run up huge debts and then have filed
bankruptcy petitions to discharge their debts.
ut there is just no evidence of widespread
bankruptcy abuse. It is true that bankruptcy
filings have increased. Is tllis increase attributable to
credit card debt? Perhaps. But the credit card
companies brought this on themselves with their aggressive
marketing tactics, such as the indiscriminate issuance of new
cards to marginal customers. Also, there are statistical studies
showing that about 90 percent of all bankruptcies are filed
not by credit card abusers but by people who get sick, laid off,
or divorced. The credit card industry can only document that
three percent of all filers may qualify as "abusers. "

B

Nevertheless, justified or not, the primary goal of the Bill is
to introduce the idea of "means testing," under which
many debtors seeking relief under Chapter 7 would instead
be forced into Chapter 13 payment plans. To oversimplify,
Chapter 7 provides for liquidation of the debtor's assets
and the discharge of the debtor's obligations without any
payment by the debtor, while Chapter 13 provides for the
filing of a plan for the payment over time of all or part of
the debtor's obligations.

filings . The debtor, already in distress, would then have the
additional burden of overcoming that motion, often without professional or legal help.
I think that this Bill sets the bar far too low, sweeping in
thousands of famiJies with modest incomes and forcing them
to pay off their debts in protracted and burdensome Chapter 13

At some level, access to Chapter 7 probably should be "needs
based" or "means tested." Poor filers should be permitted to
use Chapter 7; higher-income filers ought to be forced into
Chapter 13. But where do we draw the line? The Congressional
debate over that issue resembles a famous incident involving
George Bernard Shaw, who was seated next to a pompous
lady at a dinner party. Idly, he asked her, "Would you spend
the night with me for a million pounds?" She pondered his
rhetorical question and said that yes, she probably would. He
followed up: "Would you do so for five pounds?" She was
shocked: "What kind of a woman do you think I am?" Shaw
replied, "We've already established what you are, madam;
we're merely haggling over the price."
n a slightly less risque vein, everyone would agree that
a wastrel with a very high income and very large
credit card debts should not be permitted simply to
declare bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and walk away
from debts, but should be forced to pay off creditors over
time in a Chapter 13 plan. Everyone would also agree that
a moderate-income family that had incurred crushing
medical bills should be permitted to file Chapter 7 to obtain
a fresh start, instead of being forced into Chapter 13.

I

But that's not what the Bill provides. Instead, anyone with
more than $166 in net monthly income (after deducting
certain items of expense) would be forced into Chapter 13.
And the Bill handcuffs the bankruptcy judges, eliminating
their authority to review a debtor's unique circumstances
unless the debtor can fully document extraordinary expenses.
The means-testing criteria are based on rigid IRS standards
not drafted for bankruptcy purposes, and they do not take
into account individual circumstances. Judge Eugene Wedoff
of Chicago, in materials prepared for the American
Bankruptcy Institute, explained the effect of that proposal:
"For example, a debtor with medical bills totaling $200,000
and disposable income [greater than the minimum amount]
wouJd be found to have made an abusive Chapter 7 filing,
even though less than three percent of the unsecured debt
could be paid in a five-year Chapter 13 plan."
Following every bankruptcy filing, the court-appointed
trustee would be required to review the debtor's financial
records and to move to dismiss any "abusive" Chapter 7

plans, rather than obtaining a fresh start. And overinclusion is
not only harsh, it is also impractical. Many people forced into
Chapter 13 will seek permission from the bankruptcy courts
to escape back into Chapter 7, where they belong, and the
courts will be overwhelmed with those motions.
Beyond the sheer number of "escape" motions, the courts
will be burdened by the muddy and imprecise IRS standards
contained in the Congressional "means-testing" formula.
Imprecise standards are not only difficult to administer,
they also encourage litigation since they do not lead to
predictable results. Nor will the problem end when the
debtors are forced into Chapter 13. Under current law, twothirds of all existing Chapter 13 plans fail and are converted
to Chapter 7, even though the debtors have voluntarily
chosen Chapter 13 . Forcing thousands of marginal debtors
into Chapter 13 will greatly increase the failure rate, at
great expense to all involved.
The gatekeepers to Chapter 13 are the trustees in bankruptcy,
who are already underpaid, receiving approximately $60 for
each "no asset" case that they handle. Adding an extra burden
to their load will ensure that the job will not get done.
13i!o$'4olf·1LAWYERI

Finally, the Bill contains a number of other pro-creditor
provisions in both consumer and commercial contexts. The
corporate insolvency provisions will make it significantly
harder to reorganize struggling businesses.

WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE DONE
(AND MIGHT DO NEXT TIME)
In prior publications (and during my involvement with the
legislation itself), I have urged Congress to abandon the
mean-spirited means test and to try another solution.
I have clearly lost this particular round, but I am hopeful
that another Congress will revisit the issue and
clean up the mess created by the Bill. The solution is obvious in principle but difficult to
define: the bar should be set at a realistic
level, rather than forcing low-income
filers into Chapter 13. A successful
Chapter 13 repayment plan depends upon
the availability of discretionary income
to pay off a percentage of the old debts,
while the debtor tries to rebuild his life.
A person with $166 in net income who
is shackled to a repayment plan will not
be able to make a fresh start.
ather than using an arbitrary, and wrong, "$166
in net income" test, is
there a more principled
way to choose the cutoff point? In
statistics, there is a concept called
"standard deviation," a measure of the
spread of the familiar bell-shaped curve.
Given a normal distribution, about two-thirds of any
given statistical sample should be within one standard
deviation of the mean. Individuals more than one standard
dev1at10n above or below the mean are, by definition, out
of the ordinary. Congress could require Chapter 13 plans
for all debtors whose incomes are more than one standard
deviation above the mean, thus forcing upper-income
debtors into Chapter 13, while still permitting ordinary
moderate-income debtors to stay in Chapter 7.

A

clear and reasonable benchmark tied to local
poverty standards will solve a lot of problems: It
is not overinclusive, avoiding both harsh results
and court congestion. It is easy to administer, so
that both courts and litigants can resolve disputes quickly.
A clear standard enables litigants to predict the outcome of
litigation, avoiding many fruitless motions. It takes account
of regional differences in the cost of living and it changes over
time, unlike the current Congressional formula.

R

My statistical research indicates that families earning
more than one standard deviation above the mean are
those earning more than $75,000 per year. Almost everyone would agree that families who file bankruptcy with
incomes of $75,000 or more should be forced into
Chapter 13, absent extraordinary circumstances such
as big medical bills. The figure of $75,000 is about
five times the Federal poverty guideline. For the sake of
simplicity, I suggest using a five-fold multiple of the most
recently published local poverty guideline as the benchmark for access to Chapter 7.
1N'l•lf·1LAWYER]14

The only other "fix" necessary to complete the package is
some additional compensation for trustees-cum-gatekeepers
.
"'
.
....., r ·
.
rr
.
r
to
\..onaprer
1. ;:,mce rne1r errorrs ww mcrease me numoer or
Chapter 13 plans and will therefore increase the payouts
to the creditors of Chapter 13 debtors, a very small
percentage of those payments should be set aside and pooled
to pay for their services.
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REALISTICALLY,
HERE IS WHAT WE CAN EXPECT
So much for high-minded suggestions that have no chance of
adoption. For the next several years, the bankruptcy courts
will struggle through the debris of the bankruptcy storm.
Here is what I think we will see:
The flood of consumers involuntarily shunted into Chapter
13 will result in a counter-flood of motions seeking
permission to file under Chapter 7. Almost all of those
consumer filers will be pro se. Under current law, relatively
few competent practitioners represent consumers. The Bill

will exacerbate that shortage, since it forces lawyers to
verify the debtors' papers, risking personal liability and
sanctions if the facts described in the papers turn out not to
be true. Reputable attorneys will be even less willing to do
consumer work.
No competent professionals will step up to fill that gap.
The tide of incompetent pro se filings, already a burden on
the courts, will inundate the courts. The judges will be
forced to wade through the papers; instead of being
knee-deep, as is now the case, the judges will be neck-deep. The
bankruptcy courts will be choked with consumer work.
The bankruptcy bench, which is already viewed as something less than a plum position (because of its inordinate
workload), will have even more trouble attracting new
recruits. Commercial insolvency cases will be bumped to the
back of the calendar, just as civil cases are in District Court
(as the result of the voluminous criminal caseload).
Consumer bankrupts themselves will see huge delays;
many will become discouraged by the congestion and will
drop out of the bankruptcy process. Many of those who
stick with Chapter 13 will find it very onerous.
In the context of corporate reorganization, the pro-creditor
aspects of the Bill will mean that many more struggling
companies will be liquidated under Chapter 7, instead of
rearranging their debts under Chapter 11. Salvageable
companies will die.

SO WHAT7
At the end of all of this, who cares? So what if life gets a lot
tougher for bankrupts? A small change in the bankruptcy
laws may indeed have little effect on society as a whole. But
to illustrate why we ought to care about a big change in the
fate of bankrupts, imagine what life would be like if there
were no such thing as bankruptcy. Would that be so terrible?
es, it would. If consumers knew that they could
never escape their debts, no matter what, they
would behave very cautiously. They would incur
little or no debt, paying for everything in cash.
The economy would be many times smaller than its current
size. Individuals would be afraid to take any entrepreneurial
risk, for fear of incurring contingent liability. Small business
formation would dry up.

Y

Paradoxically, the absence of bankruptcy courts would
make collection much riskier for creditors, since we
would no longer have an orderly system of liquidation
and distribution. Creditors would have to become more
conservative. Instead of taking nonpossessory security
interests, they would have to take possession of tangible
collateral, as in feudal times.

A small change in the

bankruptcy laws may
indeed have little effect
on society as a whole.

T

he unavailability of bankruptcy would engender
the same sorts of problems for struggling
commercial enterprises. Businesses that could
have been reorganized would be liquidated
piecemeal. The "going concern" value of the assets would
be lost, to be replaced by fire-sale values, killing the Golden
Goose. Jobs would be lost; tax revenues would drop .
Instead of maximizing the total return to the creditors over
time, the assets of the business would be quickly exhausted
as the vultures grabbed whatever they could reach.
Even for moribund businesses, the unavailability of
court-supervised liquidation would lead to grossly unequal
treatment among the creditors. There would be no way to
prevent or rectify fraudulent misappropriation by the
insiders, as in the Enron case, or by creditors holding
the insiders' personal guaranties. To protect themselves
against these risks, creditors would demand very conservative
loan-to-value ratios, with ample collateral, thus further
starving the credit market. It is a bleakly Darwinian
scenario: Mad Max in business suits.
I have seen economies (in Eastern Europe) that closely
resemble the dystopia described in the preceding paragraphs,
and it is not a pretty sight. I am not saying that the pending Bill
will lead to the end of the world as we know it, but it pushes
us in the wrong direction, with unknown consequences.
I hope that all of the doom and gloom in this article is just
the fevered ranting of an isolated law professor. I hope that
by the time this hits print, the sun will have come out, the
Golden Nineties will have returned, and the Dow will be
back at 11,000.
But I doubt it. •!•

DanielS. Schechter is professor of law at Loyola Law School. Schechter
joined the Loyola faculty in 1980. Prior to teaching, Schechter practiced
law in Los Angeles in the areas of insolvency, commercial finance, and
business litigation. He is highly regarded as a specialist in the area of
corporate insolvency (particularly failed or failing leveraged buyouts ).
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POST·ENRON WORLD
By Therese H. Maynard, Professor of Law *

As a parent of four teenage daughters, I can
assure you that the more the world changes,
the more it stays the same. I have been
reminded often of this old adage as I have
reflected on the events of the past year.
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year ago, I penned an article for the Loyola
Lawyer that posed the question: Do
Lawyers Matter? That was before-before
WorldCom melted down; before the wellknown lawyer, Mark Belnick, then serving as Tyco's
general counsel, was indicted; before his boss, Dennis
Kozlowski, was forced to resign as CEO of Tyco; before
Congress passed the landmark reform legislation known
as the Sarbanes-O xley Act; before the demise of the Big
Five accoun ting firm of Arthur Anderson; before Harvey
Pitt was forced to resign his position as SEC chairman;
before Attorney General Spitzer flexed his muscle under
state securities law to clean up alleged abuses on Wall
Street; and before the SEC adopted a detailed set of
professional responsibility rules for securities lawyers as
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.

Without overstating the case, the business world is a vastly
different place today than it was a year ago. Yet (as the
parent of any teenager knows), the more the world changes,
the more it stays the same. Many of the scandals that we have
witnessed over the past year seemingly are attributable to
root causes that are not all that novel: greed, power, conflicts
of interest. This certainly seems to be the conclusion drawn
from reading the Powers Report (which is the report of
the independent committee of the Enron board of directors
that investigated the events that led to that company's
bankruptcy filing), as well as the testimony and documents
that were publicized as part of the congressional investigations into Enron and WorldCom (which ultimately led
Congress to adopt the Sarbanes-Oxley reform measures).
At the outset of these congressional investigations into
the financial scandals of the past year, seasoned observers
were heard to say that the scope of reforms proposed in
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation would never become law.
At least that was the conventional wisdom until the scope
and number of financial scandals grew to such proportions that it precipitated a crisis in shareholder confidence
in U.S. financial markets. In an effort to restore investor
confidence, Congress aggressively pursued a package of
legislative reforms of financial market practices and within
publicly traded companies-addressing, among other
17i!o$'l•!ULAWY ERI

things, the structure and function of audit committees,
the regulation of the accounting profession, and the
accountability of chief executive and chief financial officers. It certainly was not surprising, at least not to me,
that Congress would eventual ly ask the question: Where
were the lawyers? Why didn't or couldn't the legal advisors
to these public companies take steps to prevent these
scandals from occurring?

A

nd Congress certainly possessed some very
compelling evidence indicating a need for
legislative reform of the legal profession in
order to prevent future financial scandalsscandals on a national scale not seen since the Great
Depression. As the new SEC chairman, William H. Donaldson,
observed in a speech delivered in March 2003, at the
annual "SEC Speaks Conference," in Washington, D.C.,
"In my opinion, we are in the midst of one of the most
challenging times for the corporate and financial community since the events that led to the bust of 1929,
which gave way to the reforms of 1933 and 1934 and the
very establishment of the agency. It is time to get serious
[about pursuing corporate reform]. "

obligations of those attorneys who represent public companies
such as Enron and Tyco. Indeed, as I watched the scandals
of the past year unfold, my reaction was reminiscent of the
parent of a teenager whose son or daughter has just
received a driver's license. The parents of a recently licensed
teenage driver will, at some point, come to trust their teenager and give permission to their teenage driver to use the
family car for the evening. The parents, of course, impose
a midnight curfew. When the teenager is late by a few minutes,
they let it slide rather than run the risk of an ugly encounter
over a minor curfew infraction. Then, the next weekend,
they again allow their teenager to use the family car. This
time, however, the teenager is late not by just a few
minutes, but by an hour. This curfew violation, of course,
provokes a strongly worded warning from the parents,
but no draconian measures, such as complete loss of all
driving privileges, are taken. Several weekends later, the
teenage driver, feeling invincible as all teenagers presumably
feel at some point, decides to stay out way past curfew. Not
surprisingly, on his way home very late at night, the sleepy
teenager weaves across lanes into incoming traffic, hitting
another car, injuring himself and the driver of the other car.
The parents' reaction is swift, immediate and dramatic:

Congress, like the good parent,
responded with comprehensive legislation.
As a political matter, therefore, it certainly is no surprise
that Congress took legislative action to respond to allegations that the advice of Enron's outside law firm, Vinson
& Elkins, purportedly facilitated Enron's use of special
purpose entities to move debt off the company's balance
sheet in an apparent effort to camouflage the true state
of financial affairs within the company. Or, to refer to
yet another high-profile example that Congress could ill
afford to ignore, the summer of 2002 brought widespread
publicity of allegations that Mark Belnick failed to disclose
on the company's Director and Officer questionnaires
that he was indebted to his employer, Tyco, for approximately $14 million in loans that were apparently used by
Mr. Belnick, then Tyco's general counsel, to refurbish his
Manhattan residence and his vacation home in Utah.
In the face of such widely publicized allegations of attorney
misconduct as part of the financial scandals that have precipitated the ongoing crisis in investor confidence, it is not
surprising to me that Congress felt compelled to respond
with legislation intended to strengthen the professional
il!o$'ltJU LAWYER]18

they revoke all driving privileges, require the teenager to
pay for all the vehicle damage, and insist that the teenager
demonstrate responsible behavior before any driving
privileges will be restored. The teenager must earn back the
trust of his parents in order to regain the privilege of
driving the family car.
o how is this story relevant to the financial scandals
involved at Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, to name
but a few? In the wake of last year's financial
scandals of devastating proportions, Congress, like
the good parent, responded with comprehensive legislation
designed to reform the conduct of a broad cross section
of participants in our financial markets-CEOs, CFOs,
accountants and auditors, investment bankers, financial
analysts and, not surprisingly, lawyers. As the parent of a
teenage driver, I would expect nothing less of Congress.
Much like the distressed parent, Congress felt the pressure to
do something in order for public companies and their
managers and legal advisors to earn back the trust and
confidence of investors.

The reaction of many in the Bar, however, has been quite
critical of many of these reform efforts, particularly of
the SEC's new professional responsibility rules. I am of the
view, however, that, at least for those practicing lawyers
fortunate enough to have been educated here at Loyola Law
School, the new rules require nothing more than what any
damn good business lawyer (from LLS) already believed
to be a fundamental part of their professional obligations
to their corporate clients.

L

ong before it became fashionable to preach and
teach high ethical standards, Loyola emphasized
to our students the importance of adhering to
the highest standards of professional conduct.
An integral part of this educational mission has always
been to educate our students as to the importance of
the lawyer's reputation as an independent professional.
So, although much of the buzz and publicity associated
with the SEC's efforts to satisfy its rulemaking obligations under the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has apparently
caused many practicing lawyers to worry about how to
bring their conduct into compliance with the new rules, I
believe that lawyers who have been educated at Loyola will
find that there is little in the conduct of their day-to-day
practice that they must change in order to bring their
professional response to evidence of client misconduct
into line with the SEC's new rules. In fact, my colleague,
Professor Cindy Archer, and I recently offered an ethics
workshop that analyzed the SEC's recently adopted rules of
professional responsibility. As part of our presentation we
compared the obligations imposed by the SEC's new rules
to the current standards imposed on lawyers practicing in
California. Without minimizing the differences- which do
exist- the bottom line of our presentation is that business
lawyers who have the good fortune to be ed ucated here at
Loyola already are conducting themselves substantially in
accordance with the mandate of the SEC's new professional
responsibility rules.
Briefly summarized, the key principle to be implemented
by the detailed, and somewhat complex, provisions of
the SEC's new professional responsibility rules is widely
referred to as the "up the ladder" rule. Under the SEC's
new rules, if a lawyer for a publicly traded company
becomes aware of "evidence of a material violation" of the
federal securities laws, the lawyer must disclose the matter
to the company's chief legal office (CLO) or to the CLO
and the company's CEO. [Alternatively, the lawyer may
make disclosure to a qualified legal compliance committee
(QLCC). In the event that the lawyer refers the matter to
a QLCC; the obligations under the SEC's new rules are
very different.] The CLO then must conduct an investigation into the matter forming the basis for the "evidence
of a material violation" of the federal securities laws .

Long before it
became fashionable
to preach and teach
high ethical standards,
Loyola emphasized to
our students the
importance of adhering
to the highest standards
of professional conduct.

If the attorney who originally reported the violation fa ils
to obtain an appropriate response, the attorney must go up
the chain- taking the matter to the board of directors, if
necessary. (The more controversial aspect of the SEC rules
as originally proposed- known as the "noisy withdrawal
rule" - was not adopted as part of the SEC's newly-enacted professional responsibility rules; instead, this rule was
re-proposed by the SEC and put out for further comment.
Although the comment period has expired, no final action
had been taken by the SEC as of the date this essay was
finalized for publication.)
As adopted, the SEC's new rule clearly is designed to
implement the congressional mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley,
which had its impetus in the widely held sentiment that
corporate advisers, including company counsel, who
become aware of misconduct within the corporation,
should be held accountable. As is the case with reforming
19i!o$'4•JU LAWYER[

the errant ways of teenage drivers, only time will tell
whether these congressional reform measures will evoke the
desired result of rehabilitating the corporate governance
practices of public companies and restoring investor
confidence in our markets. Nonetheless, that Congress
should react to corporate scandals such as Enron and Tyco
by legislating mandates that hold company managers and
their legal advisors responsible for their conduct should
come as no surprise. It is a natural outgrowth of the scandals
of the past year, in much the same way we expect parents
to impose consequences on their teenage drivers to hold
them accountable for their misconduct while driving.

must confide, however, that I do find it deplorable that
this core principle of accountability requires the kind of
detailed rulemaking found in the SEC's new professional
responsibility rules. This is especially deplorable when
damn good business lawyers should appreciate that their legal
advice must ensure not only technical compliance with the
requirements of the law, but also must promote the spirit of
the law-to implement the underlying public policy objectives
of a particular legal rule, regulation or doctrine.

I

In fact, I am of the view that most lawyers do take
seriously their obligations as independent legal advisors. In
my classroom, the developments of the past year, including
the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, have presented a significant opportunity to consider the
meaning of being a lawyer-an independent
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to stress to my students
the importance of the
lawyer's good judgment.
professional legal advisor-and the very essence of
the attorney-client relationship. In the process, I use
the events of the past year to stress to my students
the importance of the lawyer's good judgment.
I firmly advise my students that, to be a damn good
business lawyer, technical expertise is assumed-but
is not enough. As we have seen reflected in the
Powers Report and congressional investigations into
the financial scandals at WorldCom, the modern
practice of corporate and securities law unquestionably
demands mastery of a vast body of complex and
detailed legal rules . But these events also underscore
that the enduring and defining characteristic of a
damn good business lawyer is judgment.

ut what of all those careful teenage drivers who do
not err-whose driving does not lead to tragedy?
In the aftermath of any tragedy with disastrous
consequences, the rest of the community must be
careful not to label all teenagers as bad drivers . Likewise,
in the wake of recent financial scandals, the legal and
financial community must resist the temptation to label all
lawyers as indifferent to-or even worse, ignoring-their
professional responsibilities.
l!o$'4o!ULAWY ERI20

In this post-Enron era, I am quite explicit in my
message to my students: the exercise of sound professional
judgment is of vital importance to both lawyers and their
clients, the corporation. I emphasize to my students that
the damn good business lawyer "adds value" to the corpo·
ration's daily functioning and decision-making through the
exercise of professional judgment. I use the events of the past
year to emphasize to my students that the exercise of professional judgment requires more than mere expertise as to the
substance of the law. Good judgment also requires the

And may that client
have the great fortune
to entrust his
legal problems to
the damn good
business lawyer.
capacity and experience to apply the detailed terms of the
legal rules to the problem at hand to fulfill the spirit of the
law as well as to comply with its express terms. Even more
important in our post-Enron world, I use the events of the
past year to illustrate that sound professional judgment is
the unique offering that damn good business lawyers can
provide to their clients. As such, I teach my students that
judgment is the lawyer's most precious asset, and I implore
my students to resist any pressure to compromise their
exercise of sound professional judgment.
hich brings me back to my theme: the
more the world changes, the more it stays
the same! Of course, there will have to be
some changes in professional conduct to
take account of the new professional responsibility rules.
I believe, however, these measures are native to the damn
good business lawyer, although they may be setting a
higher and more demanding bar for those lawyers who
may have lost sight of the fundamental ethical obligations of their profession. Today, in light of the detailed
rules adopted by the SEC, when securities lawyers become
aware of "evidence of a material violation of the federal
securities laws," it will be important for them to document
their efforts to comply with the professional obligations
imposed by the SEC's new rules. But the core standards of
professional responsibility imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation and the SEC's implementing rules-that lawyers
who advise public companies do not stand by idly while
corporate insiders engage in serious misbehavior-do not
vary significantly from the standards that have traditionally formed the core of legal education here at Loyola.

So, in a year in which scandals have come to dominate the
headlines of the financial press, I tell my students that I
believe these are exciting times to be a ~orporate lawyer. In
the midst of the current turmoil is the very real possibility
for a damn good business lawyer to make a difference.
Now, more than ever, I really mean it when I tell my
corporate law students, "The world desperately needs
damn good business lawyers!"
By way of conclusion, I would like to repeat a quote
that many readers may recognize if they remember their
Corporations class with me here at Loyola. In these
financially troubled times, that are made all the more
complicated and difficult by the conflict in Iraq, I return to
find strength and purpose in the words originally penned a
number of years ago by a fellow colleague, Professor James
Gordon, III, who teaches corporate and securities law at
Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School:
Good lawyers must have the skills required
for professional competence. But this is not
enough. They must know how to carry the
burdens of other people on their shoulders.
They must know of pain, and how to help
heal it. Lawyers can be healers. Like physicians, ministers, and other healers, lawyers
are persons to whom people open up their
innermost secrets when they have suffered or
are threatened with serious injury. People go
to them to be healed, to be made whole, and
to regain control over their lives. These are
large and important tasks, and they require all
that we have to offer. They require both good
minds and good hearts-not only mental acuity and professional skill, but also compassion,
righteousness, mercy, and strength to suffer
and carry pain. That is what it takes to be a
truly good lawyer. And the world desperately
needs truly good lawyers.
To this I can only add ... Amen!! And may that client have
the great fortune to entrust his legal problems to the damn
good business lawyer who has been educated by Loyola
Law School. •:•
Therese H. Maynard is professor of law and Leo J. O 'Brien Fellow
at Loyola Law School. She joined the Loyola faculty in 19 83. Maynard,
who practiced securities litigation with the Los Angeles law firm
of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, publishes extensively in the area of
securities law.

':·copyright Therese H. Maynard. All Rights Reserved. 2003.
My thanks to Ann Carey ('02) and Alex Shukhman ('01) for
their helpful comments.
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Attorney, Writer, Photographer, World Traveler
Eric lawton proactively affects the world around him.
In his Century City practice, he concentrates on complex
civil litigation involving business, insurance, tort, real
estate and construction defect matters, as well as acting
as a private mediator. His clients range from individuals
to major corporations. He was first inspired to practice
civil litigation by his torts professor, Frederick lower, Jr.,
who emphasized the philosophical foundations of
America's system of rights and privileges that empower
those
he American legal system
and a deep appreciation
for individual rights and
democracy have always
fascinated Lawton. While at Loyola
he was mentored by Tom Girardi
'64, at whose firm he worked for his
first six years of practice. It was there
that he developed an appreciation for
the responsibility lawyers have when
entrusted with their clients' personal
and financial futures and the satisfaction lawyers can achieve by thinking
creatively in order to make a difference
in their clients' lives.
In addition to practicing law, Lawton
is a world-renowned fine arts photographer, writer and visual artist, whose
work has been collected, exhibited
and published throughout the world.
His interest in photography began
i! •U.It ·1LAWYERl22
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after taking the Bar exam, when he
traveled through Europe while waiting for the Bar results. He packed
along a camera and photographed
foreign cultures and ancient sites.
Upon his return four months later,
Lawton began receiving recognition
for his photographs.
After practicing law with Girardi for
the next six years, Lawton decided
to take some time off to travel and
explore the world. He set off with
two cameras and an abiding curiosity,
and traveled for three years through
75 countries in the South Pacific, Asia,
Africa, the Middle East and Europe.
He returned with a body of work that
expressed not only what he had seen,
but also what he had experienced.
He resumed his law practice and also
began to exhibit his photographs.

otherwise

have

a

voice.

Many were published in magazines,
and used in multi-media productions
and theatrical performances.
Lawton feels he has achieved a balance
of his law practice, his art and his family.
His art has led to many other forms
of expression, including exhibitions,
theatrical performances, magazine assignments, advertising campaigns and
books. His art appears in numerous
private, corporate and public collections,
including the Skirball Museum, the
International Museum of Photography,
the New York Public Library and the
Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. In 2001,
his solo exhibition, Photographs from
Earth, was displayed at Los Angeles
City Hall. His work has appeared in
The New York Times Magazine,
Fortune and Conde Nast Traveler, as well
as worldwide advertising campaigns

for Citigroup and Motorola. Actress
Susan Sarandon quoted from Eric
Lawton's book "The Soul Aflame" in
introducing the "In Memoriam" section
of the 75th Annual Oscars presentation
in March 2003 (seen on television by
an estimated one billion people worldwide): "As photographer Eric Lawton
reflects: 'What is a life? What do we
leave behind that can't be worn down
by wind, or time, or fire? It is the trace
we leave on memory."'
Through his travels to developing
countries, Lawton has discovered a
new appreciation for the American
legal system of freedoms, rights
and remedies, including the right
to inherent human dignity. He also
learned a great deal about human
nature. Lawton says, "As I spent time
observing the world's many traditions,
their elements began to merge into
one another. Within the many unique
ways of coping with life on this
planet, fundamental patterns clearly
shine through."
He also sees a parallel between his
law practice and his art: "In each case,
whether I'm presented with a legal
problem or whether I'm considering
a visual subject, I'm presented with
a world in chaos. There is a certain

disharmony and incoherence at the
initial stages. The art of photography,
like the art of law, is to discern the
underlying theme-to find the story
that is buried within the chaos and
express it in a clear, compelling way."
It is no surprise that his central
theme in life is focus. He says that
the balance between both careers
and his family is an art in itself, but
focus helps him to make the most
of his time. "By giving a voice to
our creative side, we become better
lawyers," he says, "and that makes
all the difference."
As lawyers face the challenges of
leading a balanced life between
the demands of the profession and
those of their personal and creative
lives, Lawton may have found a
peace that transcends the many
facets of life. He has found a way
to give back to the world. Lawton's
book of photographs, The Soul of
the World (HarperCollins ), is in its
third printing. Currently, he is
helping create a multi-dimensional
book entitled, Nishmat T zedek,
Hebrew for "A Righteous Soul,"
dedicated to the victims of terrorism.
It will include a music CD of an
original choral symphony, along
with written passages from writers

and philosophers including Nobel
Prize winner Elie Weisel, matched
with Lawton's photographs. It will
be published in mid-2003. •!•

EL MOLO BOY EL MOLO ISLAND LAKE TURKANA KENYA 1977 This boy
is outside one of the only "strudures" on El Malo Island, a thatched
hut made from the straw and dried weeds of the lake.

I TWO WOMEN MACHAPUCHARE NEPAL 1978 The sacred peak of Machapuchare (2 2,958 feet) has never
been climbed. Nepali legend holds that twin goddesses reside on the mountain peak.
• POND PALACE OF FINE ARTS SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA 1997 Built for the World's Fair at the turn of
the 2otfi Centu ry, San Francisco's Palace of Fine Arts is the last vestige of an age of grace and wonder.
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In the Spotlight
Mark Geragos '82 has always had a passion for law. One
could say that he was programmed to be a defense lawyer.
Since the age of five, when he spent summer vacations
following his lawyer father around the courthouse, he was
exposed

to

the

passionate

world

of

criminal

defense.

A

fter graduating from Loyola, he became a partner in his father's law firm Geragos & Geragos. Since then,
he has broken ground in the criminal defense field and has earned a national reputation successfully
representing his political and entertainment clientele. The Los Angeles Criminal Courts Bar Association
named him "Trial Lawyer of the Year," and he was also tabbed as one of the " 100 Most Influential Attorneys
in California" by California Law Business. Geragos maintains that one of his great motivators is his passion for winning.
Besides his day job, he is a regular commentator on CNN and Fox, providing legal commentary on contemporary legal
topics. Geragos also raises and races thoroughbred horses. As much as he may be a sure bet these days in the courtroom,
don't be surprised to see one of his horses posting at Hollywood or Santa Anita. •!•
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Prosecution and the Art of Defense

Darren levine '88 is a deputy district attorney with the los Angeles County District Attorney's
Office. He is currently assigned to the Crimes Against Peace Officers Section (CAPOS), an
elite unit responsible for prosecuting murders and attempted murders of police officers.
evine has prosecuted 80 felony
jury trials, including many
challenging, high-profile murder cases involving the slaying
of on-duty peace officers. His motto is
"protect the protectors." He has a 100
percent conviction rate. He was named
"Prosecutor of the Year" in 2003 by
the Los Angeles County Association of
Deputy District Attorneys. Levine's
passion comes from working closely
with the surviving family members of
officers killed in the line of duty. While
at Loyola, Levine was employed by
local, state and federal law enforcement
agencies to teach self defense and officer
survival tactics. An expert in police use
of force, Levine was encouraged by
i!t$j•IULAWYER]24

police administrators to become a
prosecutor. Standing up to do the right
thing seems inherent in his philosophy
of life. Levine is a true hero for these
times-when violence is treated as
entertainment and remorse has become
an outdated virtue. He balances his
law practice with being a founding
partner in the Krav Maga National
Training Center, the largest training
facility in the world, featuring the
fighting system of the Israeli military
and anti-terrorist units. He is the U.S.
chief instructor of Krav Maga and
actively teaches police SWAT teams and
military special operation units in the
U.S. and abroad. •!•

Snow coats the shops of the ChampsEiysees; Deidre Beckett '86 hurries by the
store windows. She may have luxury goods
on her mind, but shopping is not on her
agenda. Beckett is senior counsel for the
American subsidiary of Paris-based LVMH
Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc.
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The Law of Luxury
VMH's stated goal is to "represent the most refined
qualities of Western 'Art de Vivre' around the
world." It globally disseminates good taste through
such brands as Dom Perignon, Givenchy, Donna
Karan, Christian Dior and TAG Heuer.
To Beckett, though, her employer's luxury goods just make
the workday fun. It is the opportunity to work in-house
that really excites Beckett. As a corporate counsel of
LVMH, she is closely tied to the business. "Understanding
the priorities of LVMH is essential, " she says. Beckett feels
this intimate collaboration between attorney and client is a
welcome contrast to larger firms where attorneys often
work in a "vacuum." Beckett guides LVMH chiefly in
employment disputes. Yet, because of the small size of
the legal department, she may find herself pouring over
wine and spirits regulatory restrictions one day and
advising LVMH on antitrust matters the next. This variety
originally attracted Beckett to the position. (The job opening serendipitously crossed her desk when she worked as a
legal headhunter.) However, Beckett admits the frequent
trips to Paris, Los Angeles and San Francisco, as well as her
Manhattan office nicely situated within walking distance
of her home, are pleasant perks too. •:•
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From the Heart
The doors of Orange County courtrooms stand like
battlements against plaintiffs bringing medical malpractice
suits. Recently, Amy Solomon '87 found herself inside such
a fortified courtroom preparing her client for the worst.
Still, Solomon was hopeful, because "I really felt the case
came from my heart," she remembers.
n a victorious break from tradition,
the court listened to her sincere
advocacy and decided in her client's
favor. Once again, Solomon
slung the rock that felled Goliath.
Solomon, a partner at Girardi and
Keese, has made a career of defending
"consumers or people who have been
injured by defendants with much
greater power than the plaintiff." In
February of 2000, she won a settlement for a boy who suffered serious
injuries after becoming pinned under a
Disneyland ride. Similar tragic injuries
and long odds often characterize
Solomon's cases; her voice still lingers,

laden with emotion, when certain cases
are recalled. Yet, Solomon prevails,
with support from an unflagging
belief in her clients.
Solomon complements conviCtiOn
with an affinity for the mental rigor of
the practice of law. She pursued a
professional ballet career until injuries
heralded retirement. Craving rigorous
mental exercise similar to the strictures of ballet training, Solomon
turned to law school and a career in
law. She began clerking for Girardi
and Keese as a second year student.
Solomon feels like part of a family at

Catherine B. Hagen '78 is a trial
lawyer

practicing

employment

law for O'Melveny and Myers,
where she has worked since her
graduation from Loyola.

Catheri e . Hagen '78
A Balanced Life

Girardi and Keese. "I've grown up
here, and I see myself growing old
here .. .if they'll have me," she laughs.
Certainly her success foretells a long
career with the esteemed firm. Solomon's
successful substitution of the stage with
the courtroom was a natural switch;
only the absence of exuberant curtain
calls distinguishes her legal performances from those of a more graceful
variety. Her ability to communicate
emotion to an audience, regardless of
the medium, is the same. •:•

On November 12, 1892, a man was paid $500 to play football for the Allegheny Athletic
Association in a game against the Pittsburgh Athletic Club. With Pudge Heffelfinger's
paycheck, professional football was born, and the seeds of a venerable institution were
sown. The National Football league now has 32 teams, each licensed and marketed by NFL
Properties LLC. Enter David Weinberg '93, Associate Counsel in the Business and legal Affairs
Department of NFL Properties.

avid
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He's Got Game
n that role, Weinberg views himself
as a facilitator of business rather
than a law monger. "I look
for solutions to facilitate an
agreement, while staying in focus of
league goals and protecting league
assets," Weinberg says. Thus, all of
Weinberg's transactional work-retail
licensing, corporate and international
sponsorship deals, or media negotiations-is tinged with the knowledge
that the NFL is ultimately assembling
a product that millions of fans
passionately view.

I

However, Weinberg is not new to
tremendous and very public undertakings. Weinberg started his career in

agen's
motivation
to
practice law comes from
the challenges and intellectual stimulation of
representing employers in an increasingly complex workplace, where her
practice requires working with people
on many sides of many issues. She
advises employers on complying with a
myriad of laws-most of which did not
exist when she was in law school.
Hagen enjoys unraveling the mystery in

the Legal Department for the 1994
World Cup organizing committee. As
the world watched, waiting for the
American organization's effort to
collapse, the event ran beautifully.
After a year of practicing civil litigation,
Weinberg returned to the sport as
Legal Counsel for Major League
Soccer. Naturally, starting a new
soccer league in the midst of America's
overcrowded sports field was a difficult
mission. Yet, Weinberg emergedcareer intact-to assume his present
position as facilitator for the league
that keeps millions of fans glued to
their armchairs each Sunday. •!•

every situation applying to law. After
being out of college for 11 years, she
went back to law school as a mother
of two, which challenged her and
presented an "intellectual focus in my
life that hadn't been there before."
Loyola was her choice of law schools.
It gave her the flexibility to make her
way through her studies that other
competitive schools could not provide.
Her success is drawn from combining
hard work, mental discipline and a

David Weinberg with 14-month-old son Brandon,
who is a Dallas Cowboys' fan.

sense of knowing how people think and
work. Hagen balances her practice with
a vineyard she owns with her husband
in Santa Barbara. They began producing
Chardonnay and Pinot Noir in 2000,
under the name Clos Pepe. It is the
physical work that creates the balance
with her intellectual life of law. •!•
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Just east of the San Francisco Bay, a man rides an orchard
tractor through the gentle hills of Livermore Valley, one of
the nation's oldest grape growing regions. Sblend Sblendorio
may have a lot on his mind; after all, his chief occupation is
the acquisition and finance of intellectual property from
bankrupt businesses. Yet, the weekends and
evenings are times to be with his vineyard
and his tractor, the vineyard's only tractor.
Sblendorio has owned, managed and
run the Sblendorio Estate and Vineyard
since 1996. The decision to become
a grape grower came naturally to
Sblendorio; his family owns vineyards in their native Italy, and he
grew up on a fruit farm in Orange
County. As a young man, Sblendorio
helped his family run their RV storage
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Not Afraid to Dirty His Hands

company. This experience instilled
in Sblendorio a keen interest in
business; during law school his favorite
classes were tax, bankruptcy, and
practically any other course where
the U.C.C. held sway.
Despite a successful and busy legal
career, Sblendorio could still hear the

earth calling to him. So he decided to
get his hands dirty and till the land like
his family has done for generations.
Today, Sblendorio's vineyard produces
grapes for Chardonnay, Zinfandel, and
Petite Sirah. Sblendorio's agricultural
dedication has resulted in his appointment as president of the Livermore
Valley Winegrowers Association. •!•

Ann Rundle '95 wanted to be a lawyer since the fourth grade.
That's when she read Inherit the Wind, a book that inspired

The Joy of Argument
her to a life of justice. According to Rundle, it was an easy
step from that childhood dream to eventually choosing
Loyola for her education.
At Loyola, the late Professor Bill Hobbs was instrumental in showing her how to be
a lawyer, by applying the knowledge acquired in the classroom to the courtroom.
Along with Hobbs, Rundle considers her mother to be a great inspiration. She used to
accompany her mother to her teaching jobs in South Los Angeles. Through that
experience, Rundle was exposed to the inner city and public service, and she realized
she wanted to practice law for public service. Upon graduating cum laude with the
Order of the Coif, Rundle joined the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
and now serves as a deputy district attorney. She has prosecuted many high-profile
cases involving media coverage. But her greatest satisfaction has come from prosecuting homicide cases. Being able to stand up in court and argue is one of her
greatest joys. By combining the opportunities in her life and the desire to be the
best she can be, Rundle has succeeded as a public servant and a trial attorney. •!•
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If you ask, Martin Stone '51 will gladly give you his two cents'
worth of advice. But make no mistake, this savvy businessman's
two cents is worth much more than that. At age 75, Stone has
amassed a fortune running companies in the last half century,
most notably Los Angeles-based Monogram Industries, Inc., a
manufacturer of aircraft components. When Stone arrived, the
company had sales of $6 million and was losing $300,000 per year.
In only a few years, he turned Monogram into a $180 million-a
year conglomerate with an annual profit of $25 million .
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Patience, Persistence, Determination and Will
Born in St. Louis in 1928, Stone moved with his family to
Los Angeles when he was six. He still has vivid memories
of the Great Depression. "My family drove across the
country from St. Louis to Los Angeles so my dad could try
and find a job. We just piled all our belongings into an old
Buick and drove to California, hoping there was work
there. We were a family that lived in a non-cash environment. It was a very tough existence."

a bad knee, he did find himself in the major leaguespitching batting practice for 16 years for teams like the
Boston Red Sox and the Los Angeles Dodgers. "I had
a rubber arm and I eventually developed incredible
control. I could throw every pitch in the book,"
he says. Today, Stone is an owner of the Tucson
Sidewinders, AAA Baseball Club Affiliate of the Arizona
Diamondbacks.

Stone says those hard times shaped his character. "It made
me very security conscious, and it drove me to try and accumulate enough wealth so that I would never have to be as
financially insecure as my parents were."

Stone says his greatest accomplishment is his family. "I have
five kids who really like and respect me, and I feel the same
about them. They're good people. There's nothing else in
my life that I enjoy taking as much credit for, and it is a
credit that my wife and I share," he says.

After graduating from Fairfax High School in 1945,
Stone attended UCLA, earning his B.A. in economics and
political science in 1948. Then he entered Loyola. "Law
school turned out to be of monumental importance to
me. It gave me credentials, but it also trained me in a way
of thinking and a way of analyzing issues that have been
vital to my business career and to the rest of my life."

As for Stone's strategy for success, he offers four words:
persistence, patience, determination and will. "I think if
you have those things you can be successful at almost
anything you do." •!•

An avid sports enthusiast, Stone prides himself on his
lifelong fitness regime that includes running, hiking,
tennis, skiing, baseball and, most recently, golf. And
even though his pro baseball ambitions were cut short by
291!-ij•lt·iLAWYERI

Loyola

Alumni and

Headline News

Mark Geragos '82, Scott Peterson's
attorney, believes Loyola plays such
prominent roles because the "type of
student who is attracted to Loyo la
comes in with certain life experiences
that lend themselves to courtroom
settings. Loyola nurtures and instills
trial advocacy unlike most law schools
that emphasize traditional Socratic
learning." He continues, "Loyola produces lawyers who are the quickest on
their feet. There is an emphasis on this
in law school, a give and take in
the classroom which translates to the
courtroom." On his role in the Peterson

Allred started the law firm, Allred,
Maroko & Goldberg along with two
other Loyola classmates. She is representing Frey because she wants to
"protect the integrity of her testimony."
Allred told the CBS News Early Show,
"Victims are entitled to attorneys, as
are witnesses. And, of course, it's
not unusual in high-profile cases for
witnesses to have attorneys to advise
them and to help explain the criminal
justice system to them."
There may not be one particular
attribute that sets Loyola Law School

THE LACI PETERSON MURDER TRIAL
By Walter Lothiam '05

atch any high-profile
criminal trial and it is
quite possible you will
see a Loyola alumnus
counseling a client. Any legal journey
begins with that first optimistic step in
law school, and the hope that there will
be a career waiting at the end of the
march. Loyola alumni are building a
solid reputation for Loyola in the courtroom. From the often-mentioned O.J.
Simpson trial to the Winona Ryder
shoplifting trial, Loyola attorneys are
playing prominent roles in high-profile
criminal cases. The Modesto-based Laci
Peterson murder trial is no different.

W

Stanley A. Goldman '75, a professor
at Loyola, is a legal editor for Fox
News Channel on the Peterson trial.
Goldman joined the Loyola facul ty
after serving as a Los Angeles County
Deputy Public Defender. He teaches
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure,
and Evidence at Loyola. His own
opinion of Loyola's involvement in
nationally recognized criminal cases
is, "We are one of the largest law
schools in the state. There is a history
of Loyola students being interested in
criminal law. The School emphasizes
court and trial advocacy, which produces
people in the trial business."
i!o$joi!·1LAWYERI 3o

Mark Geragos

Stanley Goldman

trial, Geragos told the Sacramento
Bee, "I'm facing a case where I've
been advised by everyone not to take
it-told it is career suicide, told I'm
clinically insane. Why do it? I do take
seriously the idea that you're not
supposed to turn down a case just
beca use of its notoriety."
Two other Loyola graduates also sit
on the defense side working with
Geragos. Matthew Dalton '89 is a
12-year veteran of the district attorney's
office, having handled several death
penalty cases. Nareg Gourjian '02 is a
recent graduate and is gaining valuable
experience in the Peterson trial. He is
developing his own skills as a criminal
defense lawyer.
A Loyola alumnus, Joseph Distaso '92
is senior deputy district attorney, who
along with David Harris, is prosecuting
Scott Peterson. To add more Loyola
alumni to the case, Gloria Allred '74 is
representing Amber Frey, the woman
who was allegedly having an affair with
Scott Peterson. More than 2 7 years ago,

Gloria Allred

., Loyola nurtures
and instills
trial advocacy unlike
most law schools
that emphasize
traditional Socratic
learning."
apart in the crim inal law area. But
looking at the caliber of trial attorneys
Loyola has produced, from Johnnie
Cochran, Jr. '62, Nancy Cohen '78,
and Thomas Girardi ' 64, to Walter
Lack '73, and Robert Shapiro ' 68, it is
hard not to be impressed. Whether it
is the faculty, the curriculum, or the
practical nature of a Loyola education, one thing is clear: Loyola alumni
are competent and highly sought out
as trial lawyers. •!•
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RUN, WALK OR RIDE,

AVOIDING POLICE CONTAa and THE

TH Amendment

By Stanley A. Goldman, Professor of Law

INTRODUCTION
The uniformed officer dismounted his black
and w hite motorcycle and approached the lone
male motorist whom he had just pulled over
after observing a broken tail light on the
driver's late model pickup truck. As he slowly
walked to the driver's side of the vehicle in
order to write a fix-it-ticket, he noticed the
~ occupant discreetly attempting to stuff a brown
t

~

·cc

paper bag beneath the unoccupied passenger

T

he driver, in an angry tone and with the aid of
much profanity, refused the officer's request,
responding in substance that he could not think
of any good reason why the officer would be
justified engaging in such an intrusion. The officer smiled
wryly and answered that he really didn't need permission
to enter the vehicle and search the bag. The very attempt to
conceal it from the policeman's potential view had given
him reasonable cause to believe that the driver may have
had something criminal to hide and thus provided him with
justification for a search.
The Alice in Wonderland logic of this encounter could
seemingly exist, of course, only in some alternate universe
concocted from the imagination of Lewis Carroll, or perhaps
Ray Bradbury. Why should the very act of attempting
to prevent a governmental intrusion into a private area
be the conduct which gives the police the right to invade
that very privacy?

0

a:
w

seat. Since the stop had taken place in an area

0.

IE

~ known for high drug trafficking, the officer
~
c

!

asked if the motorist would mind showing him

"'
·~

j

what he was apparently attempting to hide.

Yet, in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (200 0 ), the
Supreme Court's 5-4 decision does at least open for
debate the possibility that this type of furtive gesture
(the attempt to hide one's self or one's property from
the prying eyes of the government) ma y be usable by
the state as part of the justification for some types
of police intrusions.

~
-5
~

r
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ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW
Shortly after noon on September 9, 1995, four police
cars converged in what the officers suspected was
an area of high drug trafficking on the west side of
Chicago. The officers were there to investigate possible
illicit drug activity. The occupants of the last of these
police vehicles, Officers Nolan and Harvey, noticed
an African American man, later identified as William
Wardlow, carrying an opaque bag.
Upon seeing these last two officers arrive, Mr. Wardlow
attempted to flee the scene through a nearby alley. Though the
suspect had not appeared to be violating any laws, Officers
Nolan and Harvey briefly pursued, caught and conducted a
protective pat-down of Mr. Wardlow for weapons. Prior to
this frisk, the officers asked the suspect no questions, nor did
they state the purpose of the forcible stop.

A

s part of the pat-down, Officer Nolan squeezed
the opaque bag that the suspect was carrying
and, upon feeling a hard heavy object with a
shape similar to that of a gun, opened the bag
and discovered a .38 caliber handgun and five rounds of
live ammunition. Mr. Wardlow was arrested and, after
the .38 was successfully offered into evidence against
him, convicted by the trial court of unlawful use of a
weapon by a felon.

Crystal Stimpson , OK
"Snake Dream " acrylics

The Illinois Supreme Court
ordered the case dismissed
on the grounds that the
police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Mr.
Wardlow. In spite of the high
crime nature of the area, the
Illinois court concluded, in
the absence of reasonable
articulable susp1c1on to
detain, a pedestrian has the
right to simply ignore and
walk away from even an
attempted police stop. The
court stated that flight, such
as that of the suspect here,
was merely the exercise of
this right to walk away "at
top speed."

n reversing Illinois ' high court, the majority of
the Supreme Court declined to hold that fleeing
the police in and of itself was either sufficient or
insufficient to justify a "stop and frisk." The
Co urt, however, did conclude that based upon the
"totality of the circumstances " of the particular case

I
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before it, th e pat-down and search of the bag was
constitutionally permissible.
Brief detentions, based upon less than probable cause,
were first recognized as constitutionally permissible by
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
There, a seasoned veteran of over 30 years on the police
force observed three men acting suspiciously in a manner
which the officer, based upon his long experience,
recognized as consistent with persons on the verge of

After all, how many
of us wander
the streets carrying
non-opaque containers?
committing a robbery. In possession of this articulable
suspicion, he approached the men and inquired about
what they were doing. When they failed to respond
clearly, the officer, fearing they might be armed, patted
the outside of one suspect's clothing. Feeling a revolver,
he retrieved it. The same procedure was repeated with
respect to the other two men, resulting in the discovery
of one more weapon.
In analyzing the officer's behavior, the Court first concluded
that the Fourth Amendment does protect individuals from
being seized and patted down, just as it protects them
from being arrested or searched. Yet the Court, for the first
time, found that this type of intrusion could be justified
based upon the type of reasonable suspicion that had existed
here, even though it was less than full "probable cause." The
officer had conducted himself in conformity with constitutional
demands. The Court did warn, however, that not all suspicion
rises to the level of the "reasonable suspicion" constitutionally
required for such Terry-type "stop and frisk."
What was it then about William Wardlow's behavior that
gave the officers such "reasonable suspicion?" To what
extent is the Court's analysis of the furtive gesture of flight
analogous to, and therefore precedent for, the similar
use of other furtive acts? To answer these questions it is
first necessary to understand the basis for the Wardlow
decision. The particular circumstances of the case and

its holding can be summarized in
one short sentence: There are three
suspicious factors identified as justifying the stop and frisk: the bag,
the neighborhood, and the flight.

143, 147-48 (1984). Yet, even in
such a neighborhood, not all suspicious behavior is sufficient to permit
police detention.

T

his was made clear by the
Supreme Court in Sibron
In writing for the five-vote-majority,
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1988). In Sibron, an offiChief Justice Rehnquist noted that
cer observed the eventual defendant
the "bag" the suspect was initially
associating with a group of six to
observed to be carrying was "opaque."
Rehnquist never actually specifies
eight known drug addicts for a
that this was one of the reasons why
period of several hours. The suspect
later entered a restaurant, where he
the stop and frisk was constitutionally
started a conversation with three
permissible. Yet one cannot ignore his
other known addicts. At this point,
choice not to refer to the object by
the officer ordered him to exit the
any other term, such as shopping bag,
restaurant and told the suspect, "You
briefcase, back pack, or purse.
know
what I am after." The defendant
Arthur Keigney, MA " Bull Pen " acrylics
The exclusive reference to an "opaque
mumbled something and reached into
one of his pockets. The officer then placed his hand in that
bag" appears to have been a less-than-subtle attempt to
same pocket and recovered a quantity of heroin.
remove this object from the day-to-day commonplace and
suggest a sinister quality. The Chief Justice may be suggesting
that in an area of heavy drug trafficking, someone carrying a The officer had been unable to hear any of the conversations
non-transparent bag could be using it for the transportation
between the suspect and the alleged addicts, nor had he
observed any exchange taking place, which could ha ve
of contraband or even weapons.
been a drug transaction. The Supreme Court concluded
that the officer had failed to articulate sufficient suspicion
If indeed this fact played a part in the majority's holding, then
to justify the intrusion.
the Court's ruling would be subject to some obvious criticism.
After all, how many of us wander the streets carrying nonSimilarly, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), two
opaque containers? For example, luggage made of cellophane
has for various reasons proven not to be as popular as those police officers patrolling an area known for heavy drug
constructed of sturdier materials.
activity observed Brown, whom the officers had never seen
in the area before, and another man walking away from
each other in an alley. One of the officers, believing that
oes this then signal a new trend? Are all who
their arrival had interrupted a drug transaction, exited
carry non-translucent closed containers now to
be suspect? Perhaps the less-than-compelling their patrol car and asked Brown to identify himself and
nature of this as an element of suspicion is the
explain his presence. Brown refused and complained that
reason why, even though the majority begins by noting its
the officer had no right to stop him. As a result of police
observations and the suspect's behavior, Brown was
opaque nature, the opinion concludes without specifically
frisked . Finding nothing, the officers nonetheless arrested
listing the bag itself as one of the factors giving the
Brown under a Texas law which, at the time (though
officers the right to detain or pat-down. Clearly, this must
be viewed, at most, as only a minor contribution to the
declared unconstitutional in later cases), provided that it
was a crime to refuse an officer's request for name and
"totality of the circumstances." Rather, it is the particular
address during a "lawful" police stop.
circumstances surrounding the suspect's carrying of this
bag (such as the neighborhood and the flight) which are
Given the facts in Brown, the Supreme Court concluded
seemingly most important to the Court's holding.
that, even though the events had occurred in a high drug
trafficking area, the officers had failed to express particular
THE "HOOD"
How significant a factor is it that the defendant was stopped
conduct on Brown's part sufficient to justify their belief
in an area - the arresting officers identified as known for
that he had been engaged in criminal conduct or was
armed. The Court noted that, "the appellant's activity was
heavy drug trafficking? The high crime nature of the area in
which a suspect is observed has often played a part in
no different from the activity of other pedestrians in that
neighborhood." Though Brown's behavior may have been
justifying a police intrusion. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.

THE BAG

D
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somewhat suspect, as was the case in Sibron, it did not rise to
the level needed to allow a constitutional "stop and frisk."
Thus, in and of itself, "presence in a high crime neighborhood
is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation
to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry."
udge Alex Kozinski has expressed an even more basic
concern. He opined that the most important question
arising out of Wardlow is not whether or when the
high crime nature of an area should be taken into
consideration, but rather how its high crime nature can
be constitutionally established. U.S. v. Montero-Camargo,
208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring}:

J

Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as
a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner
of his beat as a high crime area. Police are trained
to ... look at the world with suspicious eyes. This is a
good thing .... But to rely on every cop's repertoire of
war stories to determine what is a "high crime area"
and on that basis to treat otherwise innocuous
behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion strikes
me as an invitation to trouble .... I would be most
reluctant to give police the power to turn any area
into a high crime area based on their unadorned
personal experiences.

'Police are more likely than
civilians to misinterpret
events because of their
training and past experience,'
Judge Kozinski's concerns of too readily deferring to law
enforcement intuition are apparently born out by empirical evidence, which suggests that police are often too
eager to identify as suspicious behavior which is in reality
quite innocuous.
Researchers have asked police officers and lay observers
to watch films that portray people engaging in somewhat ambiguous behaviors, and to report the number
of suspected crimes they identify as having been committed.
"They have found that when viewing such films the trained
officers .. .err more consistently in finding that crimes have
been committed, [than] do lay observers. 'Police are more
IN.loi!·1 LAWYERI36

likely than civilians to misinterpret events because of their
training and past experience,' which is directly contrary
to the operative assumptions about the deference owed
police judgments concerning reasonable suspicion." James
R. Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: The Fourth
Amendment, Probable Cause, and Reasonable Suspicion,
23 Crim. L. Bull. 49, 78-79 (1987).
The "overactive nature of police imaginations when
attempting to identify criminal behavior" was the subject
of Robert Berkeley Harper's article: Has the Replacement
of Probable Cause with Reasonable Suspicion Resulted in
the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 13, 38
(1988). He concluded that an officer's propensities to see
as suspect that which is in reality innocuous was most
likely to deprive the economically disadvantaged and
minorities of their civil liberties since they tend to populate
so-called "high crime areas."
t is thus in poorer neighborhoods, where the police
presence is likely to be greater, where the citizens'
demeanor toward the police may be interpreted as
offensive, and where the people with whom the police
interact generally lack resources and other indicia of social
power, that the police are less likely to refrain from stopping
citizens for investigation. It is in just such areas that "[a]
delicate balance must be struck between the right of the
often-victimized innocent ghetto inhabitant to adequate,
unhampered police protection and the rights guaranteed to
him under the Fourth Amendment." U.S. v. Davis, 458
F.2d. 819, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972). How then should courts
treat the nature of the neighborhood in which the suspect's
behavior is taking place when evaluating the police right to
intrude into otherwise constitutionally protected areas?

I

One federal circuit court has written that: "Although decisions
of... court[s] count tllis as a relevant factor. .. [they should be]
concerned that officers not be encouraged to attach suspicion
too readily to the activities of the residents of those neighborhoods simply because they are slum or ghetto areas." U.S. v.
Thomas, 551 F.2d 347, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Some years
later, another panel of that same circuit court elaborated on
this point by writing:
The citing of an area as 'high crime' requires
careful examination by the court, because such a
description, unless properly limited and factually
based, can easily serve as a proxy for race or
ethnicity .... We must be particularly careful to
ensure that a "high crime" area factor is not used
with respect to entire neighborhoods or communities in which members of minority groups
regularly go about their daily business.... U.S. v.
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138.

There are plenty of
suspicious things that people

do every day that
do not justify an arrest, a search,
or even a "stop and frisk."

It is thus best to use the factor of high crime area
with great caution. It should be used sparingly and
only when there are other significant circumstances
pointing to criminality. Under any lesser standard,
we run the risk of treating far differently the innocent
inhabitants of economically depressed, minority areas
than those of more affluent neighborhoods.
Is flight upon seeing the police just such a significant
circumstance which, when taken together with the high
crime nature of the area, justifies a "stop and frisk"?

THE FLIGHT
In a neighborhood fraught with illicit drug transactions, it
is clearly suspicious behavior to run upon seeing a police
officer. However, is this behavior so out of the ordinary
that it rises to the level of the suspicion legally needed to
justify an intrusion into otherwise constitutionally protected
privacy? There is in fact an even more fundamental question
presented by the Wardlow decision: When, if ever, is an
otherwise seemingly innocent individual free to turn and
flee the sight of law enforcement?
There have been hints over the years that some members
of the Court might support the conclusion that flight from
officers is by itself sufficient to justify detention for
investigation. Justice Scalia, for example, once opined in
dicta that the flight of a youth upon seeing an officer
would justify a police stop. See California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991). Similarly, Justice Kennedy
noted in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576
(1988 ) (Kennedy, J., concurring), that " unprovoked flight
gave police ample cause to stop" an otherwise unsuspicious
individual. Yet, until the majority opinion in Wardlow, no
Supreme Court case had ever held that attempting
to avoid contact with the police could justify a
constitutional intrusion such as "stop and frisk."
Continued on page 97

U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Anthony M. Kenned~
gives a lectul'e in Constitutional Law to a class at Loyola Lm•
School during his visit in September 2002 .

During the evening of the Grand Reunion
in April, Dean David W. Burcham '84
presented Loyola Law School's
"DISTINGUISHED ALUMNI AWARDS "

THEdR
.
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eunton

for 2003 to the Honorable Kathryn

April10, 2003- Wilshire Grand Hotel

Doi Todd '70 and Thomas J. Nolan '75.
Judge Doi Todd of the California Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District.
Nolan is managing partner of Howrey,
Simon, Arnold and White in Los Angeles,
and specializes in antitrust, intellectual
property, securities litigation
and white-collar criminal defense.

On the same evening as the Grand Reunion, the Alumni Association
"Board of Governors Recognition Awards" for 2003 were presented
at an awards ceremony to: [I to r] Brian Nutt '83 of Thon, Beck, Vanni,
Phillipi & Nutt; Cristina Armenta '94 of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flam LLP; Patricia D. Phillips '67 of Morrison & Foerster LLP; and Robert
A. Cooney, former associate dean for business affa irs-pictured here w ith
Dean David W Burcham '84 (e).

During the even ing of the
Grand Reunion, members of the
Class of 1953 were recognized .
The g rad uates celebrated the
sorb anniversary of their graduation
from Loyo la Law Schoo l, whic h
was known during their student
years as Loyola University
School of Law.
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Professor Richard Epstein, the James Parker Hail
D istinguished Service Professor at the Universitjj
of Chicago and a Fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, presented a
workshop before the faculty at Loyola La1
School in early February on the copyrigh
extension act-as part of the law
Technology Distinguished Speakers Series
Epstein, w ho holds degrees from Columbia
Oxford and Yale, is known for research an
writing in a broad range of constitutional
economic, historic and ph ilosophical subjects.

The Robinson Family Courtroom, located
in the newly completed Albert H. Girardi
Advocacy Center, was ho me to its first " real
world" trial in January 16, 2003. While moe
trials, classes a nd speaking events arc the usua
fare for the newly completed courtroom, thi
time Loyola Law School was
honored to host the sire for an
aU-day session of the California
Court of Appeal, complete with
research attorneys, bailiffs and
clerks. Presiding were rh
Honorable Daniel Curry '60
Norman Epstein, J. Gary Hastings
and Charles Vogel.

"Religious Law and the Other:
How Do Religious Laws Deal with
Outsiders?" was the topic of a
panel held at Loyola Law School in
February. Teresa Watanabe of the
Los A~tgeles Times served as moderator. Among the three panelists was
Rabbi Yitchok Adlerstein (pictured),
who presented his perspectives on
religious law from the Jewish tradition. Adlerstein, who is an adjunct
professor at Loyola and holds the
Law School's Chair in Jewish Law,
and is director of the Jewish Studies
Institute, Yeshiva of Los Angeles and
Simon Wiesenthal Center.

Religious Law
& THE OTHER

Dean's

The " Religious Law
and the Other" panel
also was comprised of
two local religious law
scholars: Professor
Charles Frazee (I) of the
Department of Religious
Studies at California
State University,
Fullerton, and Mairaj
Syed of Islamic Studies
atUCLA (R ).

CHAIR

On April 15, 2003, the founding of the Fritz B. Burns Dean and Professor of
law Chair was officially observed. Dean David W. Burcham '84 [r] is the
first dean to hold the Chair. The endowment of the dean position
strengthens Loyola Law School's ability to attract the most qualified and
talented academic leaders to serve in this vital position. The Fritz B.
Burns Foundation, which endowed the Chair, was represented during the
evening by W.K. Skinner [2nd I] and Joseph E. Rawlinson '58, president
[3'd 1]. Dean Burcham and Robert B. Lawton, S.J., president of Loyola
Marymount University [I], in thankful recognition of the gift, presented
the members of the Foundation with the Sedes Sapicntiae Medallion.
The medallion honors the donors of endowed chairs.

Los Angeles C hi ef o f Po li ce William ]. Bratton [lj was th e specia l guest of D ean David W.
Burcham ' 84 [c [ at the annual D ea n's Forum Dinner honoring Lo yola's notable donors, held
la st February at The California C lub. Chief Bratton oversees the operations of one of the largest
major municipal law enforcement agencies in th e United States . During the evening, Alumnu s
Dennis B. Kass '88 I r [ w as na med Loyola Law School 's "Trial lawyer of the Year" for 2003 .
He is a foundin g pa rtn er of M a nning & Marder, Kass, Ell rod and R a mirez LLP in Los Angel es,
a la w firm well -kn own in the community for its support of rh e Los Ange les Police Department.
In recent yea rs, Kass has received numero us hon o rs for hi s tri a l s kill s, including th e " 2001
California Lawye r Atto rn ey o f the Year for Litiga tion " a nd the" 1999 IASIU So uthern California
Chapter Defense Attorney o f the Yea r. "

Dean's Forutn

DINNER

Lloyd Greif '84 and
John E. Anderson ' 50
at the Dean's
Forum dinner.

In early February, International law Weekend - West 2002 was held at Loyola Law School for
the first time. [I] Professor of Law Laurence Helfer, who teaches copyrigbt, torts and international
law at Loyola, co-chaired the conference along with Professor William Aceves [r] of California
Western School of Law. David ]. Scheffer [c] gave the keynote address. Scheffer is senior vice
president of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and former U.S.
ambassador-at-large for war crimes. The biennial conference brings together legal practitioners
and academics to discuss cutting-edge issues in public and private international law. The panelists,
who addressed a wide-range of issues emphasizing the impact of globalization on the practice of
law, included attorneys from Morrison & Foerster, LLP; Munger Tolles & Olson; and Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan.
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Serving as the
advocates were
students from the
California Institute
of Technology in
Pasadena.

PATENTING

a Human Genome
Program for Law & Technology
in association with California Institute ofTechnology.

The Program for Law & Technology at
Loyola Law School and the California Institute
of Technology presented the 4th Annual
"At the Crossroads Conference" on November
1, 2002. The conference, "Patenting a Human
Genome," was comprised of a mock trial on
appeal before the Supreme Court of the United
States: Salvadore Dolly v. Nugenera, Inc.
Members of the judiciary presiding were the
Honorable Kim Wardlaw, and the Honorable Alex
Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, and Associate Justice
Ming W. Chin of the California Supreme Court.

Lawyer
Alumnus Michael Casey '80 looked straight into the jaws of death late
last year-literally. The avid surfer was waiting for the next big wave on
Thanksgiving morning, 2002, while he floated about 150 yards offshore
near his home in Santa Rosa. While Casey's fin-shod legs dangled in the
near-freezing water, a 16-foot Great White circled slowly beneath. "All of
a sudden, from out of nowhere, I got slammed with an incredible force,"
he recalled. The next thing he remembered was seeing "the open jaws, a
fin-and lots of blood." Although the shark bit Casey, luckily for him it
backed off. "I saw it withdraw from my leg and go underneath the water."
Reports confirm that Casey's experience follows the typical shark-attack
pattern: they bite their victim, back off and then wait for the victim to die
in order to finish the job. However, Casey avoided such a horrific ending as
several nearby surfers helped him make it safely to shore. Scared? Naw!
The private-practice attorney and Santa Rosa deputy city attorney remains
undaunted. He recently returned from surf expeditions in Hawaii and Costa
Rica. ''I'm absolutely passionate about surfing," he insists.

law Day was held on the Loyola law
School campus on April 30, 2003.

Law Day

The event began with
mass, celebrated by
Patrick]. Cahalan,
S.J., (l) chancellor of
Loyola Marymowlt
University.

AT LOYOLA

St. Tbomas More Society is co-chaired by Dean David W.
Burcham '84; [pictured I to r] Gerald T. Mclaughlin, professor of law and dean emeritus; tbe Honorable Lawrence
Waddington, retired, Los Angeles Superior Court; and
Roger M. Sullivan '52 of Sullivan, Workman & Dee.
Recently, the Society was honored by the Los Angeles
Archdiocese for its dedication to the law and to the Church.

Following mass, Douglas W. Kmiec, a St. Thomas More professor of law at
Catholic University of America, spoke on, "Can a Catholic Serve in Public
Office-What Would Thomas Say? " The annual event is planned by the St.
Thomas More Red Mass Committee in conjunction with the Los Angeles Law
Day Red Mass- a citywide event held each fall at Our Lady of the Angels
Cathedral in downtown Los Angeles.

This past spring, Loyola Law School's
Black Law Students Association (BLSA) Moot
Court Team was named the 2003 National
Black Law Students Association Western
Region Champions. The team is pictured
here with Dean David W. Burcham '84
Q, front] and Professor Gary Williams, coach.
The team participated successfully in two
competitions. 0 to r] Zakiya Glass and
Elizabeth Powell served as witnesses for the trial
advocacy competition. In the Thurgood
Marshall Mock Trial Competition, Charlyn
M. Bender and Emabn Counts won First Place. In the Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition,
Second Place was taken by Jamon R. Hicks and Jasmine]. Watkins; and First Place and Best Brief
was taken by Danielle M. Butler (Best Oral Advocate) and Kristi E. Belcher '03.

The 82nd Commencement Ceremony for Loyola Law School
was held on May 18, 2003 at the Loyola Marymount University
campus in Westchester. More than 6,000 friends and family
attended the festivities and witnessed the conferral of nine master
of laws in taxation, 10 juris doctor/master of business administration and 43 7 juris doctor degrees; more students graduate &om
Loyola Law School than any other law school in the Western
United States. Presiding over the ceremonies were to r) David W.
Burcham ' 84, dean of Loyola Law School; the Honorable Ming W.
Chin, associate justice, California Supreme Court-who delivered
the commencement address before the Class of 2003; and Robert
B. Lawton, S.J., presideot of Loyola Marymount University.

n

Commencement

2003

Graduating members of the Black Law Students
Association {BLSA) celebrated the conclusion of
their law studies at Loyola Law School with an
on-campus graduation party on May 17-the
day prior to Commencement 2003 . Pictured are
graduates 0tor) ComeU D. Crosby '03, Kristi E.
Belcher '03, Cherri-Marie Jones '03, Marsha A.
Fowles '03, Windy L. Watson '03, Monica D.
\Villiams '03, and Alvan A. Arzu '03.

Ethical
Advocacy
Program
LECTURES
ESTABLISHED

La Raza de Loyola held its annual graduation party the day prior to
Commencement 2003. This year, the student organization honored
alumnus jess J. Araujo '76 for his suppott of Loyola Law School
and his dedication to the greater Los Angeles Latino community.
Araujo, pictured here with new graduates Carmen Vasquez '03 OJ
and Nadia ChinchiUa '03 [r], is a partner at DiMarco, Araujo &
Montevideo in Santa Ana.

Book Reviews
JONATHAN KIRSCH '76

Kirsch is the author of the bestselling King
David: The Real Life of the Man Who Ruled Israel,
a biography published by Ballantine Books
that addresses one of the most crucial and
controversial figures in the Hebrew Bible. King
David shows David to be a compelling but
disturbingly complex man who was also a
voracious lover, a troubled father, and a merciless warrior. Kirsch also recently wrote Moses:
A Hero for Our Time and The Harlot By the Side
of the Road. A columnist and book critic for the
Los Angeles Times, and literary correspondent
for National Public Radio affiliate KPCC -FM,
Kirsch is in private practice with the law firm of
Kirsh & Mitchell, where he specializes in intellectual property issues.

JOHNNIE l. COCHRAN, JR. '62

Several events marked the opening of
the new Albert H. Girardi Advocacy Center
in September 2002, including the inauguration
of two lecture series now an integral part
of Loyola Law School's Ethical Advocacy
Program: the Stephen E. O'Neil Memorial
Lecture and the William J. Landers
Lecture. At the O'Neil Lecture, the Honorable
Ronald M. George [pictured above], chief
justice of the California Supreme Court, gave
the address, "Judicial independence."

At the Landers Lecture, the Honorable Stephen S. Trott of the United States
inth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the address, "Prosecutorial Ethics."

Alumnus Dwayne A. Anderson '02 [r), pictured
here with Dean David W. Burcham '84, was
among 41 graduates from the Class of 2002 who
last December were inducted into the prestigious
Order of the Coif-the national legal honor society. Students qualify by attaining a cumulative
grade point average that places them within the
top 10 percent of their graduating class.

His second book, A Lawyer's Life, looks at a
slice of Cochran's fascinating background,
including a look into the reasons behind his
intense passion for advocacy. A Lawyer's Life
details some of the procedural changes and
famous key cases that Cochran was instrumental in implementing. Included are chapters
detailing the Reginald Denny case and Mincey
~ City of Los Angeles, a case that effectively
put a stop to the brutal police chokehold. Plus,
Cochran's work in other police brutality cases
is included, involving plaintiffs such as Abner
Louima, Amadou Diallo, Patrick Dorismond
and Ron Settles. A Lawyer's Life is co-authored
by David Fisher and is available from St.
Martin's Press.

YXTA MAYA MURRAY, Professor of Law

Yxta Maya Murray, a previous winner of the
Whiting Award for publishing, has come
out with a new novel entitled The Conquest,
published by Rayo. A mystery and a love story,
The Conquest is also a story within a story. It
focuses on the life of Sara Gonzales, a restorer
of rare books and manuscripts for the J. Paul
Getty Museum. Sara is bent on answering
the unsolved mystery of authorship of a 16th
century manuscript about the scandal behind
an Aztec princess captured by Cortes and sent
to Europe to entertain the Pope. Sara is in
love with Karl, with whom she had an affair
spanning years-even while she is married
to another and must face the societal pressures and moral dilemma caused by loving
the two men.

I u mn i

Newsworthy & N otableJ

Law students from across the nation participate
each July and August in Loyola Law School's
Summer Abroad Program, co-sponsored with the
Brooklyn Law School in New York. Participants
select one of three destinations: Beijing, China,
Costa Rica or Bologna, Italy. During Summer
Session 2002, law students took memorable
breaks away from their studies at Beijing's prestigious University of International Business and
Economics to visit notable sites such as T ian'ann1en
Square and The Great WaU [pictured].

Summer Abroad
PROGRAM

LOYOlA lAW SCHOOL
lOS ANGElES, CAliFORNIA

7;.:;<•: Cancer Legal Resource Center

Thousand and

$10' 000

I

OO/ IOO """""'

~ 'Dru6(e 'Bt'Be~t

, 'K>!i

Amy V. Silverman '87 [center] and husband Robert A. Cooney-for
whom Loyola's annual golf tournament is named-presented a check in
the amount of $10,000 to the Cancer Legal Resource Center. The Center's
Director Barbara Ullman Schwerin '87 gratefully accepted the gift, which
will help fund the Center's office expenses and the staffing of its telephone
assistance line and community outreach.

In mid-January, Loyola Law School held
its annua l, on-campus Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. Celebration. Professor Samuel
Pillsbury of Loyola Law School, who
has closely studied Dr. King's career,
gave the presentation, "The Rev. Kiug
and Our Call to Justice." In his talk,
Pillsbury discussed the religious aspect
of King's public work and its significance
for lawyers today.

Professor Laurie Levenson, director of the
Center for Ethical Advocacy, held a networking
reception in her home this past April for alumni
working in the District Anorney's Office. More
than 50 Loyola Law School graduates and their
co-workers anended.

Linda Sue Hitchens, '82, of Long Beach joins U.S.
Supreme Coun Justice Sandra Day 0' Connor at
the national leadership conference in Philadelphia.
Ms. Hitchens represented the Joseph BaU, Clarence
Hunt hm of Court of Long Beach. Approximately
220 lawyers and judges attended the conference
from around the country.

In honor of Black History Month, the Black Law Students Association (Bl.SA) invited the Loyola Law
School community for conversation with the Reverend James Lawson [err], who spoke on "Spirituality,
Non-violence and the Pursuit of Justice." Lawson, pictured here with Professor Gary Williams [l] and
evening law student Helen Ekeke [r], worked with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the South during the
1960s as a leader in the civil rights movement.

Ln the tradition of bringing notable attorners
to campus to address students on careers in
the law, the Student Bar Association (SBA)
honored Black History Month by hosting the
visit of Carl Douglas, a prominent Los Angeles
civil and cri minal defense lawyer. Douglas is
a former associate of Loyola's own grad uate,
Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. ' 62.

Remembered
CHARLES R. REDMOND '74, a retired executive
vice president of the Times Mirror Co. and former vice
chairman and chief financial officer of the Board
of Governors of the Los Angeles Music Center, died of
cancer September 30, 2001, at the age of 75. Redmond,
who retired in 1992, joined Times Mirror in 1964 as
corporate director of personnel. He was president and
chief executive of the Times Mirror Foundation until
1995 and chairman of the Pfaffinger Foundation, which
assists needy former Times Mirror employees. Redmond

also served as vice chairman of the board of trustees
of Loyola Marymount University and chairman of its
finance committee, and served on several boards-for such
organizations as the Salvation Army and the Los Angeles
Convention and Vistors Bureau. Born in New Brunswick,
New Jersey on September 19, 1926, Redmond earned his
bachelor's degree in Economics cum laude from Rutgers
College in 1950, his master of business administration
from the University of Southern California in 1960, and
his juris doctor from Loyola Law School in 1974.

JOHN J. GUERIN '49, born March 26, 1926, passed
away on May 20, 2003. Guerin was born in Los
Angeles. Following high school, he was drafted into
the U.S. Navy officer's training program in June 1946,
and was sent to the University of Colorado. Guenn
then joined the U.S. Army in 1950, and the Air Force 15
years later. He was honorably discharged from all three
branches. As WWII ended, he returned to Los Angeles
and attended Loyola Law School, the second generation
of his family to attend. Guerin married and moved to

Alumna Ami V. Silvennan '87 is the
spouse of fom1er Associate Dean
Robert A. Cooney, who recently
retired following more than 20 years
of service to Loyola Law School.
Under Cooney's watch, the campus
was transformed from a single structure (d1e William M. Rains Building)
into the academic village designed by
frank 0. Gehry.

Swearing

IN PROGRAM

Update

by Walter Lothian

Orange County is home to a growing network of Loyola lawyers. There are
currently more than 1,374 Loyola alumni living and working in Orange
County. A recent Loyola graduate, Ali Jahangiri '02, has planted himself
in the growing Orange County market. Although Jahangiri has just started
his professional career, he is no stranger to the area. He attended UC Irvine
as an undergraduate, and while attending Loyola he worked at Heart
Savers, a diagnostic imaging center in Irvine. Jahangiri is an associate at
Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, the second largest law firm in Orange
County, specializing in corporate and securities law.

Alikian Jahangiri

With its excellent quality of life and diverse career opportunities, Orange County has great potential for
young lawyers. Jahangiri encourages new lawyers to look at Orange County as an alternative to the
saturated Los Angeles market. Jahangiri explains, "Orange County is the next big metropolitan area, due
to a booming real estate market and the number of large companies based there. Young lawyers have a
chance to establish themselves with a firm and grow as the county grows."
The network of Loyola lawyers in Orange County is well established and highly visible. At Jahangiri's
firm, 20 out of the 107 attorneys are Loyola alumni, including head of the corporate department
Michael E. Flynn '85 and head of the life sciences department Lawrence B. Cohn '84. At the
Orange County O'Melveny & Myers offices, more than 10 percent of the 70 lawyers are from Loyola,
including two partners at the Newport Beach office.

Victor Gold, associate dean for
academic affairs, welcomed new

attorneys and their family members
and friends to Loyola Law School
for the Swearing-In Ceremony
held on December 4, 2002.
The annual ceremony marks the

Gary J. Singer '77 has been practicing law in Orange County for more than 20 years. A native of the
area, Singer received his undergraduate degree from UC Irvine. After graduating from Loyola in 1977,
Singer began his legal career at O'Melveny & Myers in Los Angeles. Just a few years later. Singer helped
establish the O'Melveny & Myers office in Newport Beach. He is now a managing partner of two Orange
County offices, specializing in corporate, business and securities law.
The most appealing qualities of Orange County, Singer believes, are growth and diversity. "It is a
great place to live and raise a family, and it offers a truly stimulating work environment. The legal
opportunities are cutting edge, and Orange County offers businesses at all stages of their life
cycle-from new startups and entrepreneurs to sophisticated companies. There are a wide variety
of clients, in size as well as industry."

momentous transformation from

law graduate to lawyer. Members of
the dais included: [I tor] Associate Dean Gold; Fr. Robert Scholla, S.J., campus chaplain,
who gave the invocation; Professor Theodore P. Seto, who extended congratulations
to the new attorneys on behalf of the faculty; the Honorable Carol Williams Elswick
'83 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, who gave the judicial address; Hon. Carla M.
Woehrle '77; the Honorable Tomson T. Ong '83 of the Los Angeles Superior Court,
who administered the state oath; Dean David W. Burcham '84, who gave the keynote
address; and the Honorable John V. Meigs '78, president of the 2002-03 Alumn i
Association Board of Governors, who extended congratulations.

"Perspectives on a Just War.
Reflections from the Faculty,"
was the subject of a panel held
in November 2002. Moderated
by Professor Edith Friedler (err.),
the panelists included (front)
Professor Gerald T. McLaughlin,
dean emerirus, !Friedler] and Professor Jeffrey Atik; and (back) Professor Allan Ides,
Professor Robert Benson and Robert Scholla, S.J., campus chaplain.

Huntington Beach in 1965, where he established a
private practice on Pacific Coast Highway. He and his
wife had 10 children. Guerin has been published in
the California Appellate Reports, changing the law 46
times. He celebrated his 50th year of active law practice
in June of 1999, at which time he received a "John
Guerin Day" proclamation from Peter Green, the mayor
of Huntington Beach.

Dean David \V.I. Burcham '84 prcsenred
the H onorable Judith M. Ryan 70 with
Loyola Law School's 2003 "Orange
County Distinguished Alumni of the
Year" award last February in Ncwporr
Beach, Cal if. Ryan is an arbitrator/
mediatOr for Judicial Arbitration and
~lediarion Services. She ser\'Cd on rhc
Orange County Superior Courr from
1982-89, afrcr serving one year on rhc
\'Vest Orange Coumy Municipal Court.
Prior to her appointment ro the bench,
she was legal advisor ro rhe Sanra
Ana Police Department and corporate
counsel for Hunr-\X'esson Foods.

Loyola Orange County Wine Society · If the quality of life and career opportunities do not
persuade Loyola graduates to consider the Orange County market, then there is always the wine.
Nineteen alumni attended the first meeting of the Loyola Orange County Wine Society, held at the
Golden Truffle in Costa Mesa. David W. Burcham '84 was among the attendees enjoying the theme
of 1994 and 1995 California cabernets. Daniel Sonenshine '98, an associate at Paul Hastings
in Costa Mesa, planned the event. The group's second dinner, at Pascal's in Orange County, was
themed French burgundy versus Oregon pi not nair. The group plans to meet a minimum of two or
three times a year and would like to expand their membership.

AlBERT H. GIRARDI, passed away on February 6, 2003,
at the age of 92. Girardi was an electrical engineer for
more than 30 years. His work took him to the South
Pacific during WWII as a civilian aboard naval ships and
carriers. Girardi retired at age 65, but for the next 27
years he helped his sons Tom Girardi '64 and John (Jack)
Girardi '72, as office manager for their law firm of Girardi
& Keese. Albert's grandson, Matthew Girardi, continued
the family tradition by graduating from Loyola in 2000. The
Girardi family made possible the new 15, 141·square-foot

advocacy center, which opened on September 23, 2002.
The Center was named for Mr. Girardi by his oldest son
Tom, who noted, "He did everything for me. He wanted
me to be a lawyer."

The Future of
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in the Hands of the

j___fu~ll(wJ..b ild..1ll Supreme Court

By Richard l. Hasen, Professor of law and William M. Rains Fellow

In the Winter 2001 issue of Loyola Lawyer,
I wrote an article entitled "The Campaign Finance
Mess." The article discussed how complex and
convoluted campaign finance law has become.
It also noted that major issues in the fieldincluding rules related to campaign finance
disclosure, soft money and issue advocacy-were
the subject of conflicting (and confusing) court
opinions and scholarly commentary.
he Supreme Court has agreed to decide its
most important campaign finance case of a
generation this fall. In McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, No. 02-1674 (and 11 consolidated cases), probable jurisdiction noted June 5, 2003,
the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (or "BCRA"), more
commonly known as the McCain-Feingold law. It has set
a special argument date of September 8, 2003, a mond1 before
- the Court normally returns from recess for arguments on ilie
First Monday in October.
• Whether the Court's opinion in McConnell will replace the
complex, convoluted, conflicting and confusing world of

campaign finance law with clarity does not appear likely.
But the ramifications of the Court's decision could set off
a political earthquake.

LOWER COURT CONFUSION
Pursuant to expedited procedures set forth in the BCRA
itself, the Supreme Court will be reviewing directly
a lower court decision by a special three-judge panel
of two district court judges a nd one Court of Appeals
judge from the D.C. Circ uit. The lower court panel
was so split on the constitutionality of the law's major
provisions that the three judges issued four opinions: one
opinion was a per curiam (uns igned) opinion concurred
in by two of the three judges. The four opinions totaled
1,638 pages, and featured a five-page chart that was
supposed to clarify how a shifting majority of the lower
court had ruled on the many constitutional challenges
brought by about 80 plaintiffs.
The chart and opinions were so confusing that it took days
to sort it out. The day after the opinion was issued, a San
Francisco Chronicle hea dline proclaimed: "Co urt Kills
Ban on Soft Money," while a Los Angeles Times headline
anno unced: "Soft Money Ban Upheld." In a sense, they
were both right. A majority of the Court had voted to
uphold certain provisions of the BCRA's ban on formerly
unregulated funds raised by political parties, but it did so
in a way that made the ban easy to evade.
Within days, the three-judge court had stayed its own
ruling, with the effect being that the BCRA went back
into effect, even those provisions struck down by all three
4Si!t$"lt)!'J LAWYERI

judges on the court (such as a ban on campaign
contributions to federal candidates by minors). Chief Justice
Rehnquist declined to reverse the stay order pending the
Supreme Court's resolution of the appeal, leaving the law
in effect until the Supreme Court issues its final ruling on
the case, most likely in late fall or early winter.
The issues presented in McConnell would be difficult
enough for the Supreme Court even if it had to review a
unanimous (and shorter!) opinion from the lower court.
But the review is complicated by the lack of factual
findings joined in by a majority of the lower court judges.
The Supreme Court does not defer to legal decisions made
by lower courts, but it is supposed to accept findings by
lower courts unless the findings are "clearly erroneous."

Moreover, although individuals were limited to how much
they could contribute to political parties to pay for express
advocacy by the parties, there was no limit to the amount
of "soft money" that individuals, corporations or unions
could contribute to pay for party issue advocacy and other
activiti es. Six and sometimes even seven-figure donations
flowed to the political parties.

B

CRA attempts to limit the amount of soft money
that can be raised by parties, and seeks to redefine
what counts as an election ad for purposes of
disclosure rules and the corporate and union
restrictions. At the heart of the McConnell case is the
extent to which BCRA's attempts run afoul of the First
Amendment's rights of free speech and association.

... let us hope that the Court does not feel compelled to review
the over 100,000 pages of evidence in the case from the beginning.
Here, there are no majority findings on a number of
issues; let us hope that the Court does not feel compelled
to review the over 100,000 pages of evidence in the case
from the beginning.

WHAT IS AT STAKE
IN THE BCRA LITIGATION
The two largest constitutional issues involve BCRA's
provisions regulating soft money and sham issue advocacy.
Briefly explained, lower courts had interpreted the Supreme
Court's last earth-shattering campaign finance case, Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so as to leave unregulated
campaign advertisements run near the time of an election,
but lacking words of "express advocacy" such as "vote for"
or "defeat." These advertisements would typically criticize
a candidate and end not with "Vote against Smith," but
instead with something like "Call Smith, and tell her what
you think of her plan to ruin Medicare."
dvertisements using express advocacy were
subject to disclosure rules, and could not be
run using corporate or labor union money.
(Corporations and unions could set up special
PACs to pay for these advertisements with donations from
others.) Identical advertisements lacking express advocacy
were characterized as "issue advocacy" and not subject to
any disclosure rules or the corporate/labor restrictions.
The amount of unregulated issue advocacy rose from
approximately $135 to $150 million in the 1995-96
election cycle to between $230 million and $341 million
during the 1997-98 period and to over $500 million 111
the 2000 election cycle.
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A CAMPAIGN FINANCE EARTHQUAKE?
Judging from other recent campaign finance decisions, the
Supreme Court is closely divided on the constitutional questions presented in McConnell. If the Court does not uphold
BCRA's attempt to regulate these "issue advertisements,"
it may be all but impossible to have effective campaign
finance laws on the federal, state or local level. Entities
could simply avoid even disclosing their expenses intended
to influence elections by avoiding words of express advocacy. Without effective disclosure, all other campaign finance
laws are unworkable.
The issues before the Court are difficult and the law is
complex. The questions go to the heart of disputes about
the role money can and should play in the structuring of
our ru les for democratic competition. May the government,
in the name of preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption, require effective disclosure of campaign
finances? May it effectively limit large contributions by
individuals to political parties for advertisements intended
to influence elections? May it confine corporate and union
involvement in election financing to separate PACs?
We may soon find out. Then again, we may not. Check the
headlines the day after the Supreme Court issues McConnell
and see if anyone has figured it out yet. •!•

Richard L. Hasen is professor of law and William M. Rains Fellow
at Loyola Law School. A nationally recognized expert in election law
and campaign finance regulation, Hasen is the co-author of a lead ing
casebook on election law and co-editor of the qu arterl y peer-reviewed
publication, Election Law journal.
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With interest rates low and the real estate market booming, many people

Helping Your
Law School:

REAL
ESTATE
GIFTS

are finding that their real estate holdings are becoming more valuable.
Other investments may be down, but real estate values are rising. This has
created an unusual opportunity for using a building, raw land or even
a vacation property to fulfill one's philanthropic dreams. For example,
taxable property that has appreciated in value can be given without
incurring tax on the appreciation . Thus, the value of the gift may be
substantially more than it might be were the property first sold and
the after-tax proceeds then given to charity.

f you have appreciated real
estate-especially property you
are no longer using-you may
want to consider the benefits of
using this asset to make a charitable
gift. There are several ways you can
proceed; here are four possibilities
to consider:

I

1. Give the Entire Property
Since Loyola Law School is a qualified
charitable organization, it can sell real
estate gifts without incurring tax on
the appreciation. For example, in 1980,
Mr. and Mrs. X purchase a piece of
land for $10,000. It was recently
appraised at $50,000. If they sell it,
they will have to pay tax on the
appreciation. However, if they give
the deed to Loyola, they will be free
of the tax and also escape the hassles
of having to sell the property. They
will also receive a charitable income
tax deduction for the appraised value
of the property.
2. Give a Portion
of the Property
Many people cannot afford to give an
entire parcel of real estate, but they
can give part of it. A good solution is
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to give an undivided interest in the

property, say 50 percent. Loyola then
works with the donor to market and
sell the property. Each party-the donor
and Loyola-then receives one-half of
the proceeds from the sale. A bonus
for the donor is that he or she can use
the income tax charitable deduction
for the gift portion to help offset any
taxes due on the other portion.
3. Give the Property
and Obtain Income
Some real estate owners need
additional income. Yet they also want
to make a major charitable gift to
Loyola Law School. One possibility is
to use real estate to establish a charitable trust. The trustee will then sell
the property and invest the proceeds
in a balanced portfolio that will
provide income to the donors for as
long as they live. After they are gone,
whatever is left in the trust will go
to Loyola Law School.

There are several advantages to doing
this and it may be just the thing if
you have appreciated property, need
additional income and want to help
Loyola in the process.

4. Give Your House and
Continue to Live There
Some donors want to make a major
gift to Loyola Law Schoo l by
giving their homes. However, they
still need a place to live, so they
arrange what is called a life estate
gift. This simply means that they
give their residence to Loyola, obtain
a charitable income tax deduction
and retain the right to live there as
long as they want. This arrangement
removes the property from their
estate and relieves them or their
personal representatives from having
to dispose of the house later.
Free Information
Would you like additional information
on giving real estate to Loyola Law
School? We have a free brochure we
would be happy to send you. Also, Joan
Pohas, our director of planned giving, is
available to talk with yo u confidentially
and without obligation. She can help
you understand the various options
and, if you decide to proceed, assist you
in completing your gift. Call Joan Pohas
at 310.338.3068. •!•
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Loyola

Board of Overseers
Works Diligently Toward Goals for Law School
By Elizabeth Fry,

Senior Development Officer

T

he Loyola Law School Board of Overseers was
formed originally in 1982 as the Board of
Visitors and was chaired by John E. Anderson
'50 of Kindel & Anderson. The current board
of 40 members is composed of preeminent attorneys,
prominent alumni, and corporate and civic leaders from
the legal and business communities. Board members serve
as advisors to the dean of the Law School, and when
called upon, give generously of their time and resources
to assist in developing and implementing the ideals and
principles upon which Loyola Law School was founded.
Members meet twice annually with Dean Burcham and
the de ve lopment staff to strategize on the overall fundraising efforts of the Law School, including capital needs
and the accompanying public and community relations.
They are strategically involved with the selection and
cultivation of individuals, corporations and foundations

JOHN ANDERSON, SR. 'SO
Topa Equities, LTD.

JANET T. DAVIDSON '78
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker

SETH A. ARONSON '81
O'Melveny & Myers LLP

CRAIG J. deRECAT '82
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips

ROBERT C. BAKER '71
Baker, Keener & Nahra LLP

GILBERT DREYFUSS '53
Gilbert Dreyfuss, Incorporated

BRIAN K. BRANDMEYER '62
Brandmeyer and Stanton

LLOYD GREIF '84
Greif & Company

that will substantially support the Law School. "I am
confident that the leadership of this board will inspire others
to work diligently toward achieving our goals for Loyola,"
Dean Burcham states. "In addition to being very encouraged
about our progress to date, I am particularly delighted with
the active role the Board of Overseers is taking in helping
the law school reach its goal of national preeminence as an
academic legal institution."
Members of the Board are invited to social and special events
pertaining to Loyola Law School and in conjunction with
Loyola Marymount University. "I appreciate all of the members
for offering to serve and play a more active role on the board.
We have some hard work ahead of us, but I am sure we all
feel that it is well worth our time," says James P. Lower '68,
chair of the 2003-04 Board: •!•

STUART LINER '87
liner, Yankelevitz, Sunshine,
and Regenstreif, llP

NICHOLAS P. SAGGESE '80
Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom

JAMES P. LOWER '68, Chair
Hanna and Morton LLP

PETER N. SCOLNEY
Feldsted & Scolney

LIAM E. MCGEE '84

DANIEL A. SEIGEL '68
Daniel A. Seigel Investments

President

GREGORY BREEN
Candle Corporation

FINBAR M. HILL
Irish Counsel

TIM C. BRUINSMA '73
Fulbright & Jaworski

ELBERT T. HUDSON '53
law Office of Elbert T. Hudson

ANDREW M. CAMACHO
Camacho, Incorporated

WILLIAM D. JENNEIT '58
Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett

H. BRUCE CARTER '89
Anaheim Sports Incorporated

LOUIS J. KNOBBE '59
Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear

NANCY SHER COHEN '78
Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe LLP

BERNARD E. LESAGE '74
Buchalter. Nemer. Fields & Younger

SANDRA M. COMRIE
Comrie & Associates

MICHAEL J. LIGHTFOOT
lightfoot. Vandevelde, Sadowsky,
Medvene & levine

HON. DANIEL A. CURRY '60
Court of Appeal

Bank of America California
ANTHONY MURRAY '64
loeb & loeb
RUTH 0. PHELPS '75
Phelp~ Schwarz & Phelps
PATRICIA PHILLIPS '67
Morrison & Foerster
JOSEPH E. RAWLINSON '58
Fritz B. Burns Foundation
REX J. RAWLINSON '74
Rawlinson & Ewen
HON. MANUEL REAL '51
United States District Court

ROMAN M. SILBERFELD '74
Robin~ Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi
SHEILA P. SONENSHINE '70
RSM Equico
RICHARD L. STACK '73
Darling, Hall & Rae
ROGER M. SULLIVAN '52
Sullivan, Workman & Dee
GREGORY B. THORPE '82
O'Melveny & Myers UP
TIMOTHY J. WHEELER '78
Green, Broillet, Pan ish & Wheeler

DAVID A. ROSEN '81
Rose, Klein & Marias
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things
thought
you knew about Religion
and the Constitution
you

By Kurt T. lash, Professor of law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow

There probably is no other area of law in which more
people are both absolutely sure and absolutely wrong
about what the law demands than in the area of
constitutional religious freedom.

T

his may be due in part to certain misconceptions about the
original meaning of the Constitution. It is almost certainly
due in part to a dramatic shift in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
In this essay I will address the three most common misconceptions
about law and religion and conclude with a short summary of the
Court's current approach to matters of church and state.

MISCONCEPTION #1: THE ORIGINAL ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE PREVENTS RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS
Wrong. The original Establishment Clause was meant to protect
religious establishments.
It is common place to read in newspaper opinion pages essays extolling
the Founders' desire for a land of religious freedom-a land where the
government favored no religion over another and no one was forced
to support any particular form of religion. To this end, the essayist
!!ofl•if·1LAWYERISO

generally claims, the Founders adopted the religion clauses
of the First Amendment that declare that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Thus, concludes the
essay, the First Amendment was adopted to prevent
government-established religion.

NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER
FROM THE TRUTH
In 1791, when the Bill of Rights was added to the
Constitution, there were a variety of popular views
regarding the appropriate relationship between religion
and the government. True, men like James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson believed that civil government had no
legitimate reason to interfere in religious matters, and both
men believed that the First Amendment embraced a broad
principle of separation. In his "Detached Memoranda,"
Madison wrote that the Constitution forbids "everything
like" an establishment of religion. Thomas Jefferson, in
his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, wrote that
the religion clauses built "a wall of separation between
church and state."

state responsibilities, not the separation of church and
state. The Establishment Clause thus protected the rights
of states to establish religion as much as they wished.
ow, of course, just because · the Founders
originally were more concerned with federal
than state religious establishments, this does
not mean this is the end of the story.
Later constitutional amendments, in particular the 14th
Amendment, prohibit states from abridging the "privileges
or immunities" of U.S. citizens or violating the right to due
process of law. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
14th Amendment's Due Process Clause to prohibit state
religious establishments (thus "incorporating" the original
establishment clause against the states). Today, neither
state nor federal governments may establish an official
religion. Nevertheless, this was not the purpose of the
original Establishment Clause.

N

MISCONCEPTION #2: THE CONSTITUTION
ERECTS A WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE
False.

owever, in 1791 most people did not agree with
Madison and Jefferson that church and state
had separate concerns. Founders like George
Washington and the legislators in almost every
state believed that government had a duty to promote and
support the religious beliefs of the people. State laws at the
time contained everything from religious qualifications for
public office, to tax assessments for churches and ministers,
to criminal prosecutions for religious blasphemy. The same
Congress that proposed the First
Amendment also instituted the
practice of opening legislative sessions
with prayers, delivered by a chaplain, paid for at taxpayer expense.
Despite the arguments of Madison
and Jefferson, most people in 1791
were quite comfortable with the
idea of allowing state governments
the power to establish religion.

H

On the other hand, all of the
Founders agreed that power over
subjects like religion, speech, and
the press should be kept out of the
hands of the federal government.
The First Amendment thus binds only the federal Congress,
as in "Congress shall make no law." Just to underline
the state-protective nature of the original Bill of Rights,
the Tenth Amendment, reserves to the states power over
non-delegated subjects like religion. In this way, the original
First Amendment embraced the separation of federal and
IN 'l•] f .j LAWYERI52

The above makes clear that the Constitution originally
separated federal and state power, not church and state. The
text itself, of course, nowhere calls for a wall of separation
between church and state. The phrase entered the common
lexicon of religious liberty by way of a letter written by
Thomas Jefferson. Although the Constitution originally
forbade federal religious establishments, we know the
Founders believed state governments could involve themselves with religion as much as they wished. This being the
case, how did the phrase "constitutional separation of
church and state" become a commonly accepted shorthand
for describing religious freedom in the United States?
In his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
Thomas Jefferson wrote, "I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that the act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between church and state."
Jefferson's letter reflected his own extremely critical views of
the roll of religion in society. This view was embraced for
a time by the modern Supreme Court and, for a while, the
phrase "separation of church and state" became more important than the actual language of the Establishment Clause. In
a series of cases decided in the 1960s and '70s, the Court not
only required the government to stop favoring religion (thus
striking down school prayer), the government was not even
allowed to treat religion equally with non-religion.

The original Constitution
said nothing about
the separation of church

For example, in the 1971 case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Court struck down state educational assistance programs
that aided religious, as well as secular, private schools.
In doing so, the Court announced the infamous three-part
"Lemon test:" Government actions must have a secular
purpose; they cannot have a primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion; and government regulation must
not excessively entangle church and state. The programs
in Lemon were struck down because equal funding of
religious institutions created the risk that education funds
might be used to advance religion, and efforts to ensure
that religion was not advanced would excessively entangle
church and state. Thus, even if the educational program
was not intended to advance religion, if the government aid
had that effect- or threatened to have that effect- such aid
violated the Establishment Clause.

S

ince the 1980s, however, the Court has moved
away from the "separation of church and state"
positions and moved toward an "equal treatment"
analysis. Over the past ten years or so, the Court
has upheld a variety of programs that equally aid religious
and secular institutions- most often when the aid is
available to a broad class of beneficiaries or when the
religious institution receives the aid by way of private
choice. Under this equal treatment approach, the Court has
upheld government aid to religion in the form of sign language interpreters, vocational education funds, and printing subsidies for religious publications. Most recently, the
Supreme Court upheld state school voucher programs
which allow parents to use government subsidies for
tuition costs at either religious or secular schools.
The original Constitution said nothing about the separation
of church and state. Although the modern Supreme Court
for a while embraced Jeffersonian separation, the current
Supreme Court embraces equality.

and state. Although the
modern Supreme Court
for a while embraced
Jeffersonian separation,
the current Supreme Court
embraces equality.

MISCONCEPTION #3: THE FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION CLAUSE PROTECTS
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Believe it or not, no.
As described above, the Court has embraced the concept of
equality in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Equality, however, is a two-edged sword.
Prior to the 1990s, most scholars assumed that religious
exercise received special protection under the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution. A number of Supreme Court
cases seemed to strictly scrutinize any law that had the

Continued on page 105
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The Academic
Hat-Trick:
B.S., M.D.- J.D.
FREDERIC S. BONGARD

'05

rederic S. Bongard, M.D., FACS, is a student
at Loyola, with a primary interest in patents
and liability law in the field of biotechnology,
and the process of academic research to application
and market. He is a professor of surgery, Chief Division
of Trauma and Critical Care, and director of surgical
education at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, UCLA School
of Medicine. He is also an instrument-rated commercial
pilot and Aviation Medical Examiner (AME). So, one
would ask, what is he doing going to law school at night?
He claims it is like a disease-either you have it or you
don't. It doesn't matter if you are a surgeon, a lawyer, a
teacher--you will find the time to do what drives you to
live. Bongard credits law school with opening new ways
of reasoning that are based on factual generalizations-tospecifics, the opposite of medical study, in which facts are
assembled into larger applications. Bongard has always
been interested in the science of how things work and
maintains success is having a goal and having the dedication,
ability and fortitude to carry it through. His father often
said to him, "Anything worth doing, is worth doing well."
But believe it-Dr. Bongard is not done yet. •!•
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A Born Leader
econd-year student Demetria Graves thinks
lawyers get a bad rap . "We're seen as unethical
and selfish and we'll do anything for the dollar."
The outspoken 23-year-old says flatly that she is
none of those things. She is one of the "good gals."

S

Pasadena-born Demetria is the first in her family to attend
law school. As a social welfare major at U.C. Berkeley,
she started planning her next career move while still in
her sophomore year.
"I researched many schools and visited a lot of campuses, and
at Loyola I just felt right at home. When I got here I really felt
welcomed." So far, the experience has been a rewarding one
for Graves. "At Loyola they go out of their way to help you.
They want to see you get through. They don't just want to
take your money and push you through the system."

[Profiles]

( DEMETRIA GRAVES
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Graves describes herself as a strong, courageous young
woman with focus and determination to attain her goals.
In short, she is a natural leader. Aggressive and assertive,
she thrives in the competitive atmosphere at Loyola. Graves is
currently president of Loyola Law School's Black Law
Students Association (BLSA) and is also southern
sub-regional director of BLSA. "The diversity here is one of
the things that attracted me to Loyola. It is more diverse than
most law schools." During her time at Loyola she has also
been a tutor/mentor for the Academic Support Program.
Graves says that her Loyola law degree will lead her in
a direction she has always dreamed. "I've long wanted
to be responsible for making important decisions that
would benefit the lives of others." Her future plans are
still undecided, but Graves is leaning toward a career in
family law. "Success for me will event ually be defined by
the lives I touch and those that I help." •!•

Now just a year away from graduation, Graves has some
advice for incoming Loyola students. "Be willing to get
help. Don't think you can do it all by yourself. It's not
like college; you can't cram when it's time for finals." She
also encourages new students to continue to follow their
dreams, even though the road will often get bumpy.
ssl!t$4eli·1LAW'YER]

financial aid and working 40 hours a week at McDonald's,
is on track to exceed $10 million in revenue.
Given his deep pockets and successful business acumen,
Adler might be expected to live in year-round vacation mode.
Instead, he is quite content working long hours every day
and being knee deep in textbooks at night and on weekends.
"I really think of myself as not like most people. I'm always
trying to do the next thing, to keep learning. I know most
people would probably take an easier way out, relax, or go
into early retirement. But that's not me."

Always Looking for
the Next Big Thing
MICHAEL E. ADLER '05

M

ichael E. Adler, 39, is president and managing
director of Calabasas-based Informa Research
Services, Inc., a competitive intelligence company
that researches rates, fees and best practices at over 5,000
financial institutions nationwide. Adler and his team of 125
employees sell their findings to 2,500 clients, including all of
the nation's largest financial institutions. This year, the
company he co-founded in 1983, while attending USC on

With time at a premium, Adler realized that the bumper-tobumper commute from his Agoura Hills home to the
downtown Los Angeles campus was wasting valuable time.
"There just wasn't enough time in the day to run a company,
be an awesome husband and father, and excel in school."
Ten hours a week on the freeways was too much to
squander, so he hired a chauffeur. "Now I am able to study,
work, talk on the phone or sleep-all of which increases
my productivity and allows me to accomplish my goals. In
fact, it has worked so well that I recently bought an
executive van that seats eight. It includes a conference
table, leather reclining chairs, and AC power for the
laptop, DVD player, VCR and stereo."
Adler graduated summa cum laude from USC in 1986
and received an Executive M.B.A. (summa cum laude)
from USC in 1992. He graduated with distinction from
Stonier Graduate School of Banking in 1998. Adler says his
experience at Loyola has been a great one. "So far, it's been
a blast. The professors are great, the students are great, and
the friendships will last a lifetime." •!•

PANKIT DOSHI

'03

eauty, brains and a law degree?
There is proof: Pankit Doshi.
At the tender age of 14, Doshi
started college. By 19, he was
crowned Mr. India USA. At 22, he is
one of the youngest graduates of Loyola
Law School.

B

After earning his degree in political
science from Cal State Los Angeles, the
teen decided that he needed a break.
So, on a whim, he signed up for the
first-ever Mr. India California pageant.

Mr. India!
Doshi stresses that the contest was not
some run-of-the-mill beauty pageant.
"It had more taste than that," says the
Los Angeles native. "I wasn't parading
around in a swimsuit." The event
required Doshi to compete in four categories: Indian formal wear, Western
wear, athletic wear and talent. He
shocked audiences with a 21/2-minute
dance routine in which he dressed
as a janitor and danced with a broom
in one hand and a boom box in
the other. The performance helped

errick Rostagno is known as the "Giant
Killer." And for those not in the know,
that's a good thing. As a star on the pro
tennis circuit in the late 1980s, Rostagno
boasted multiple wins over such superstars as Boris
Becker, Ivan Lend!, John McEnroe, Jimmy Connors and
Mats Wilander. He is also one of only five people to
have beaten Pete Sampras at Wimbledon.

s
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So how does a person who represented the United States at
the 1984 Olympics and by 1990 was ranked the 13th best
tennis player in the world end up at Loyola Law School?
Rostagno just smiles. He likes to say he is predictably
unpredictable. While many retiring tennis pros would have
glided comfortably into the coaching ranks, Rostagno took
the road less traveled.
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From the
Tennis
Court
to the
Court of
Law
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Rostagno; 37, has never been one to fly with the flock.
Following his noteworthy nine years on the pro circuit,
he returned to Stanford to finish off the degree that tennis
had interrupted. Earning a B.A., the Stanford All-American
then completed an M.B.A at UCLA's Anderson School of
Business. He has just finished his second year in Loyola's
four-year evening program. His day is spent as a law clerk
at Stone and Hiles, a civil defense firm in Westwood.

father's footsteps. His first choice was Loyola. "It's a very
open-minded school, with great diversity in the programs
and the student groups. The people I met on my campus
visit were so impressive that I went right over to the admissions office and picked up an application."

While law might seem like an unlikely career choice for
a former pro tennis player, Rostagno explains that his
legal ambitions come from following in his attorney

Nowadays, the "Giant Killer" spends most of his time
conquering textbooks rather than tennis opponents. But
when his schedule permits, he still gets out on the court. •!•

him nab a first runner-up prize, a
People's Choice award and the Mr.
Congeniality honor.
Doshi caused more of a shock when
he went on to win the Mr. India
USA pageant, despite the fact that
he was only the runner-up in the state
pageant. "All of a sudden, I was asked
to travel to India, to be in parades,
and to appear at lots of social
functions," says Doshi. "One woman
even asked me to sign her arm!
It really caught me off guard. One
minute I was just a regular guy, and
the next minute people were staring
at me and pointing."

However, Doshi knew that he wanted
to move beyond the fame and
glamour. Turning down a modeling
contract, he chose to attend Loyola
Law School so he could pursue his
interest in law and the entertainment business. While at Loyola,
he was selected for Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review and the Moot
Court team.
Doshi is currently in post-production
on Filmmaking in the Beginning, a
film that he helped produce under
his shingle, Indo-American Films, Inc.
It is a story about a group of South
Asians who make their own film.

Inspired by the success of films such
as American Desi, Monsoon Wedding
and Bend It Like Beckham, Doshi and
his partners believe that they can help
American audiences understand what
Indian culture is about. He also hopes
to dispel some stereotypes. "I want
my community to see that as South
Asians, we don't have to listen to our
parents, that being an actor and just
pursuing your dream is okay." •!•
(For more information on
Indo-American Films,
go to www.indoamericanfilms.com.)
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Making The Political Scene
PHILIP KOEBEL

'Olf

L

ast March, one law student
couldn't wait to become a
lawmaker. Philip Koebel wanted to be the first Loyola Law
School student to be elected to public
office. He lost to a popular incumbent
in Pasadena's March 2003 mayoral
election, but Koebel, 37, sees the
experience positively. "Although I
was 'in it to win it,' there were many
victories in our campaign," he says.
Koebel burst onto the local political
scene . With very little financing,
his campaign team of dedicated
volunteers and teenagers from his
after-school basketball program canvassed neighborhoods, trumpeting
their slogan, " One United PasadenaUna Pasadena Unida: Fair Rents &
Fair Profits and City Money for
Schools." His grassroots campaign
earned the backing of Pasadena's
weekly newspaper, Pasadena Weekly.

When the ballots were counted,
Koebel finished with 1, 785 votes, or
15% of the vote, a number he wears
with pride. "Before I ran, we had
zero," he says. His next goal is to
multiply those votes to put a "Fair
Rents & Fair Profits" initiative on the
November 2003 ballot. "We always
said this election was a launching pad
to bring laws to Pasadena that will
protect our 70,000 renters and
educate Pasadena's school kids."
Koebel is studying to be a civil rights
lawyer and is more than halfway
through Loyo la 's three-year program.
"Loyola is the best, no doubt about it.
It's got tremendous diversity, the public
interest program is brilliant, and m y
professor, Gary Williams, heads the
Southern California ACLU!" Upon
graduation, Koebel plans to set up
shop in "NeW" Pasadena (his name
for the underserved northwest area of

Pasadena), where he lives. "People are
waiting for me to pass the bar. We just
need to figure out how to pay back
my school loans."
As for his political ambitions, Koebel
puts a new spin on the old adage that
you can't fight city hall. "You MUST
fight city hall," he says matter-offactly. "People have a lot more power
than we're led to believe. Democracy,
in fact, means we have all the power.
We need to practice democracy every
day of our lives. " •!•

Putting The PRO In Pro Bono
JAMES GILLIAM

'03

nyone who thinks one person
can't make a difference
needs only to meet James
Gilliam '03. Gilliam (pronounced Gill-um) is a maJor reason
why Loyola's commitment to public
service remains strong.

A

Public Counsel to advocate on behalf
of the homeless started with James-by
himself-going out one day a month
during his first year to advocate for the
homeless. The program now has over
50 volw1teers from Loyola who rotate
their weeks of advocacy.

The project Loyola's Public Interest
Law Foundation (PILF) does with

Gilliam has completed over 400 hours
of pro bono work while at Loyola.

K

evin Lipeles exudes confidence, and for good
reason. By night, he has
just completed his first
of four demanding years at Loyola.
By day, the charismatic 29-year-old
holds an unlikely job-he is a
well-respected boxing agent. Whether
Lipeles decides to go to work for
someone else after graduation, or
continue to serve his clients, his night
classes will serve him well.

contracts. "Boxing is a dirty business
and a lot of the managers are unscrupulous. Most people will take advantage
of you if they get the chance. But I
don't ... and won't ... do business that
way. I am fair and honest in my dealings
and I've earned a solid reputation
throughout the industry. And in sports,
integrity is a rare commodity."

s
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To date, Lipelco has promoted two
nationally televised fights and has

He Loves A Good Fight
KEVIN LIPELES
As president of Lipelco Management,
an international sports management
and entertainment company, Kevin
has rubbed shoulders with some of the
world's most famous celebrities and
athletes. And in his capacity as a
manager and promoter, he has gone
toe-to-toe with a few of boxing's most
ruthless promoters. Lipeles says,
"Right now we are concentrating on
boxing, but we have some big music
deals on the horizon."
Lipeles has made a name for himself
guiding fighters' careers and helping
many get released from one-sided

"I think pro bono is a commitment
that ought to be mandatory for every
lawyer. It's key," Gilliam says. "There
are far too many people who don't
have the representation they need.
The only way out of that problem is if
those of us who've been privileged
enough to have this education start
sharing some of our talents."
Gilliam has become the "go-to guy"
for many of Loyola's faculty. With so
many projects on his plate, he could
teach a course in time management.
"People often ask me how I do all the
things I do, but I guess it just comes
naturally. I came to law school to be

'06

taken several fighters to world
championship fights. Lipeles manages
two fighters in South Africa, and
because he is fluent in Spanish (selftaught), he's managed Latin fighters
and actually worked with high-ranking
government officials in Latin America.
For many, the extreme demands of
managing fighters from around the
world and promoting fights on a global
scale would be an all-consuming job.
But Lipeles has taken his passion to the
next level. "I have seen more than my
fair share of lawsuits and contracts in
the sports and entertainment business,

an activist, and at Loyola there is
always an issue that needs to be
addressed," he says.
Gilliam chose Loyola primarily because
of the diverse student body. "That and
the full scholarship," he adds. But a
wrenching turn of events almost
changed his decision. "My mother died
three weeks before I was to begin at
Loyola, and at that point I didn't know
what to do with my life. I called to tell
Anton Mack, the dean of admissions at
the time, that I couldn't accept the
scholarship. But he encouraged me to
come to law school rather than sit at
home and wallow in misery. If I hadn't

and it was that part of my job that
fascinated me the most. I've been
involved in numerous contract negotiations, television deals, consumer affairs,
endorsement deals-you name it. I've
also successfully tried two arbitrations
in front of the California attorney
general. My Loyola law degree will
allow me to better help my clients."
As for his choice of law schools, Lipeles
sings Loyola's praises. "Loyola was the
best option for me. They have what's
considered to be the number one night
program, and I figured if I'm going to
do it, I'm going to do it right. " •!•

started law school three weeks later,
I don't think I ever would have."
Upon graduation, Gilliam, 32, will
become a litigation associate at Paul, ·
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, and he
plans to serve as pro bono cooperating
counsel for the organizations with
which he has completed externships.
His ultimate goal is to serve agencies
that need lawyers and to encourage
others to do the same. Says Gilliam,
"The day I sign my contract to come
back to Loyola to teach, I'll know
I'm a success." •!•
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Congress and the

''en • force' • ment''
of equal protection :

what's ina
By William D. Araiza, Professor of law

Even if judges, lawyers, and
academics often

disagree on

what the Constitution means,
it's normally thought that at
least they agree on who gets
to decide: the courts, and, in
particular, the Supreme Court. We
learned from Marbury v. Madison
that it is "emphatically the duty
and province of the courts to say
what the law is."

S

ince the Constitution is emphatically
law- indeed, the highest law- it
should be emphatically the power of
the courts to say what the Constitution
"is." Regardless of what one might think of
judicial review, it would seem that the practice
is unquestioned in our legal system.
IN.lo!U LAWYERI60

Or maybe not. Written into the Civil War
Amendments - the 13th (banning slavery),
the 14th (guaranteeing rights to due
process and equal protection) and the 15th
(protecting voting rights)- are provisions
authorizing Congress to "enforce" those
rights "by appropriate legislation." The
scope of this power (sometimes called
"the Section 5 power" because it is located
in Section 5 of the 14th Amendment,
the amendment that gets the most
scholarly attention of these three) is hotly
contested today. Because these amendments (especially the 14th) so alter the
federal -state balance, the scope of Congress'
power to "enforce" that alteration has
been one of the pillars of the Court's recent
focus on federalism issues. But to a greater
degree than other recent battlefields of
federalism, the issue of Congress' Section 5
power also raises profound questions of
separation of powers, as it requires us
to consider what role Congress should
have in determining what constitutional
rights actually mean. Indeed, as I will
argue, Section 5 requires us to consider
an even more basic question: What
does a court really do when it interprets
the Constitution?

T

he Section 5 power has become a major issue
only relatively recently. After an initial burst of
legislative action during the reconstruction period,
the Section 5 power underwent a century-long
hibernation, as Congress lost interest in protecting civil
rights. Section 5 came into its own only in the 1960s,
when Congress enacted a variety of civil rights laws aimed
at state governments. Sometimes these laws prohibited
conduct the Court itself had held was constitutionally
acceptable. For example, in 1959 the Court rejected an
equal protection attack on English literacy tests for voters,
if the test was applied in a non-discriminatory way. In the
1965 Voting Rights Act, however, Congress required that
Puerto Ricans educated to the sixth grade level in Spanish
be allowed to vote, even if they couldn't read English.
In Katenbach v. Morganl the Court upheld the law.
How could the Court uphold, as a means of "enforcing" the
14th Amendment, a statute that prohibited conduct that
the Court had held was consistent with that amendment?
One justification it offered, modest if a little indirect,
was that Congress might have been aiming at different
discrimination than that
directly reflected by the
literacy test, namely, the
discrimination that occurs
when a disenfranchised community IS ignored (i.e.,
treated unequally) in the
provision of government
services. This rationale is
reasonable enough; a government's failure to respond
to a community's needs
constitutes fundamentally
unequal treatment, and
enfranchising at least some of
that community thus would
help "enforce" the equal
protection clause's promise.

is! And, indeed, commentators viewed that aspect of
Morgan as potentially revolutionary. But maybe there's a
way to harmonize that startling statement with Marbury.
Perhaps we can view a Section 5-justified statute as reflecting
Congress' better fact-finding capabilities. Perhaps Congress
is better able to examine the facts and determine when
equal protection is being violated. Courts routinely defer to
legislative determinations that are grounded in conclusions
about empirical facts, since it is clear that courts are incompetent to second-guess legislatures on such determinations.
Why not here as well?

T

his argument raises a deeper question: What
kinds of determinations does Congress make
when it decides whether a partiCular voting
qualification constitutes invidious discnmination
prohibited by the equal protection clause? A determination
about empirical facts? A judgment about what "equality"
means? How should we characterize such a judgment-a
matter of law, of fact, of something else? Equal protection
may be unique in the judgments it entails. Of all the rights
guaranteed in the 14th Amendment- rights to citizenship, to
the "privileges and immunities of national citizenship,"
to substantive and procedural due process, and to
equal protection-the latter
is unique in that it is based
largely on non-legal determinations. Think about it.
What is equal treatment?
Treating everyone the same?
Does that mean that truckers
are denied equal protection
when only airlines get a
bailout, or some other
favorable government treatment, or that earners of
ordinary income are denied
equal protection when
they pay heavier taxes than
earners of capital gains?
That can't be right. We say
that some treatment violates
equal protection because we
have a sense- an intuition,
or perhaps a judgment based
both on our values and our
understanding of empirical
facts-that certain groups
are equivalent, and require
the same treatment, while
others are different, and thus
require different treatment.

Perhaps Congress is better
able to examine the facts

and determine when equal

protection is being violated.

But the Morgan Court also
offered a more controversial reason for upholding the
law. It suggested that
Congress was entitled to
have a different view
of what equal protection
required in a given case- a
different view, that is, than
the one the Court had.
So much for Marbury's
statement about the power
of courts to say what the law
i!o$j•i0 LAWYERI 62

hen
courts
review equal
protection
claims, they
seek to make that very
determination. But note that,
except m limited cases
such as race classifications,
courts examine these issues
against a backdrop of deference as there's a "rational
basis" supporting it. Why
this deference? In part, it's
because most groups (again,
except race, gender and a

Would there be any limits
to the Section 5 power
then? There should be;
after all, Section 5 was not
intended to give Congress
a blank check to rewrite
any state law it dislikes.
And, of course, Congress
is only given power to
"enforce" equal protection,
not to "interpret" that
phrase. Is there a core
meaning of equal protection that can cabin Congress'
Section 5 authority? Perhaps.

W

couple of others) are presumed capable of defending their
interests in the political process. In part, however, it is
because determining the equivalency of groups (earners of
income versus capital gains recipients, truckers versus
airlines) is simply beyond judicial ken.

N

ote what this deference means. Legislative
classifications may actually fail to reflect
actual differences, but still survive equal
protection challenges because of the deferential
standard of review courts use. The fact that judicial humility
would lead courts to uphold such a classification does not
mean that the classification, in some abstract way, provides
equal protection. But Congress need not be so humble in
its review of state laws: it is a politically accountable,
representative institution that should be at least as competent
as state legislatures to determine when a state law's
classification does not actually treat similarly situated
people "equally." Why not see the Section 5 power as a
grant of power to the federal institution that is institutionally
capable of "knowing equality when it sees it"?
What would this understanding of Section 5 mean in
practice? Most importantly, it would mean that Congress
would not be limited to addressing discrimination against
so-called "suspect classes" (most notably race and gender).
If suspect-class analysis is really more about how far courts
can legitimately go in ensuring equal protection, and less
about what equal protection actually means, then Congress'
enforcement authority should not be limited to situations
where the courts have expressed confidence about being
able to spot inappropriate differential treatment.

Fundamentally, the equal protection guarantee prohibits
government from treating groups differently simply
because of dislike. This rule against "animus" is bedrock
equal protection law, and it should guide Congress, in
"enforcing" the clause, as well as the courts, in adjudicating
equal protection claims made in courts. In considering a
claim that a federal law constitutes an "inappropriate"
enforcement statute, a court should be able to make use of
its own thoughts about the classification-e.g., how
obvious animus seems on the face of the state action being
countermanded by Congress-in determining whether
Congress has in fact gone too far. Courts should also be
able to use common sense in determining the likelihood
that a given classification was motivated by animus. Earners
of ordinary income, recipients of capital gains, truckers and
airlines are all mainstream members of our society; for
Congress to determine that one of them was harmed
because the state legislature hated them would be a difficult proposition to defend.
n one sense this approach is not all that different from the
Court's current Section 5 doctrine, which asks whether
the federal statute is "congruent and proportional" to the
underlying constitutional violation.2 But it would expand
Congress' authority beyond current doctrine, by recognizing
that state laws may reflect animus even when the harmed
group has not been recognized by courts as a suspect class.
One concrete example would be the mentally challenged, who
are not a suspect class; yet, even the Court itself has recently
recognized they may be the victim of animus.3

I

Continued on page 107
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Loyola Law School has
established a long tradition of
providing graduates to the
judiciary since the 1920s.
Service on the judiciary
is service to the
community at large
and the legal profession.

OUR ALUMNI SERVING
IN THE JUDICIARY INCLUDE:

ARIZONA MUNICIPAL COURT
Hon . Peter C. Rosa les '86

CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD
Hon. Ro berta W. Lee '70

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
Hon . Patricia Bamattre-Manouk ian '77

Hon. John P. Marrin '84
Hon. Anthony T. Ross '7 L

Hon. Eve Cohen ' 65 (ret. )
Hon. Lynn D. Compton '49 (ret. )
Hon. Dan iel A. Cu rry ' 60

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Hon. Darlene R. Seligman '79 (ret.)

Ho n. Kathryn Doi Todd ' 70
Pictured here are some of the Loyola alumni serving
on the judiciary [It or[ Honorable Victor E. Chavez '59 and
Honorable lawrence W. Crispo '61 of the los Angeles Superior Coun,
Honorable Manuell. Real '51 of the United States District Coun,
and Honorable Pani S. Kitching of the California Coun of Appeal.

il

Hon . Margaret A. Grignon '77
Hon . Patti S. Kitching '74

EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT APPEALS BOARD
Hon. Martin £. Agui lar '69

Hon . Manuel A. Ramirez '74
Hon. Deborah L. Terry-Walto n '79
Hon . William F Rylaarsdam '64
Hon. Sheila P. Sonenshine '70 (ret. )
Hon. Gertrude K. Wilson 73•

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Hon. N . Fred Woods '63

Ho n. Pamela C. Sellers '74

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, KENTUCKY

Hon. Lo uis H. Burke '26•

Hon. Joan L. Byer '8 1

Hon. Otto M. Kaus '49•

NEVADA SUPERIOR COURT
Hon. Mark W. Gibbo ns '74
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l-Ion. Irma]. Brown-Dillon '73

OFFICE OF APPEALS,

Hon. Carol W. Elswick '83

Hon. Earl Klein '57 (ret.)

l-Ion. Soussan G. Bruguera '81

Hon . Douglas M. Elwell '76

Hon . Elinor S. Knox '61 (ret.)

l-Ion . Ca rl F. Bryan '73

Hon . Michael J. Farrell '65

Hon . Richard G. Kolostian '63

Hon. Sam Bubrick '50 (rer.)

Hon. John T. Feeney 'SO

Hon. Sandy R. Kriegler '75

l-Ion. Mary Buchanan '80

Hon .

Ho n. Marlene A. Krisrovich '78

Hon. Michael L. Burke '59 (ret.)

Hon. James J. Ferr '54

Hon. Thomas W. LeSage '3r

l-Ion . James M. Byrne '68 (ret. )

Hon . Gary J. Ferrari '70

l-Ion. Gibson W. Lee '76

Hon . Raymond]. Byrne '71 (ret. )

Hon. Larry P. Fidler '74

l-Ion. Lisa B. Lench '79

arhaniel B. Fellner '69 (ret. )

SOCIAL SECURITY ADM INISTRATION

Hon. Eileen G. Burlison '66

OREGON OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

Hon . Alison G. Webster '87

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD

Hon. Ann L. Weinman '80

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Hon. Richard A. 1-lonn '78
l-Ion. Madge S. \XIatai '67

STATE OF CALIFORNIA. DEPARTMENT
OF GENERAL SERVICES

Hon. Ralph B. Dash '76

STATE OF HAWAII DISTRICT COURT

Hon. Robert R. Campagna '62 (ret.)

Ho n. Hugh M. Flanagan '70

l-Ion. Stephen A. Leventhal '63

Ho n. Alan G. Campbell '36*

Hon . Rodney G. Forneret '74

Hon . Gerald]. Levie '48*

Ho n. Luis A. Cardenas '68 (ret.)

Hon. Brad Fox '79

Hon. Michele D. Levine '83

Hon. Joan M. Carney '60 (ret. )

Hon. Thomas P. Foye '51 (rer. )

Hon . James L. Liesch '60 (ret. )

Hon . John P. Carroll '51 (ret.)

Hon . Josh M. Fredricks '76

Hon . Antoinette C. Liewen '74 (ret.)

Hon . David R. Chaffee '73

Hon. William A. Friedrich '50*

l-Ion . Daniel S. Lopez '78

Hon. Vicroria Gerrard Chaney '78

l-Ion. Charles E. Frisco '50 (ret.)

l-Ion. Gilbert M . Lopez '76

Hon . Vicror E. Chavez '59

H on. James E. Funk '54 ''.

Hon . Ro nald G. Lorden '68

Hon . Victoria M. Chavez '78

Hon. Richa rd A. Gadbois '58''.

Hon. Frederick ]. Lower, J r. '64 (ret.)

Hon. Dennis S. Choate '72

l-Ion. Brian D. Gain ' 72

Hon. Lonzo Lucas '72

Hon . Kenneth L. Choriner '69 (ret. )

l-Ion. Kenneth W. Gale '52 (ret.)

Hon. Richard W. Lyman '72

l-Ion . Hurschell D. Christian '70

Hon. Nancy S. Gast '77

Hon. John J. Lynch '55 (ret.)

Hon. James P. Cloninger '79

Hon. Susan Gamson Karl '80 (ret.)

Hon. Earl H. Maas '57 (ret.)

Hon . Tari L. Cody '85

Hon. Brian F. Gasdia '81

Hon . William E. MacFaden '36*

Hon . Yale D. Coggan '54 (ret. )

Hon. Francis A. Gately '71

Ho n. Ronald J. Maciel '73

Hon. Colette Y. Garibaldi '80

Hon . Samuel E. Collins '51*

Hon. George Genesta '75

Hon. Darryl A. Majied '78*

Hon. Kei Hirano '59 (ret.)

Hon . Ronald R. Combest '77 (ret.)

Hon . Roberr H. Gillham '54*

l-Ion. Frederick A. Mandabach '72
Hon. Francis X. Marnell '50*

LAW

SCHOOL ·:· LOS ANGELES

l-Ion. John L. Martinez '68
Hon. Richard A. McEachen '73
Hon. John D. McFarland '48•

SUPERIOR COURT

Hon. Joan Comparet-Cassani '77

Hon . August J. Goebel '54*

Hon. Kevin]. McGee '79

Hon. S. William Abel '73

Hon. Manuel J. Covarrubias '77

Hon . Thomas M. Goethals '77

Hon. Charles R. McGrath '63

l-Ion. Adrian \XI. Adams '50 (ret.)

Hon. Lawrence W. Crispo '61

Hon. Hank M. Goldberg '85

Hon. Vincent J. McGraw '71 (ret. )

Hon. Richard A. Adler '71

l-Ion. Stephen D. Cunn ison '69

Hon . Murray B. Gross '74

Hon. Jan ice M. Mcintyre '75

Hon. Leo Aggeler '24''

l-I on. Richa rd J. Curran '50 (ret.)

l-Ion. Jeffrey L. G unther '71

Hon. Robert J. Mcinty re '77

Hon . Mervyn A. Aggeler '32''

l-Ion.

J. Stephen Czu leger '77

H on. A rturo F. Gutierrez '74

Ho n. Jo hn V. Meigs '78

Hon. Gregory \XI. Alarcon '81

l-Ion. Gary E. Daigh '77

Hon. Gary R. Hahn '73

Hon . Pau l I. Metzler '68 (ret.)

Hon. Donald R. Alvarez '79

Hon. Douglas \XI. Daily '78

Hon. Patrick J. Hegarty '73

Hon . Rita

Hon . S. Robert Ambrose '6 1

Hon. John H. DarlingtOn '69

Hon. Deirdre E. Hill '85

Hon . Loren Miller '62 (ret. )

Hon . Thomas P. Anderle '64

Hon. Leo A. Deegan '39*

Hon. Joel P. Hoffman '66

Hon. Rex H. Minter '54 (ret.)

Hon. Gail A. Andler '82

Hon . Wayne C. DentOn '72

Hon. Yuri G. Hofmann '77

Hon . Lawrence J. Mira '69

Hon. Benjamin Aranda '69*

Hon . Joseph E. Di Loreto '66

Hon. Francis J. Hourigan '68

l-Ion. Peter]. Mirich '78

Hon. Ernest L. Aubry '69*

Hon . David I. Doi '73

Hon. Susan E. lsacoff '70

Hon . Steven L. Monette '86 (ret. )

Hon. Robert T. Baca '56 (ret.)

Hon. Patrick H. Donahue '83

l-Ion. James B. Jennings '68

Hon. Richard Montes '67 (ret.)

Hon . Althea R. Baker '84

l-Ion. John T. Doyle '78

Hon. Jane L. Johnson '80

Hon. Judson W. Morris '73

Hon . Alfonso M. Bazan '65*

Hon. Maureen Duffy-Lewis '74

Hon. Charles E. Jones '65 (ret.)

Hon. Phillip M . Morris '70*

Hon. Margaret M. Bernal '83

Hon. Leslie A. Dunn '74

l-Ion. Anthony S. Jones '79

Hon. Dion G. Morrow '57 (ret. )

Hon. Martin]. Blake '65'

Hon. Reginald A. Dunn '70 (ret. )

Hon . Richard P. Kalustian '63 (ret. )

Hon. Beverly E. Mosley '78

Hon. Tho mas J. Borris '79

Hon . Carroll M . Dunnum '46*

Hon. Burton S. Katz '63 (ret.)

Hon. Robert]. Moss '73

Hon . Russell A. Bostrom '72 (ret.)

Hon. John S. Einhorn '68

Hon. Ernest L. Kelly '48*

Hon. Milton L. Most '52*

Hon . Richard L. Brand '73

Hon . Laura A. Ellison '87

Hon . Kath leen A. Kennedy-Powell '77

Hon. Thomas C. Murphy '40'

Hon. R. Gary Klausner '67

Hon. Timothy M . Murphy '77

Hon. Francisco P. Briseno ' 68
Hon. Gi lbert T. Brown '74

J.

Miller '79

Hon. Dean ne S. Myers '74

Hon. Robert W. Nagby '83

Hon. Rau l M. Thorbourne '76

Hon. Va lerie S. Chapla '75

Hon. john M. Na irn '49''

F-lon. Robert C. Todd '57 (ret. )

Hon. Louis M. Daraban '72 (ret.)

Hon . Michael Nash '74

F-lon. Richard F. Toohey '76

Hon. Maury D. Gentile '52 (ret.)

Hon. james F. Nelson '53 (ret. )

Hon. Thomas N . Townsend '68

Hon. Michael D. Lecover '76

Hon. Ro y L. Norman '58*

F-lon . Rolf M. Treu '74

Hon. j ohn K. Mah '75
Hon. Frank T. Quinones '80

Hon. Robert C. Nyc '48 (ret. )

Hon. jack B. Tso '60*

H on . Richard ]. Oberholzer '70

Ho n. James K. Turner '54 *

Hon. Perer C. Robbins '80 (ret.)

Hon . joanne B. O'Donnell '83

Hon. Kenneth E. Vassie '6 1 (rer. )

Hon. Rafael E. Vivero '73

Hon . Sam 0. Ohta '89

Hon. David C. Velasquez '78

Hon. Robert E. Welch '69 (ret.)

Hon . Dan T. Oki '77

Hon. Aiden R. Victor '67

Hon. Russell G. Zarert '72

Hon. Charlaine F. Olmedo '89

Hon. Richard G. Vogl '68

Hon. Tomson T. Ong '83

Hon. Richard F. Walmark '84

OTHER (Court Unknown)

Hon. Eugene Osko '72 (ret.)

Hon. Henry j. Walsh '70

F-lon. Maripaul S. Baier '55 (ret.)

Hon. john Ouderkirk '77

F-lon. Fumiko H. Was erman '79

Hon. julian Beck '35*

Hon . John S. Pasco '57 (ret.)

Hon. Lauren L. Weis Birnstein '77

Hon. Walter S. Binns '39*

Hon. Robert J. Perry '72

Hon. William R. Weisman '73

F-lon. Desmond j. Bourke '50*

Hon. Suzanne E. Person '75

Hon. Carl]. West '78

F-lon. L. Harold Cha ille '49'·

Hon. Victor H. Person '71

Hon. Elizabeth A. White '81

Hon . Antonio E. Chavez '59*

Hon. Anthony Peters '88

Hon . Randall D. White '78

Hon . j oseph T. Ciano '3 :1 *

Hon. jan A. Pluim '73

Ho n. Thomas L. W illhite '79

Hon. Peter Cook '47""
Hon . Gera ld R. Corbett '26*

Hon . Peter J. Palos '90

Hon . Ernest G. Williams '54 (ret.)

Hon. William R. Pounders '69

Hon.

Hon. Ronald H. !'renner '56*

Hon. Mark Wood '49'·

Hon . James E. Cunningham '41 *

J. Steve Williams '50'·

Hon. Robert L. Corfman '39'·

Hon. George L. Pugsley '66 (ret. )

Hon.James S. Yip '58 (ret.)

Hon . George A. Dockweiler '26*

Hon. Anthony J. Rackauckas '71 (ret. )

Hon. D. Zeke Zeidler '91

Hon . Burch Donahue '46*

Hon. j. Wesley Reed '52 (ret.)

Hon. Thomas Zeiger '52 (ret.)

Han . Milton A. Elconin '53*

Hon. Pamela Rhodes-Rogers '78 (ret.)

F-lon . Albert M. Felix '47*

Hon . Raymond R. Roberts '48 (ret.)

TEXAS STATE JUDICIAL COURT

Hon. Charles L. Fergerson '69*

Hon. Mark P. Robinson, Sr. '50*

Hon. Keith Dean '81

Hon. Helen L. Gallagher '55*

Hon. Gary P. Ryan '72 (ret.)

H011. Leland W. Geiler '45*

Hon. Judith M . Ryan '70 (ret.)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

F-lon. George J. Gliaudys '68

Hon . Eric T. Sanders '75 (ret.)

Hon. Howard P. Sweeney '68 (ret.)

Hon. Robert H. Keefe '68*

Hon. Michael T. Sauer '62

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Hon. Diana R.

Hon . Philip E. Schaefer '64 (ret.)

Hon. Richard Mednick '66 (ret.)

Hon. Thomas R. McCarry '33*

Hon. Floyd H. Schenk '50 (ret. )

Hon. Geraldine Mund '77

Hon. Eugene McClosky '51*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Hon. Edward A. Q uaresma '31""

Hon. j ohn A. Shid ler '35 *

F-lon. William M . Byrne '29*

Hon. Christine E. Stancill '89

Hon. Stephen D. Sitkoff '82 (ret.)

Hon. William B. En right '50

Hon. John C. Teal '61 ,.

Hon. Valerie L. Skeba '88

Hon. Gregory G. Hollows '79

Hon. Albert E. Wheatcroft '29*

Hon. Warren E. Slaughter '42 (ret. )

Hon.John R. Kronenberg '58 (ret.)

Hon. Kimberly K. Sloan-Menninger '85

Hon. Alex R. Munson '75

* Deceased

Hon . Peter S. Smith '60 (rer. )

Hon. Manuel L. Real '51

Hon . Thomas R. Sokolov '68

Note: List compiled from best
available data. We apologize i11

Hon. Carolyn Turchin '79

advance for o1nissions or mistakes.

Hon. Philip L. Soto '86

Hon. john F. Walter '69

Hon . D . joseph Spada '53 (ret.)

F-lon. Carla M. Woehrle '77

Municipal Court Service listed
under Superior Court and
former Judges coded (ret.).
Updates 213.736.1046

Hon . James E. Sart '53 (ret. )

Hon.James A. Madden '38*

Hon. Patricia M. Schnegg-Oppcnheim '77
Hon. Steven D. Sheldon '74

Han. Paul S. McCormick '37*

Hon. Richard E. Spann '74 (ret. )
Hon. james D. Tame '48 *
Hon. Meredith C. Taylor '75

iarsel '73 (ret. )

WORKER'S COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

Hon. Ross Gene Tharp '52 (ret. )

Hon. Alvin R. Barrett '71

Hon. W. Jean Thomas '78*

Hon. David B. Brotman '80

Campus]
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OPENED IN SEPTEMBER OF 2002, THE NEW ALBERT H. GIRARDI ADVOCACY CENTER WA:
NAMED THROUGH THE GENEROSITY OF THOMAS V. GIRARDI '64 OF GIRARDI AND KEESE
IN HONOR OF HIS FATHER, WHO PASSED AWAY IN FEBRUARY 2002. THE SOARIN<
THREE-STORY STRUCTURE OF BURNT ORANGE, DESIGNED BY RENOWNED ARCHITEC
FRANK 0. GEHRY, WAS CONSTRUCTED AT A COST OF MORE THAN $7 MILLION. IT IS DEDICATE!
TO ADVOCACY SKILLS AND HOME TO LOYOLA'S ETHICAL ADVOCACY PROGRAIV

By Elizabeth Fry, Senior Development Officer

ithin its 15,141 square feet, the advocacy center contains
90-person trial comtroom and jury deliberation roon
a 70-person appellate co urtroom, a 36-person ethic~
advocacy classroom and video training labs, as well a
state-of-the-art presentation technology on all floors . More than 2,00
alumni participated in fundraising efforts to comp lete the center. Some c
the most notable effor ts of support from various alumni are acknowledge
here with great appreci ation. "This impressive educational facility, housin
two major classrooms and the ethical lawyering training facilities, will serv
as an invaluable resource for our students who wish to develop critic;
courtroom skills," Dean David Burcham stated.

W
Ii
I

The Co urtroom of the '90s naming campaign resulted in over $300,00
in pledges and gifts from more than 600 alumni- a significant componer
of the building campaign. "Our new program in ethical advocacy will offt
courses taught by outstanding trial lawyers, as well as masters courst
in tria l advocacy, offering advanced training. I am personally grateful t
the alumni from the classes of the '90s for their contribution to one of th
most impressive and tec hnologica lly advanced courtroom teachin
fa cilities in the country," expressed Professor Laurie Levenson, director c
the ethical advocacy program. Campaign Chair Daniel A. Sonenshine '9

Thomas V. Girardi '64 ( L) with his
father Albert H. Girardi (R ). The new
Center was named for Albert through
a $2.4 million gift.

FUNDRAISING EFFORTS

Mark Minyard '76 stands near the
Minyard Tower, the architectural signature
for the new Center. Mark and his wife
Barbara made a major gift to Loyola Law
School in support of the new Center.

expressed his gratitude for the active partJclpatlon and generous
responses, saying, "The graduates of the '90s who participated in the
campaign have left their mark on Loyola Law School."
MARK E. MINYARD '76 of the Orange County firm of Minyard
and Morris, LLP and his wife Barbara, generously contributed to the
naming of the MINYARD TOWER of the Girardi Advocacy Center.
The Minyard Tower represents an architectural design element that
serves as the entrance to the center. Standing three stories tall, it features
unique glass floor plates, and stainless angel hair steele sheathing that
mirrors the blue skies of downtown Los Angeles.
EDISON H . MIYAWAKI, M.D. AND SALLIE Y. MIYAWAKI of
Honolulu, Hawaii, made a most generous pledge to support the
construction of the new Girardi Advocacy Center. The couple was
recognized for their gift by Dean Burcham and Professor Christopher May
at the Second Annual Hawaii Alumni Reunion held in conjunction with
the Fifth Annual Loyola Law School & Edison H. Miyawaki Moot
Court Competition. The April 5, 2003 events were held at the MidPacific Institute High School, where Lieutenant Governor James R.
Aiona, Jr. served as judge for the competition.

Dedication of the Albert H. Girardi Advocacy Center on
September 23, 2002. U.S., Supreme Court Associate
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (L-center) along with Robert
B. Lawton, S.J., President of Loyola Marymount University
(R-eenter) perform the ribbon cutting ceremony.

Gsl!ei1U!·j LA\XIYERI

Around
[campus]

A generous gift from MARK P. ROBINSON,
JR. '72 of the Newport Beach law firm
of Robinson, Calcagnie & Robinson, Inc.
named the courtroom on the first floor-a 90person trial moot court classroom and
an ancillary jury room. The ROBINSON
COURTROOM, as well as all classroom/
courtrooms throughout the Advocacy Center,
are equipped with state-of-the-art audio-visual
equipment. Mark is the son of the late Hon.
Mark P. Robinson, Sr. '50 and the father of
Daniel S. Robinson '03.
A charitable grant from the WEINGART
FOUNDATION was received in February

'I
'

I'

I

Mark P. Robinson, Jr., '72, another
major donor to the Center, helped
create the new Robinson Courtroom, a
technology enhanced trial courtroom.

1Hlo!ULAWYERI66

Dean David W. Burcham '84, Associate Clinical Professor
Susan Poehls '88, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Victor Gold, along with Professor Laurie Levenson
[not pictured] are planning the new ethical advocacy
curriculum for Loyola Law School.

2002. Chief Administrative Officer Fred]. Ali,
along with the Weingart Foundation directors,
conveyed their best wishes for the success of
Loyola's advocacy program. Support from the
Foundation helped to complete the construction
and furnishing of the new classroom facility.
Dean David W. Burcham extended his appreciation to all of the board members of the
Foundation for the thoughtful gift, stating, "The
training that our students will receive in the new
WEINGART FOUNDATION LABORATORY
FOR ETHICAL LAWYERING will increase
their effectiveness and support Loyola's commitment to educate lawyers with the capacity
to meet ethical challenges."

More than 60 mem bers of the Judiciary who
are also alumni of Loyola Law School participated in supporting the construction of the
new Girardi Advocacy Center. Contributing
members were honored by having their names
installed on a plaque which is prominently
displayed on the bench in the courtroom of the
center. Their valued support will help Loyola
to establish a nationally recognized advocacy
program and provide one of the most sophisticated teaching environments in the nation.
To conclude the physical environment of
the Law School, the FRITZ B. BURNS
FOUNDATION pledged a significant gift to
create the FRITZ B. BURNS PLAZA, designed
by Frank 0. Gehry & Associates to link
the new Advocacy Center to the camp us.
"The students, faculty, alumni, administration
and staff are immensely grateful to each of
the members of the Foundation- Don
Freeberg, Joseph E. Rawlinson '58, Rex J.
Rawlinson '74, W.K. Skinner, Edward F.
Slattery and the late J. Robert Vaughan '39for their vision and philanthropic leadership
and their desire to maintain and enhance the
Law School's mission toward excellence,"
stated Dean Burcham. •!•

Loyola Law School's Information Technology Department employs 15 full-time
staff members, and is one of the largest information technology departments
of any comparable law school. However, understanding the technical jargon
that describes Loyola's information technology services can be intimidating.
From terabytes to gigabits, it would be the same for a lawyer explaining res
ipsa loquitur and comparative negl igence to his client. People's eyes
inevitably glaze over as the more complex explanation pours forth. So, it is
easy to take for granted the amount of work and dedication that goes into
running these campus services.

The Information Technology Department at Loyola Law School is continuing to
evolve rapidly to keep up with the School's classroom, research and administrative needs. Supporting these services is a state-of-the-art cabling infrastructure,
providing approximately 2500 network ports. Fourteen hundred of these ports
are currently active, with 1100 ready in reserve to meet future needs. The
network backbone includes 64-gigabit ports supporting current services. These
ports will be capable of supporting future high-bandwidth use, including
network distributed high-definition multimedia presentations originating from
the Girardi Trial Advocacy Center, or other locations on campus. In addition to
the cable-based network, the Law School has purchased wireless network
equipment that is being set up on an experimental basis.

Wired

Although the maJOrity of students bring their own laptop
computers to connect to the campus network, there are 400
modern personal computers on campus. There is also a wi de
range of digital services available from both on and off campus,
including email, calendaring, network storage, printing, remote
access, streaming digital audio and video, student information
systems, and extranet/intranet class web services. Delivering
these services are 25 high-performance servers that provide
over 3.2 terabytes (3 .2 million megabytes) of network-based
storage. Everyone in lTD is responsible for keeping Loyola's
computer network running and up-to-date; their work and
dedication speaks for itself. •!•

Around
[campus]
t 1s a pleasure to join the Loyola Law School
community. As the new assistant dean of admissions,
I look forward to building on an already admirable
national reputation. Loyola is well recognized for
its student interaction, high-quality academic programs,

320 students in the day division and 80 evening students.
Faculty members and staff were instrumental in showing
the pride of the Law School to prospective applicants
by conducting campus tours, seminars and informative
panel discussions. Faculty members were encouraged to
reach out to students to provide information on our
highly acclaimed academic programs. The strength of our
institution rests with its students, faculty and alumni.
This is why our c01runitment to build a strong channel of

The Personal Approach
to the Admissions Process
By Sonel Shropshire, Assistant Dean, Admissions

and notable alumni and faculty. The Office of Admissions
has had a successful yea r creating innovative programs
in recruitment and student involvement. Applicants have
been very receptive to our new form of "constant personal
contact" during the admissions process. In addition to
regular admissions updates, the Office of Admissions
has created phone-a-thons for admitted students, more
campus information seminars, and student mentor
programs for prospective applicants. We have a lso
improved our prospective student database to track
students throughout the admissions process. All of these
avenues will prove beneficial in maintaining the app licant's
interest in our law school.
During Fall2002, the Office of Admissions embarked on an
aggressive recruitment campaign. Over the course of four
months, we visited nearly 57 college venues, including seven
national law forums sponsored by the Law School
Admissions Council. We have developed specific recruitment
methods of targeting scholarship and legacy applicants.
As a result, we have received a record 5,500 app lications
for consideration for Fall 2003 enrollment. Although we
received most of our applications from colleges and
universities within California, we have significant and growing
representation from out-of-state institutions of higher education. Loyola 's recognition has reached into the competitive
undergraduate feeder schools of Harvard, Yale, Georgetown,
Cornell, University of Virginia and University of Florida.
The LSAT median of the admitted class was above the goth
percentile nationally, while the median grade point average
increased to 3.41. The Fall 2003 prospective enrollment is
I !•Wlf·iLAWYERI68

communication among our constituency has remained an
essential priority. Communication is the key to success. Every
applicant, organization and alumnus can provide innovative
suggestions on methods to improve our law school.
e have reemphasized our efforts in creating
a qualified and di verse student bod y. This
law school is a microcosm of the city it
resides in. Los Angeles has so much to
offer progressive students searching for a personalized law
school within a downtown environment. Our reach in legal
education will expand as we continue to develop new ways
of telling others about our vibrant law school and city.
I have tremendous pride in what we have been able to
accomplish as a law school-a pride that will continue as
we focus on the path of excellence in legal education. •!•

W

SONEL SHROPSHIRE joined
Loyola Law School in July 2002
after having been assistant dean
of admissions at Texas Wesleyan
University School of Law. He received
his juris doctor from the University of
Florida College of Law in 1997.

A ream
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t's a question I am asked frequently
in troubled economic times. Truth
be known, I am asked this question often throughout all phases of
the business cycle; boom, bust and in
between. I suppose it's most people's
way of asking "How's business?" In
considering my response, I often think
of a presentation made at Loyola by
legal career author Kimm Walton
(author of Guerilla Ta ctics for Finding
the Legal Job Of Your Dreams). She
said law students frequently (and
anxiously) ask "How's the market?" as
though that macroeconomic question
somehow bears direct releva nee on
their individual job searches. Walton
observed that if you've got a job, the
market is great; if not, well, then it's
lousy. Another way to put it is that
students should worry less about the
market and more about actually
conducting their job searches. My own
response to students is usually that it
depends on what you're looking for
and how well you've done in law
school. In reality, the market has various
segments-some of wh ich are available
to some students a nd not others.

I must confess that as director of
oyola's career services office, I am
never satisfied with the state of the
arket, even at its most robust,
because we in career services are always
striving for more for our students and
graduates-more opportunities, more
quickly, paying more money. These are
certainly trying times in which to strive
for more because the economic downturn has affected all three major legal
employment sectors: private firms,
government and public interest agencies.
During the 2002-03 school year alone,
we have seen two leading firms dissolve
entirely and a third close its branch
office in Los Angeles. What's more, the
trend toward consolidation of large
firms through mergers or acquisitions
continues unabated. Despite these
developments, during each of the last
three or four years, the percentage of
Loyola graduates employed within nine
months of graduation (the standard
benchmark) was well into the 90th
percentile. The reasons are manifold
and include the market's continuing
recognition that Loyola graduates
are ready to practice law. So often,
our students return from summer
clerkships and report that some of
their peers from more "elite" law
schools are ill-prepared to perform even
the most fundamental clerking task of
preparing a legal memo.

How's ther
By Graham Sherr,

ket?

Assistant Dean, Career Services

Ultimately, it doesn't really matter
how the market is because there is no
alternative to looking for a job. To
employers and alumni, I often respond
that the market is not as bad as one
might think from press reports of firm
layoffs and even closures, though it is
also not as robust as I would like.

Another reason for our students'
success is the dedicated effort of our
Assistant Director Marla Najbergier,
whose sole mtsston is assisting
graduates in securing employment.
This is a luxury few law schools
choose to afford, but one which Dean
Burcham believes is vital to our

graduates and the Law School. With
solid grounding in the employment
industry, and a true passion for helping
students and graduates find jobs,
Marla has been a godsend to our new
graduates and our department. Her
efforts could not be fully realized,
however, without the response of our
alumni who faithfully "reach back" to
hire our students and graduates. As
I write, the pleasant memory of the
recent alumni Grand Reunion is still
very fresh in my mind. For those of
us who are fortunate enough to work
at Loyola, it is always a pleasure to
encounter former students and learn
of their success. As a former headhunter, I find it especially rewarding
when graduates report securing
employment as a result of contact
with the career services office. At this
year's event, a graduate greeted me
and reported his satisfaction with
the firm to wh ich I had referred
him following his bankruptcy court
clerkship. A short while later the
long-time alumni Board of Governors
member who alerted me to that opening in the first place thanked me for
having referred the graduate, who
was a welcome addition to her firm.
As I often do, I replied, "That's why
I get up in the morning!" And it is.
When you get right down to it, the
market is really just an aggregation
of countless encounters such as
the "match" I just described. With the
continued support of Loyola's vast
and growing alumni network, I am
confident that we can provide a good
market to all our students. •:•
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VISIT THE ALUMNI WEB SITE OF EVENT SPECIFICS

18th

Las Vegas Alumni Reception
Home of John O'Reilly, las Vegas, NV

Alumni Student Mentor BBQ
law School Campus

Sacramento Chapter Meeting
Home of Judge Jeffrey Gunther '71
Carmichael, CA
28th

Latino Alumni Family Picnic
law School Campus

TBA

Entertainment Law Luncheon

26th

Attorney & Media Brunch

Hosted by Professor Jay Dougherty
Home of Professor Laurie Levenson

12th

Fresno Alumni Luncheon
Fresno, CA

13th

San Francisco Alumni Luncheon

14th

Sacramento Alumni Luncheon

San Francisco, CA
Firehouse Restaurant, Sacramento, CA
20th

Alumni Reception for Classes of
1999-2003

3rd

Swearing-in Ceremony for July
Test Takers, law School Campus

our alumni office was busy
this past year hosting many
alumni events. These events
included a Women of Loyola
Law School Dinner, an Alumni &
Student Mentor BBQ, a Latino "Fiesta,"
the Bob Cooney Golf Tournament, a
Small and Sole Practitioner Reception,
several Entertainment Luncheons, an
African American Alumni and Student
Jazz Mixer, an Orange County Alumni
Reunion, an Asian American Alumni
Get-Together, Brunch at the Magic
Castle, the Grand Reunion, and a
District Attorney Reception. Regional
and out-of-state events were held in
Palm Springs, Sacramento, San Diego,
San Francisco, Arizona and Hawaii.
An alumni gathering was also hosted
during the California State Bar's annual
meeting in Monterey.

Y

A[ound
[campus)
to make available on LAWnet. Only
alumni will have access to LAWnet,
which is password protected and maintained on the server. I hope you take full
advantage of the Web community and
its many benefits, including networking
and referral opportunities.
All alumni events and services are
designed to give you an opportunity
to stay connected with fellow alumni
and the law school. Our goal is to get
you involved and actively participating in alumni activities. At the end of
the last fiscal year, which ended on
May 31, 2003, 20 percent of alumni
attended a law school event or made
a gift to the law school. Our goal is
to increase the percentage of alumni

ALUMNI OFFICE OPEN

24/7

By Carmen Ramierez, Alumni Director
Long Beach Reception
Home of Dean David W. Burcham '84
long Beach, CA

TBA

African American Alumni Reception
law School Campus

TBA

Asian-American Alumni Reception
law School Campus

TBA

Alternative Career Panel & Reception

TBA

Entertainment Law Luncheon

19th

Orange County Reunion

l aw School Campus

26th

San Diego Luncheon
University Club, San Diego, CA

TBA

DC Area Alumni Reception
District of Columbia

TBA

AZ Area Alumni Reception
Phoenix, AZ

TBA

Dean's Forum Dinner
California Club, los Angeles

The alumni office also launched
a monthly electronic newsletter,
Alumni InBrief, in May 2002. Alumni
InBrief is designed to keep alumni
informed about fellow alumni and
current Law School and community activities- in an easy-to-read
format. A free e-mail forwarding
service was also made available to
alumni. Approximately 5000 alumni
are receiving the electronic newsletter
or taking advantage of the e-mail
forwarding service. If you would like
to receive Alumni InBrief or take
advantage of the free e-mail service,
please visit the alumni Web site at
http:/ / alumni.lls.edu.

TBA . Hawaii Alumni Reunion
Home of Benjamin Cayetano '71, Honolulu, HI

Miyawaki Moot Court Competition
Punahou High School, Honolulu, HI

TBA Grand Reunion
23rd

83rd Commencement Ceremony
Loyola Maryrnount Campus. Westchester, CA

http://alumni.lls.edu

This summer we launched an online
alumni community. LAWnet includes
an online directory allowing alumni to
locate fellow alumni by class year, area
of practice and even by geographic
location. LAWnet is a convenient resource
and communications tool. Alumni determine how much information they want

donors every year. Alumni partiCipation is extremely important because it is
a measurable indicator demonstrating
how much alumni value their alma
mater. Alumni support sends a strong
message to non-alumni donors that
the graduates of Loyola Law School
value their education.
he most important asset of
any great law school is its
alumni and the value that
they place on their alma
mater. Your participation and support
brings great value to the Law School
and even greater value to you as a
graduate of Loyola Law School. It is
through your support that Loyola 's
name will be recognized in both the
legal and academic worlds as the great
law school that it is.
I enco urage you to contact the alumni
office and let us hear how we can
better serve you. •!•
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Programs]
oyola Law School has in its
hold a trinity of success and
academic achievements. The
three law reviews, each with
its distinct field, enhance Loyola's
reputation with both dedication and
hard work. The student-run publications cleave three separate and distinct
categories, all finding their way through
the tangle of real world issues. The
goal of law review is to give reasoned
opinions on topics that will create
discussion and an open forum of
thought. Each distinct law review may
have its own subject matter; however,
the reviews come together to form
a trinity, building Loyola's reputation.
Each review selects staff members through
the annual Write-On Competition.
Competitors write an essay of approximately twelve pages based on a packet
of supplied research materials. This
essay is submitted along with the
application packet and is reviewed by
the current law review editors.

I

I.
I

Jerry C. Chow, executive editor of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for
2003-04, takes pride in the fact that
he is a member of a law review. Chow
considers "membership on law review
as one of the most prestigious honors
that a law student can achieve." Law
review is "important" because it offers
students "new academic challenges
and enables students to improve and
perfect their own writing styles."
According to Chow, "Members also
have the opportunity to interact with
professors and practicing attorneys,
allowing students to establish both
personal and professional contacts
outside the bounds of school."
IN.lo!ULAWYERI72

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
LAW REVIEW
To foster the idea of having an open
forum, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review (Law Review) adopted a
faculty-edited symposium format in
2002, which puts together a collection
of articles on a particular issue.
The new format allows symposium
editors to bring together top legal
experts and specialists from other

each with a different angle and
insight." Additionally, White is
pleased that the all-symposium format has encouraged intellectual
debate between scholars and authors.
In fact, the format has worked so
well that several other law reviews
across the country have contacted
the Law Review editors and staff to
learn more about switching to an allsymposium format.

TRINITY OF THOUGHT
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LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
LAW REVIEW

disciplines for an in-depth look at
emerging legal issues. This format also
generates a broader range of ideas.
erry White, editor-in-chief
for 2002-03, states, "Where
previously someone researching a particular topic might
have found one article helpful in
any given issue, he will now have a
variety of articles to choose from,

1(

INTERNATIONAL &
COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW

This all-symposium format showed its
worth when the Supreme Court cited
the LLR in their Eldred v Ashcroft decision. In Eldred v Ashcroft, the Supreme
Court examined whether Congresss'
extension of copyright terms exceeded
its power under the Copyright Clause
or violated the First Amendment.
Disney's copyright on Mickey Mouse,
who made his screen debut in 1928,
was due to expire in 2003. Disney's

rights to Pluto, Goofy and Donald
Duck were also in danger of expiring.
Coming to Disney's aid, Congress
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA), and rescued Mickey and his gang from the
public domain.

T

he staff cut their production
time almost in half to publish
their symposia of articles on
Eldred v. Ashcroft. LLR even
pre-published the page proofs in a
binder format and shipped them
directly to the Supreme Court before
it heard the case In a 7-2 decision,
the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress's extension of the existing
copyright terms did not exceed its
power under the Copyright Clause or
violate the First Amendment.

The student-run
publications cleave
three separate and
distinct categories,
all finding their way
through the tangle
of real world issues.

A YEAR OF CHANGE
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW
Amy Freeman, editor-in-chief for
2002-03 of Loyola's International and
Comparative Law Review (ILR),
realized ILR's need for growth.
Turning to the faculty for input,
Freeman gained perspective on the
future of ILR. Freeman recognized that
the ILR editors and staff must focus on
the challenge of keeping the articles
current through publication.

In response to faculty input, Freeman
worked with ILR editors and staff
to adjust the production process. The
first step was to redefine the roles of its
journal members. After clarifying each
role, the production process was redefined in relation to those roles. As a
result, the staff decided to cut production
from four to three issues a year. With
a longer production cycle, more articles
could be evaluated and developed,
resulting in a higher-quality journal.

posting articles on its web site. Kent
Lowry, editor-in-chief for 2002-03,
explained the change as an effort to continue meeting the needs of ELR's readers.
Posting articles on its web site, Lowry
explains, "maximizes accessibility and
overall interest in the journal."

The journal then concentrated on seeking
articles from professors and alumni.
"Receiving articles and ideas from
alumni and respected professors from all
over the country boosts the quality and
relevance of the issues we publish,"
notes Freeman. In a recent issue, Robert
Shapiro '68 authored an article entitled,
"The Impact of the Denmark-U.S.
Extradition Treaty on Tax Evasion."
In 2003, Loyola Law School presented
International Law Weekend, a two-day
conference that brings together legal
practitioners and academics to discuss
current issues in public and private
international law. The conference focused
on the following key issue: How globalization impacts the practice of law.
Selected papers from the conference will
be published in a forthcoming ILR.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW
The Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Review (ELR) recently began

The focus of ELR is dictated by its
subject matter. ELR prides itself ·
on publishing current articles written
by distinguished academics, members
of the Bar, and entertainment and
sports industry commentators.
On February 22nd of this year, the Law
School conducted its Fourth Annual
Entertainment Law Symposium, titled
"Tune In, Turn On, Cop Out? The
Media and Social Responsibility."
The symposium focused on various
media law issues, including media
liability for acts of audience violence,
investigative journalism, and the legal
issues surrounding television's newest
darling- "reality" shows. The symposium, organized by Professor Jay
Dougherty, brought national scholars,
top local media and constitutional
law litigators to the Loyola campus
for a day of panel arguments over
hypothetical fact patterns based on
real-world cases.
ther topics discussed at
the event included whether
violence in the media
causes violent behavior, the
changing conception of who a journalist
is in the world of the Internet, and
the implications of that for traditional
journalists and their ethical standards.
Lowry describes his work as exciting.
"We strive to appeal to both the
academic and the practical side of
the law." The law is a balance
between theory and real world interpretation, and ELR strives to give
its readers a diversity of issues. This
not only creates a high-quality journal,
but it also gives professors and
lawyers a continuing education on
today's legal issues. •!•
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ow time does fly! The Cancer Legal Resource
Center [CLRC] , a joint program of Loyola
Law School and the Western Law Center for
Disability Rights, recently entered its sixth
year of service, providing information and education on
cancer-related legal issues to the cancer community. The
CLRC is a clearing house, providing information on
cancer in the workplace, access to healthcare, changes in
health insurance law, government benefits, estate planning
and other issues of importance to cancer patients and
others impacted by the disease.

H

Since 1997, the CLRC has reached almost 24,000 cancer
patients/survivors, their families, friends and employers
through its Telephone Assistance Line, commu nity outreach
programs, workshops, conferences and other activities. Its
founding director, Barbara Ullman Schwerin '87, speaks
nationally on legal issues of importance to cancer survivors
and their families. The office is staffed by two additional
attorneys, J. Cai Ryan '97 and Joanna Fawzy '02. Joanna is a
Loyola Law School post-graduate public interest law fellow

Barbara Ullman Schwerin '84, director of CLRC, [rj with three extern sw dents.

Cancer
Legal Resource Center
Loyola's

Provides

Help for Those in Need

on a two-year fellowship from Loyola Law School. Additionally,
the CLRC is staffed with Loyola Law School student externs,
who are the "front door" to the program and handle the
Telephone Assistance line under the supervision of the CLRC
attorneys. There were 15 students externing at the CLRC in
Spring 2003. More than 100 LLS students served as externs at
the CLRC since its inception.
The CLRC also has a panel of attorneys who volunteer
their time to provide more in-depth legal information and
counsel to numerous callers to the CLRC. Approximately
50 attorneys and other professionals volunteer their time for
CLRC callers, sometimes simply by providing information
over the telephone, other times by writing letters or making
l!ow!U LAWYERI74

telephone calls on the caller's behalf. Without the help of
these volunteer attorneys, our CLRC callers would have
nowhere else to turn. In addition, Loyola Law School
offers a course in cancer law as part of the curriculum. •:•

If you are interested in volunteering your time at the CLRC, or know of attorneys
in other parts of California who might be interested in serving on its volunteer
panel, please contact Barbara Ullman Schwerin, Director, Cancer Legal Resource
Center, 919 S. Albany St., Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211 , telephone: 213.736.1455;
e-mail: Barbara.Schwerin@lls.edu

[Programs]
GREENE, BROILLET, PANISH & WHEELER LLP NATIONAL CIVIL TRIAL COMPETITION

A First Year Success
ourteen ABA-accredited law
schools participated in the
National Civil Trial Competition,
which ran November 14November 16, 2002. Elimination
rounds took place at the U.S.
Courthouse in Los Angeles. Campbell
University, Loyola Law School,
Syracuse and the University of Florida
competed in the semi-finals, with
Syracuse and the University of Florida
pairing up against each other in the
final round; all of which were argued
at Loyola's Albert H. Girardi Advocacy
Center. Each school sent a four-person
team and argued a hypothetical
wrongful termination case based on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Syracuse
received the finalist trophy, with semifinalist trophies awarded to Loyola
Law School and Campbell University.

F

The University of Florida team was
named champion of Loyola Law
School's first annual National Civil
Trial Competition. They were awarded
a permanent trophy for their school,
as well as a traveling trophy that will
be passed on to future champions.
Ryan Kerwin, from Syracuse University
College of Law, was named Best
Advocate/Final Rounds; and Christine
Ducat, from Temple University James
E. Beasley School of Law, was named
Best Advocate/Preliminary Rounds.
All judging was done anonymously.
Judges were drawn from the Los
Angeles legal community, with many of
them Loyola Law School alumni.
Participating were Los Angeles Superior
Court Judge Tomson T. Ong ' 83 and
U.S. Magistrate Judge Carla Woerle '77
of the US District Court, Central

District of California, who judged the
semi-final rounds. Retired Superior
Court Judge Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64
presided over the final round. •:•

II

... exposure t o
courtroom

dynamics at the
law school level
will result in
better lawyers.··
Timothy Whee ler, partner
Greene, Broil let, Pan ish & Whee ler LLP

Fall 2002 marked the inauguration of Loyola law School's
atio nal Civi l Tr ial Co mpetiti o n, mad e possi ble
t hro ugh the sponso rship of Greene, Broiller, Pan ish &
Wheeler, LLP of Santa M o nica, Ca li f. " Loyola Law
Schoo l is p leased ro be the first law school to host a
to urna ment of thi s ca li ber o n the West Coast," says
Associate Clini ca l Pro fesso r Susa n Poehls '89, the
to urn a ment's d irector a nd coach o f th e Loyola's Byrne
Tri a l Ad vocacy Tea m-w hi ch pa rticipa ted in t he
competi t io n. Poehl s is p ictu red here wi th the firm 's
partners Brow ne Greene, Bruce A. Bro illet a nd Ada m
Shea '93, w ho served as judges in the semi -fin al ro unds.
Brian J. Pa n ish, Mark Q uig ley, Christine Spagno li '86
a nd T imothy J. Whee ler '78 of the fi rm also participa ted as judges. Whee le r, a ma naging pa rtner, stated,
"We are pleased to sponsor [the tournament] beca use
we are convinced that ea rl y ex pos ure to co urtroo m

dyna mics a t the law stu de nt level w ill result in better
lawye rs. Our hope is t hat t hi s competitio n w ill encourage th e natio n's law schoo ls to fo ll ow Loyola's exampl e by adding mo re hands-on tra ining to their curric ul a,
and by ho lding regio nal competiti o ns tha t enco urage
tria l ad vocacy skill s."

Loyola Law Schoo l's Byrne Trial Advocacy Tea m nabbed third place at the first tria l com petitio n ever held at
t he d owntow n l os Angeles law school. T he National Civil Trial Com petitio n was held in mid -November 2002.
Pictu red are members of t he Loyola tea m with members of the law firm : II to r l Ma rc us M usante (rea m), Larry
Law rence (rea m ), Emil y Terre ll (rea m), Brow ne G reene, Sheri Webb (rea m), Kris Diulio (ream ), Ma rry Pritik in
(coach ), Jo hn H enry (coach) a nd Bruce Bro il let.
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conflict, consumer problem, employment dispute-or any
other type of conflict. The Court also routinely refers cases
to the Center each month.

Helping more than 17,000 Los Angeles-area
residents resolve sometimes difficult issues is
no small task. "We are busy helping our
community avoid costly legal battles year
round," says Marta Gallegos, associate director
for the Law School's public interest center.
After 10 years of service to the community,
the Center has saved Los Angeles residents
hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation
fees, and has assisted thousands of people in
finding solutions to everyday problems.

The Center provides mediation, conciliation and facilitation
services to hundreds of satisfied clients daily. Mediation is a
process where the parties work together toward a resolution
that tries to meet every party's interests. The parties to the
conflict voluntarily meet face to face and with the help of
a neutral mediator, try to resolve their conflict by talking
directly to each other. The mediator does not decide how
the dispute is to be resolved; the parties do. Any conflict
might be resolved in this way if the parties are willing to
try. The Center also provides convenient concilia tion.
This type of conflict resolution involves a neutral conciliator
who helps the parties resolve their conflict by talking to the
parties separately, often on the telephone. Facilitation is
not a kind of conflict resolution but rather a way to avoid
potential conflicts. Neutral Center facilitators are availa ble
to attend meetings to help parties talk to each other in
wa ys to try to avoid conflicts.

Loyola Law School's

CENTER FOR Conflict Resolution

cELEBRATEs

10 Years Serving the Community

A

s part of Loyola Law School's commitment to
public interest law, the School's on-campus
Center For Conflict Resolution provides critically
needed alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
services to low-income and Spanish-speaking residents of
Los Angeles. The Center's mission is to expand the availability
of problem-solving alternatives to costly litigation to the
low-income community and to train lawyers to understand
the benefits of alternative dispute resolution. The Center
recently expanded its services to include a court mediation
project. Professional mediators co-mediate with Loyola
Law School students. These services are free of charge or at
a sliding-scale cost to those who can afford to pay.
The Center is staffed with both English- and Spanish-speaking
mediators and conciliators who are experienced in helping
people resolve any dispute. The staff includes both attorneys
and law-students that have completed a rigorous training
program. Local residents are encouraged to call with
their issues, whether it is a landlord-tenant dispute, family
i!•$1•1N LAWYERI76

The Center regularly conducts trainings in mediation, conciliation and facilitation skills on site or at the Law School. The
Center has, to date, assisted in training more than 250 community groups to demonstrate how their programs can benefit
from using ADR problem-solving techniques. •:•

GROUPS INCLUDE: The A.CL.U; Alcohol and Drug Council of Greater L.A.; Angel's Flight;
The Archdiocese of L.A.'s Justice and Peace Commission, Office for Vocations, Office of
Justice and Peace; Asian Pacific American Legal Center; Bet Tzedek Legal Services; Center
for Human Rights and Constitutional Law; Central Juvenile; Community Youth Gang
Services; Department of Child and Family Services; Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission; Family Service Of L.A; L.A. Boys and Girls Club; L.A. City Board of Education;
L.A. City Housing Authority; L.A. County Bar Association- DRS; L.A. Superior Court·A.D.R.
Services; L.A. Unified School District (LAUSD); L.A.P.D. Newton Division; Mattei Learning
Center; Planned Parenthood L.A.; Salvation Army; San Fernando Valley Girl Scout Council;
Santa Monica AIDS Projed; YMCA an d countless others.
STAFF: Mary B. Cu lbert, director; Marta S. Gallegos, associate director; mediators: Sara
Campos, Gabriela DeAnda, Monica Ruvalcaba Gerken and John S. Rodriguez.

Approximately 200

The Manatt, Phelps
& Phillips/Loyola Law School

Annual Trial Institute
Will Address Issues Facing
Trial Lawyers and Corporate Counsel

Loyola students
participated in the
Volunteer Income Tax
Preparation externship
this year. Students
provided over 4,400

oyola Law School and the
firm of Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips, LLP have created an
annual trial institute to
address current issues facing trial
lawyers and their clients. "The Trial
Institute presenters will include the
nation's best civil and criminal lawyers,
prosecutors, trial judges, jury consultants, corporate lawyers, legislators and
technical advisors," says Dean David
W. Burcham '84.

L

The main theme for the initial
presentation will be "Corporation as
Litigant" and is planned for November
7, 2003, in the Robinson Courtroom
at the Law School. Director of
Loyola's Ethical Advocacy Program,
Professor Laurie Levenson, will serve
as institute coordinator. The day-long
event will begin with breakfast and
registration and include three panels,
lunch and keynote speaker address,
and conclude with a cocktail reception. Speakers and panelists w ill
include nationally recognized trial
lawyers, government officials and
corporate leaders.

Southern California. It is only appropriate that Loyola Law School, which
is recognized as producing many of
the finest trial lawyers in the country,
sponsor such an important event,"
said Craig J. de Recat, co-chair of
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips's national
litigation practice.
"I am exceedingly grateful to Paul
Irving '80 an d Craig de Recat '82 as
well as the firm of Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips for making this series of
annua l advocacy events possible,"
expressed Burcham. •!•

services to ten VITA sites
throughout the
Los Angeles area, and
prepared more than
2,500 returns for mostly
low-income and elderly
citizens, saving taxpayers

November 7, 2003

an average of $45 to $65
per return, had they

ROBINSON COURTROOM

"The purpose of this Institute is to
bring together the nation's leading
authorities to discuss evolving issues
and challenges faced by the legal community and those it serves. This is the
first and only event of this kind in

hours of tax preparation

LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL

needed the services
of traditional preparers.

L

claims that are "equally strong," which
comports with what one instinctively
feels to be fair.

[Programs]

This is not Solomonic. Solomon
offered to divide the contested baby
not because he shrugged his legal
shoulders, but rather as a psychological
ploy to tease out the facts. Solomon
never intended to split the baby, and
a modern-day Solomon should not
have ordered the ownership of the
baseball to be divided.

A HIGHER AUTHORITY

Salam

)

HE AIN'T

By Yitzchok Adlerstein and Michael Broyde
Special to the National Law Journal. February 3, 2003.
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s the arbiter of the Barry
Bonds 73rd home run ball
dispute, San Francisco
Superior Court Judge Kevin
McCarthy struck out with his decision
that Alex Popov and Patrick Hayashi
had to arrange, by Dec. 30, 2002, to sell
the ball and split the anticipated $1 million. Contrary to media blandishments,
McCarthy is no Solomon. Indeed,
neither Popov nor Hayashi has been
willing to go along with his order, so the
case continues to languish.
When Bonds knocked his record-breaking home run into the right field stands
in October 2001, Popov caught the ball
into the upper part of his glove's
webbing, only to be set upon by a mob
of competitors, struggling to grab it
away. Hayashi, felled by the same stampede, managed to spot the ball on the
ground and to pocket it. Popov sued,
arguing that his stopping the ball was
sufficient to constitute legal possession.
McCarthy struggled with competing
definitions of possession. We will
never know, he reasoned, whether

Reprinted by permission.

Popov could have succeeded in establishing complete control over the ball,
if not for the illegal and violent actions
of a mob. That mob needs to hear
a strong message of disapproval. On
the other hand, he was convinced
that Hayashi-who emerged with
unequivocal control of the ball-had
done nothing wrong.
McCarthy rightly rejected suggestions
that the limited steps Popov took to
possess the ball themselves constituted
legal possession: To catch a baseball
requires more than blocking its progress.
Popov never had possession and thus
never acquired title. On the other
hand, McCarthy's sense of moral
outrage led him to invent, in equity,
a "prepossessory interest" sufficient
to "cloud" the clear possession of the
law-abiding Hayashi.
Having convinced himself that each
claimant has an equally reasonable
and equally incomplete argument,
McCarthy turned to Roman law
for a save and relied on the equitable
remedy of division to resolve competing

Equity is meant to address gaps m
the law, to be used when individual
circumstances, or unclean hands of
one party, prevent the law from
performing the way it was designed.
Neither of these considerations applied
to our disputed baseball. Equity should
not have been invoked.
Judge McCarthy would have been
better served going to a more majorleague rule book: the Talmud (ancient
rabbinic writings). Jewish law, the
oldest continuously practiced legal
system known to man, would have
provided him with far more incisive
and nuanced guidance. A third century
Mishna (early redaction of rabbinic
law) opens with a discussion of two
people, each of whom has spotted an
abandoned garment. They arrive in
court, each holding on to an end
and claiming full ownership as the
first to pick it up. Further discussion
yields what one could call the laws of
intractable and insoluble dilemmas.

T

he Talmud introduces a
variety of tools. Courts can
sometimes walk away from
the decision process (insufficient evidence of claim on either side).
They can send contested property into
a judicial limbo (as a disincentive to false
claims). They can, on rare occasions,
summarily award contested property
to an individual litigant (through
extrajudicial weighing of truthfulness,
as Solomon did).

T

hey can also divide the trophy.
But division is appropriate
only if both parties have
physical possession, either
in whole or in part, directly or by
proxy. There must exist at least the
possibility that the division ordered
by the court could match a factual
scenario- both parties could have
found the item at the same time, and
taken legal title simultaneously, making
them joint owners. Neither of these
criteria obtained in the baseball case;
either Popov or Hayashi is the "real"
owner, but not both.

Possession, according to Jewish law,
not the phantom of "prepossessory
interest," is critical. Hayashi wound
up with clear possession. Popov could
trump that in Jewish law only by
showing that Hayashi's possession
was illegal, in that Popov had satisfied
the legal requirements for possession
first. Popov would have to demonstrate that, but for the interference
of the crowd, the ball would
have completely and fully lodged
in his mitt. (This "but for" standard
for legal possession is assumed by
another third century Mishna, and
falls halfway between the poles of
absolute, complete control and that

s
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of partial control, both offered by the
completing legal lights that McCarthy
consulted.) Because Popov could, or
can, do nothing of the sort, Hayashi's
claim should prevail.

UPDATE:

San

Francisco

Superior

Court Judge Kevin McCarthy ruled
on December 18, 2002, that Alex

Jewish law insists on at least a stab at
"fairness." The court is instructed to
attempt to coax the litigants to arrive
at a solution through compromise,
for the sake of communal peace and
tranquility. But if the parties wish to
know what the law says, they-and
society- should be able to hear it,
loudly and clearly. "Let the law pierce
the mountain," says the Talmud.
Neither compromise nor equity
should substitute for the rule of law.

Popov and Patrick Hayashi each had
legitimate claims to Barry Bond's
record setting 73rd home run baseball. Popov lost the baseball in a
skirmish and Hayashi managed to
pick up the ball in the melee. The
court opted for the middle ground,
ordering the baseball to be sold
and the proceeds divided equally
between

the

two

parties.

Todd

McFarlane, the man who paid $3.2
million for Mark McGwire's 70th

Barry Bond's home run generated a
judge's dilemma, somewhat akin to
a fielder who cannot decide whether
to throw to first or second. Throwing
it halfway between the bases is not
an option. •:•

homerun ball in 1999, bought the
Barry Bonds baseball at auction for
$450,000. After the auction, Popov
said disappointedly, "It was about
history. It wasn't about the money.
I've got 20 months of joy out of the
experience. It was unpredictable.
I had no expectations." Hayashi,

Yitzchok Adlerstein holds the Sydney M.
Irmas Chair in Jewish Law and Ethics at
Loyola Law School. Michael Broyde is a
law professor at Emory University
School of Law and academic director of
its law and religion program.
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unsure whether he would make any
money, concluded, "In the end, it's
probably going to be a wash."

L

DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES MARR I OTT HOTE L

Who should attend:
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Attorneys
Accounta nts
CEOs & CFOs of Tax-Exempt Organizations
Directors & Trustees of Nonprofit Organizations

Sponsored By Internal Revenue Service and Loyola Law School

[ Information 213.736.1423 ]

th am~ndm~nt
By Allan Ides, Professor of l aw
and William M. Rains Fellow

We are primed to accept the familiar.
Patterns recur in our perceptions almost
because we will them to do so. This is as
true in constitutional law as it is in everyday
life. Occasionally, however, our brains escape
the habits of familiarity and allow us to
perceive something old in a new way.
his is usually the res ult of some random,
inexplicable occurrence. Consider this essay as
the product of such an accid ent, an intellectual
bump in the night. Suddenly, after teaching the
9th Amendment for 19 years, the famili ar began to look
different . This is what occurred to me.

A FAMILIAR VIEW
OF THE gTH AMENDMENT
In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion relied in part on the 9th Amendment as a basis
for establishing the unconstitutionality of Connecticut's
contraceptive ban. See 38 1 U.S. 4 79, 48 6 (1965 ). Goldberg
did not treat the 9th Amendment as an independent
repos itory of judicially enforceable rights, but as a liberal
rule of construction inviting the judici ary to construe
enumerated rights broadly, including the liberty protected
by the due process clause. The essence of his opinion was
that the 9th Amendment, although creating only a rule of
construction, was a rights-oriented vehicle through which
the judiciary could discover and enforce non-text ual rights.

Justices Black and Stewart objected strongly to this view.
Id. at 507, 520 (Black, J., dissenting); Id. at 527, 529-530
{Stewart, J., dissenting). The 9th Amendment, according
to them, was to be read along with the 10th Amendment as
reflecting nothing more than an obvious principle of
federa li sm, namely, that the federal government co uld
exercise only those powers granted to it.
Goldberg's opinion has an immediate appeal to it.
The 9th Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, sha ll not be construed
to deny or disparage others reta ined by the people. "
The reference to " rights not enum era ted " strongly
suggests-promises would not be too strong a word-that
these rights have a constitutiona l status similar to those
found elsewhere in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Indeed, on one reading, Goldberg may not have gone far
enough when he simply treated the 9th Amendment as a
liberal rule of construction. The language of the 9th
Amendment could easily be construed to embrace a body of
" unenumerated " substantive rights that are enforceab le by
the judiciary in the same manner as enumerated rights, and at
certain points Goldberg's opinion suggests as much. That
broader possibility aside, the remarks made by James
Madison in proposing the measures that eventually became
the Bill of Rights confirm Goldberg's basic premise that the 9th
Amendment created a constitutional guarantee that rights not
enumerated in the Constitution were nonetheless protected:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights,
that, by enumerating particular exceptions to
the grant of power, it wo uld disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that
those rights which were not singled out, were
81i!oU.lt·iLAWYERI

intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible
arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system;
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see
by turning to the last clause of the fourth
resolution (the 9th Amendment). I Annals of
Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834).
To the extent that this vision invites a type of freewheeling
judicial activism, however, it may foster legitimate concerns
regarding the proper scope of judicial review within our
system of representative democracy.

T

he more circumscribed approach suggested by
Black and Stewart surely derives from such
concerns. Their interpretation of the relevant
provisions, however, downplabs the obvious textual
differences between the 9th and lOt Amendments. The
10th Amendment articulates the precise reserved powers
principle credited by Black and Stewart. It speaks in terms
of reserved powers: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." The 9th Amendment, on the other hand, refers to
rights and responds to a very different concern, namely, the
fear that a specification of rights might be read to disparage

something. And was Goldberg so clearly right? It certainly
is not obvious that the 9th Amendment was intended to
invite the judicial enforcement of non-textual rights. It may
have been, but why foreclose other plausible alternatives?
Why not assume, for purposes of curiosity if nothing else,
that Black and Stewart were right (or at least less wrong
than a first reading suggests) and see where that takes us?

A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
Our new working premise: The 9th and 10th Amendments
create a coordinated response to the fear that the
Constitution established a central government with virtually unlimited powers. The 9th speaks in terms of retained
rights, while the 10th refers to reserved powers. Both are
addressed toward the national government, the source of
the fear motivating their adoption. Taken together, these
amendments represent a microcosm of the frequently intersecting themes of structure and rights that permeates the
constitutional text. They are designed to ensure that the
national government stays within its assigned sphere of
authority and competence. That sounds nice, but how does
this coordinated model work without rendering the 9th
Amendment a redundancy? To answer this we must first
trace the source of American political power and then
examine how "retained rights" operate within a system in
which that power is both shared and withheld.
All power within our constitutional system can be divided into
two types, the powers granted to the national government

All power within our constitutional system
can be divided into two types, the powers granted
to the national government and those reserved
under the 1Oth Amendment.
others left unmentioned. As such, the 9th Amendment says
something quite different from the 10th. Yet, under the
Black/Stewart thesis, the text of the former appears to have
no independent meaning. It apparently does no more than
establish the same principle of federalism that is implicit in
the text of the Constitution and explicitly described in the
10th Amendment- the national government is a government of limited powers. Or so it would appear.
The Black/Stewart thesis seems so obviously flawed as a
matter of textual interpretation that one's instinct is to
ignore it entirely. But this off-handed dismissal may have
been premature. Whatever we may say of them, Black and
Stewart were not ciphers who lacked the ability to read and
compare passages of constitutional text. We may be missing
l !t$'l•lf·1LAWYERlB2

and those reserved under the 10th Amendment. Since the
people are the sovereigns of both the federal and state
governments, it follows that the reserved powers, just like
the granted powers, find their authority in the people. The
text of the 10th Amendment implicitly embraces this premise.
The powers not granted are reserved to the "States respectively, or to the people," the order suggesting that the
people are the font of all political power. The reservation
to the states simply recognizes that the people have ceded
some of that authority to their respective states. Therefore,
just as the people have defined the range of federal power,
the people of each state are free to determine what quantum
of reserved powers may be exercised by their respective
state government. Seen in this light, the 10th Amendment
is not simply a protection of abstract federalism, but a

recognition of the people's right to determine the proper
allocation and reservation of governmental powers at
both the national and state level. In other words, it is
premised on liberty.
As to the retained rights, it's perfectly clear that the people
of a state can limit the exercise of the reserved powers to
protect individual liberties against state incursion. They
can do this by withholding power, as suggested above, or
by imposing specific limitations on the powers they choose
to vest in their state governments. Thus, as to the latter, a
state constitution may include a bill of rights that limits
the exercise of the powers vested in the state. But the
retained rights referred to in the 9th Amendment are rights
held in opposition to the exercise of national power and
state constitutions are not usually thought of as designed
to check federal power. So these observations do not take
us very far toward understanding the interrelationship
between the 9th and 1oth Amendments. We still must
determine how the retained rights work in tandem with
the reserved powers to protect the invasion of those rights
by the national government.
One plausible explanation is that the reserved powers
embrace an authority to resist federal transgressions of the
retained rights. Stated somewhat differently, the purpose of
the reservation of the "unenumerated" powers is to ensure
the retention of the "unenumerated" rights. I am assuming
here that the reservation of powers was not premised on an
abstract desire to preserve state sovereignty, but at least in
part on a pragmatic desire to protect liberty through a vertical
dispersal of power. Madison suggested as much in the
Federalist Papers: "The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people .... " The Federalist, No. 45, at 292-293
(James Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). If that is so, the
rights retained by the people may well be those rights that
the people define through the exercise of their reserved
powers. Indeed, how else are those rights to be given
constitutional stature vis-a-vis the federal government? (We
have implicitly set aside the Goldberg solution.)
een in this light, the coordinated 9th and 10th
Amendments offer a striking example of the
Madisonian precept that the ultimate purpose of
federalism (and separation of powers) is to create
counteracting forces of power as a double security for the
protection of liberty. The Federalist, No. 51, at 323 (James
Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition." Id. at 322. If the 9th and 10th
Amendments are treated as either truisms or platitudes, there
is nothing to counteract the force of national power. The
double security is lost. Similarly, one might argue that relying

solely on federal courts to enforce the core of the 9th
Amendment is to place the candy in the crib. But treating the
9th and 10th Amendments as a coordinated response to federal power fits cleanly within the model of counteractin~
"ambitions" endorsed by Madison. Thus, just as the 14t
Amendment provides security a~ainst the state abuse of individual rights, the 9th and 10t Amendments may provide
security against the federal abuse of such rights, creating a
liberty enhancing tension.

COMPARING THE TWO MODELS
In essence, the above explanation gives the people of each
state a potential trump on the exercise of federal power.
Certainly this is quite different from the orthodox view of
national supremacy. Is such a regime even possible or have
we (I) fallen through a constitutional rabbit hole?
Before answering that question, an example may help us
see how this restructured constitutional regime might
operate. Suppose the people of a state, through a proper
resort to the initiative process, enact a measure legalizing
the medical use of marijuana by persons for whom the drug
will provide the only means of relief from excruciating
pain, nausea, or the like. Such use is, of course, contrary to
the federal Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") which
makes the possession of marijuana a felony. Assume the
federal government seeks to enforce the CSA against an
individual who qualifies to use marijuana under the above
state law. What role might the 9th and 10th Amendments
play in that individual's defense?

If we follow the standard model, the defendant would use
the 9th Amendment as part of her substantive due process
argument, hoping for a generous construction of the word
"liberty." Here the defendant would have to establish thatvictim of animus.3
Continued on page 107
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Beyond campus lecture halls,
the Loyola Law School
faculty share their expertise
with the world-through
CINDY I.T. ARCHER

their published works
in law journals and
casebooks, through their
paper and symposium
presentations, through their
bar association committee
work, and through volunteer
involvement for the public's

Ca lifornia Tax-Exempt Organizations and at the
West Coast Women's Forum of the Georgetown
University Law Center, an d moderated presentations at conferences of the Los Angeles
County Bar and American Bar Association Tax
Sections. In addition, Aprill heads the planning committee for the Fifth Annua l Western
Conference on Tax-Exempt Organizations, and
co ntinues her participation in the American Bar
Association 's Section of Taxation as a member
of the Executive Committee of the Teaching
Tax Committee, of the Section's aminating
Committee- and its Judicial Deference Task
Force. She also continues to serve as a member
of the Investment Policy Oversight Group of
the Law School Admissions Council, and th e
Academic Advisory Board of the Tannewa ld
Fo undation for Excellence in Tax Scholarship.
ASSOCIATE CLINICAL PROFESSOR CINDY I.T. ARCHER,

benefit. Here is an update
on their recent professional
accomplishments.

john E. Anderson
professor of tax law and director of th e Tax
LL.M. program, published an article en titled
"Personage and Tax Policy: Rethinking the
Exclusion," in 96 Tax Notes 1243 (2002),
reprinted in Exempt Organization Tax Review
(October 2002 ). Aprill authored the entry on
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for a threevolume work entitled Major Acts of Congress.
She has joined the Editoria l Board for a forthcoming textbook series des igned fo r Tax LL.M.
courses, and has been appo inted to the Planning
Committee of the University of So uthern
California Institute on Federal Taxation. Apri ll
spoke at a seminar on Advanced Is ues for

PROFESSOR ELLEN APRILL,
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professor of Ethics, egotiations, and Writing,
gave a Continuing Legal Education (CLE )
presentation wi th Professor T herese Maynard,
"Ethical Business Lawyers in a Post-Enron
Wor ld," before a gro up of Orange County
alu mni this past spring. The program provided
an overview of the SEC's new professional
responsibility rules, and compared and contrasted them to the current obligations of a
California lawyer. Archer was recently awarded
a research grant to stu dy th e roles of lawyers
and clients in legal negoti ations, th e effect of
technology, and the ethi ca l dilemmas that arise
as a result of divergent training and roles of
lawyers and clients .
PROFESSOR WILLIAM D. ARAIZA participated in
the Consti tutiona l Law Professors Roundtable
on the First Amendment at Brandeis School
of Law, Univers ity of Louisville in Louisville,
Kenrucky, las t November. The sa me month,
Ara iza published Th e First Amendment: Cases,
Dialogues and Comparative Perspectives
(A nderson Publishing Co., 2002). Araiza

JEFFERY C. ATIK

JAN C. COSTELLO

served as a visitin g professor at the University
of Western Ontario in London, Ontario,
Ca nada, in January; as a panelist at the SocioLegal Studies Association Conference in Leeds,
England, in April; and as a visiting lecturer at
the University of Mainz in Mainz, Germany,
also in April. More recently, Araiza spoke at
Macquarie University and th e University of
Western Sydney, both in Sydney, Australia,
on "H ate Speech a nd Free Speech;" and his
paper "Tales from the Net: Captive Audiences,
Children and the Home" was recently listed
on Social Science Research etwork's (SSRN )
"Top Ten " download list for "Constitutional
Law Recent Hits" and "Cyberspace Law
Recent Hits."
PROFESSOR JEFFERY C. ATIK (Sayre Macneil
Fellow) has been appointed by the United
States Trade Representa tive (USTR) and the
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade to a five-member binational
panel to review the imposition of anti-dumping
duti es by th e Un ited States on softwood lumber
imported from Ca nada. Atik also continues
to serve on a U.S./Mexican binational panel
reviewing anti-dumping duties imposed on
certain Mexican steel products. During fall
2002, Atik taught international law at UCLA
School of Law. In March 2003, Atik and his
Loyola
AFTA semi nar students traveled to
Tijuana, Mexico to participate with faculty
and stud ents of th e law schoo l at Universidad
Iberoa mericana-Tijuana in a bili ngua l discussion of a NAFTA investment case. In Apri l,
Atik moderated a panel discussion, "Is the
International Trade Regime Fair to Developing
States?" at the annual meeting of the American
Society of Internationa l Law in Washington,
D.C. During summer 2003, Atik taught in
Loyol a's summer program in Bologna, Ita ly,
and in Suffolk Law School 's summer program
in Lund, Sweden. His forthcoming publications
include "The Weakest Link-Demonstrating

MARY B. CULBERT

F. JAY DOUGHERTY

the Inconsistency of 'Appropriate Levels
of Protection' in Australia-Salmon," Risk
Analysis, available at SSRN (date posted Feb.
14, 2003) and "Science and International
Trade-Third Generation Scholarship, " 26
B.C. Jnt'l & Comp. L. Rev. (fo rthcoming 2003)
(with David Wirth) .
ASSOCIATE CLIN ICAL PROFESSOR SUSAN SMITH
BA KH SH IA N '91 served as a presenter at the
Rock y Mountain Regional Legal Writing
Conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
in March 2003. Bakhshian's presenration
addressed rhe process of crafting legal writing
problems that encourage integration of written
and electronic legal research skills.
PROFESSOR ROBERT W . BENSON , in his role
as director of the pro bono International
Law Project for Human, Econom ic and
Environmental Defense (HEED), helped
organize the Los Ange les community's participation in the United Nation's World Summit
on Sustainable Development in johannesburg,
South Africa, in September of 2002. Stanford
Law School's public interest law program
invited Benson to make a presentation
at irs annual "Shaking the Foundations"
winter conference. H e also was a speaker and
organizer for the
arional Lawyers Guild
Annual Convention, addressing the topics
of "Recolonization of the Third World" and
" Recruiting Women and Latinos into the
Battle Against Free Trade. " Working with
the Foundation for Taxpa yer and Consumer
Rights, Benson drafted the Corporate Three
Strikes Act (S.B.335 ), introduced in the
California legislature by State Senator Gloria
Romero. The bill would revoke the corporate
charters of companies convicted of three
felonies within any 10-year period . Later in the
academic year, Benson testified in Sacramento
before t he State Senate J udiciary Committee
and the Senate Govern ment Orga ni zation

EDITH Z. FRIEDLER

V ICTOR GOLD

Committee on the Act he drafted , and another
corporate reform bill. Both bills were repo rted
out of committee favorably.
CLINICAL

PROFESSOR

BARBARA

A.

BLANCO,

the faculty externship director at Loyola Law
School, presented a panel at the conference
"Externships: Learning from Practice " in
March at the Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law. The panel addressed
the issu e of promoting effective off-campus
externship supervision of experience in the
field, and a paper on the subject is to follow. In
November 2002, Professors Blanco and Sande
Buhai presented an ethics seminar for legal
services lawyers at Bet Tzedek Lega l Services
in Los Angeles. Blanco continues to be active
in pro bono activ ities invo lving her community
free clinic, as well as with equestrian organizations and horse rescue groups.
ASSOCIATE CLINICAL PROFESSOR JEAN BOYLAN

'86 wrote the article, "Crossing the Divide:
Why Improving Success for Nontraditional Law
Students Requires Summer Programs at Every
Law School," has been published in St. Mary's
L. Rev. on Minority Issues, (S pring 2003);
and "Abandonment of Contract Doctrine in
Construction Disputes " has been republished
in the Legal Handbo ok for Architects,
Engineers, and Contractors, edited by Alben
Dibb. The book selects cutting-edge articles
in construction litigation for republication.
In addition, Boylan gave a presentation last
summer at the National Academic Supporr
Conference on "Designing a Bar Preparation
Program to Enhance Success in Bar Passage. "
PROFESSOR
SANDE
BUHAI
'82,
faculty public interest law director at Loyola
Law School, gave a presentation with Professor
Barbara Blanco entitled "Ethics for Legal
Services Attorneys" at Bet T zedek in Los
Angeles, November 2002. She also presented
CLINICAL

BRYAN D. HULL

"The Ethics of Getting and Keeping Clients
and Getting Paid " before the Women Lawyer's
Association of Los Angeles in January 2003.
Buhai participated in a panel discussion of
"Promoting Effective Supervision" at Catholic
University's Externship Conference in March.
Her most recent article, "Honor Thy Mother
and Father: Preventing Elder Abuse through
Education and Litigation," has been published
in the 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (Winter 2003 ).
Buhai continues to serve on the board of
directors of the Western Law Center for
Disability Rights and UnCommon Good.
PROFESSOR ROBERT S. CHANG (J. Rex Dibble
Fellow) is one of two Loyo la Law School
professors listed on the "50 Most Cited Faculty
Who Entered Teaching Since 1992" [New
Educationa l Qua lity Ratlkings of U.S . Law
Schools]. Chang has published : "Closing Essay:
Developing a Co ll ective Memory to Imagine
a Better Future," 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1601
(2002) (Symposium : Critical Race Studies);
" Critiquing 'Race' and Irs Uses: Critical
Race Theory 's Uncompleted Argument, "
in Crossroads, Directions, and a New
Critical Race Theory 87 (Francisco Valdes,
Jerome Culp, & Angela Harris eds., Temple
University Press, 2002); '"Forget the Alamo':
Race Courses as a Struggle Over History and
Collective Memory," 13 Berkeley La Raza L.
]. 113 (2003 ); "The Sojourner's Truth and
Other Stories," 55 Univ. of Florida L. Rev. 479
(2003 ); and "When Interests Diverge," 100
Mich. L. Rev. 1532 (2002) (reviewing Mary L.
Dud ziak, Cold War Civil Rights (2001 )) (with
Peter Kwan ). Chang's forthcoming articles
are "After Intersectionality," 71 UMKC Law
Review (2002 with Jerome Cu lp); "Teaching
Asian Americans and the Law : Struggling
with History, Identity, and Po litics," 10 Asian
L. ]. (2003); "(Racial) Profiles in Courage, or Can
We Be Heroes, Too?" 66 Albany L. Rev. (2003) .
Chang gave the presentation, "Who Are
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(Updates]
You Rooting For? Transnationalism, the World
Cup, and War," at the Conference on
Transnationalism, Ethnicity and the Public
Sphere at the Center for Critica l Theory and
Transnational Studies, at the Un iversity of
Oregon in February 2003; and he served as a
presenter on "(Racial) Profiles in Courage, or
Can We Be Heroes, Too?" at the symposium
"Confronting Realities: The Legal, Moral,
and Constitutional Issues Involving Diversity"
at Albany Law School, New York City, in
ovember 2002.
will be publishing her article entitled "When Free Exercise
Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and
the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of
rhe Catholic Hospital Conflict" in th e Oregon
Law Review (January 2004) . In addition,
Clark hosted and moderated a panel discussion
at Loyola Law School last spring entitled
"Healthcare Professionals Shortage: California
in Crisis," sponsored by the Los Angeles
County Bar Association- Health Law Section.
She also continues to serve on rwo boards at
the California Hospital Medical Center: the
Institutional Review Board, which reviews proposals for research on human subjects, and the
Biom~dical Ethics Committee, which advises on
ethical conflicts relating to end-of-life issues.
PROFESSOR BRIETTA R. CLARK

published three
articles in the areas of children and the law and
mental disability law: "Why Have Hearings
for Kids If You ' re Not Going to Listen?":
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to
Mental Disability Proceedings for Minors, 71
U. Cincinnati L. Rev. 19 (2002); "Wayward
a nd Noncompliant" People Wirh Mental
Disabilities: What Advocates of Involuntary
Outpatient Commitment Can Learn From the
Juvenile Court Experience With Status Offense
Jurisdiction, 9 Psycho/., Pub. Pol'y & L 233
(2003); and "The Troubl e Is They're Growing,
the Trouble Is They're Grown": Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Adolescents' Participation in
Mental Health Care Decisions, 29 Ohio N .U.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) Costello spoke
PROFESSOR JAN C. COSTELLO

ALAN IDES

KURT T. LASH

on "International Law Agreements Affecting
the Legal Rights of Women and Children,"
at the RSHM Symposium on "Building
Global Solidarity: The Social, Political and
Economic Impact of Globa lization on Women
and Children," held at Loyola Marymount
University (February 22, 2003); and gave
rwo presentations-"Legal and Ethical Issues
in Representing Child Clients Identified as
Mentally Disabled" and "Legal Challenges
to Commitment and Involuntary Treatment of
Minors in Private Programs"-at the ational
Association of Rights Protection and Advocacy
(NARPA) Conference held in Portland, Oregon,
m ovember 2002. Costello also conducted a
workshop on "Children and Mental Disability
Law: Emerging Law and Policy Issues" for
mental health co urt hearing officers of the Los
Angeles Superior Court on December 12, 2002.
She completed 15 years of service (1987-2003,
chair 2000-03) on the board of directors of the
Mental H ea lth Advocacy Services, Inc. (MHAS ).
Costello continues to serve on the faculty of the
UCLA Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship Program,
and as a vo lunteer consultant/attorney to several non-profit organizations serving people with
mental disabilities. She is working on a book for
the American Psychological Association (APA)
series on Law and Public Policy. Lawyers in the
Mental H ealth System: Advocates, Adversaries,
or Allies? explores the unique legal role and
ethical obligations of la wyers and advocates in
the mental hea lth system who represent clients
identified as having mental disabilities.
PROFESSOR MARY B. CULBERT, director of
the Loyola Law School Center For Conflict
Resol uti on, presented numerous community
seminars on mediation skills throughout the
year and rwo 25 to 30-hour mediation trainings in November 2002 and June 2003 that
satisfy th e requirements to mediate in court
and community programs. More than 500
individ uals and organizations participated in
th ese trainings throughout the year. Culbert
also hosted the Ca lifornia Dispute Resolution
Council's (CDRC) Seventh Annual Conference
entitled "The New World of ADR Regulation:
How It Will Affect Your ADR Practice"
(November 2002). At that conference she
presented on a panel with Judge David
Rothman, Heather Anderson (staff attorney
with the Administrative Office of the Courts),
and Ellen Mi ller (co-chair of the ABA's Dispute
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Reso luti on Section Court ADR Committee
and director of the Civil Mediation Program
for the San Diego Superior Co urt) regarding
"New Ethical Rules for Court Mediators."
Culbert specifically addressed a new case law
circumscribing mediation confidentiality and
its impact on the rules. Culbert also presented
a training on mediation confidentiality entitled
"Is Your Mediation Confidential?" (February
2003), and is presenting on a panel on mediation confidentiality at the State Bar Conference
in Anaheim this September. She published an
article entitled "Confidentiality Protection
Afforded Mediation Reports, Writings and
Other Ph ys ical Evidence Severely Compromised
by Rojas v. Los Angeles County Superior
Court" in the CDRC Statewide Newsletter.
Culbert currently sits as a CDRC board
member and advisor to the State Bar Alternative
Dispute Reso lution (ADR ) Committee.
latest article,
"All the World 's Not a Stooge: The
'Transformativeness' Test for Analyzing a First
Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity
Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art,"
will be published in Columbia Journal of Law
& the Arts this fall . Dougherty has also
co-a urhored a new edition of a casebook on
entertainment law which was released by Lexis
Publishing this summer. Dougherty organized
and mod era ted a panel on "The Roles of
Attorneys, Agents and Managers" at the
California Lawyers for the Arts Annual Film &
Media Law Seminar, and helped organize and
moderate a panel at the Sundance Film Festi va l
entitled "Artists Rights and Wrongs, " dealing
with recent cases involving technologies that
permit objectionable material to be deleted in
viewing films . Dougherty spoke at McGeorge
Law School on "Who Owns Your Digital
Creations? The Arts, Teaching, Public Agencies
and Digital Copyright." His talk was part of a
panel on "The Digital Copyright Debate for
Creati ve Artists." Dougherty organ ized and
hosted two Loyola entertainment law alumni
luncheons, one featuring alumn a Pamela Kirsh
'90, senior vice president of motion picture
production legal affairs for Warner Bros., and
the other featuring alumnus Jeffrey S. Robin
'70, head of business affairs for th e William
Morris Agency. As part of those programs,
Dougherty gave presentations on th e recent
Supreme Court decision, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
PROFESSOR F. JAY DOUGHERTY'S

CHRISTOPHER N. MAY

THERESE H. MAYNARD

and on lega l ethics in transactional practice. In
addition, Dougherty hosted and moderated two
panel discussions ar rhe law school last spring,
"A Day in rhe Life of an Entertainment Lawyer"
and "Practice in the Areas of Film and Television."
Dougherty was awarded tenure in April.
{Fritz B. Burns
Chair of Real Property) published the sixth
edition of Findley, Farber and Freeman, Cases and
Materials on Environmental Law (West Group,
Jtme 2003). Also in June, he raughr International
Environmental Law ar rhe University of San
Diego's stunmer abroad program, held ar the
University of Barcelona in Spain.
PROFESSOR ROGER W. FINDLEY

PROFESSOR EDITH Z. FRIEDLER, director of
summer abroad programs, also directed rhe
Un iversity of San Diego summer program
in Barcelona, Spain. She was invited by the
University of Granada (Spain) to give a lecture
ro faculty and srudents of the law school on
"Highlights of U.S. Immigration Law."
PROFESSOR VIGOR GOLD , associate dean for
academic affairs and William M. Rains
Fellow, pub lished 2003 updates for rhe four
books he co-authored with rhe late Charles
Alan Wright in rhe multi-volume treatise,
Federal Practice and Procedure. Gold and
Professor David Leonard have completed rhe
manuscript for their new casebook, Evidence;
A Structured Approach, which will be published
by Aspen in 2004.
PROFESSOR RICHARD L. HASEN (William M. Rains
Fellow) spent much of 2002 writing The Supreme
Court and Election Law; judging Equality from
Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, which is being
published this fall by NYU Press. Hasen also
wrote "The Benefits of 'Judicially Unmanageable'
Standards in Election Law Cases under rh e Equa l
Protection Clause," 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1469 (2002),
"The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v.
Valeo," 2 Election L.j. 241 (2003 ), and "Vouchers
and Buckley: The Need for 'Regime Change,"' 37
Univ. Richmond L. Rev. 1049 (2003). Hasen is ar
work on book chapters concerning the Guaranree
Clause, the future of rhe Voting Rights Acr, and
the use of social science evidence in election law
cases. Hasen also continues ro co-edit (with
Professor Dan Lowenstein of UCLA) the quarterly
publication Election Law journal. Hasen is one
of rwo Loyola Law School professors listed on

the "50 Most Cited Faculty Who Entered Teaching
Since 1992" [New Educational Quality Rankings
of U.S. Law Schools].
HAYDEN (Jacob Becker
Fellow) has published "Purring Ethics ro
the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the
Origins of the MPRE" in 71 Fordham L. Rev.
1299 (2003).

PROFESSOR PAUL T.

(Lloyd Tevis
Fellow) has been awarded a research fellowship
from Princeton University's Program in Law
and Public Affairs for the 2003-04 academic
year. The program is a joint venture of the
Woodrow Wilson School, rhe University
Center for Human Values, and rhe Princeton
Politics Department. Helfer's research project
wi ll focus on "Exit, Escape and Commitment
in International Governance." His recent
pub li cations include "Overlegalizing Human
Rights : International Re lations Theory and
rhe Commonwea lth Caribbean Back lash
Against Human Rights Regimes," 102
Colum. L. Rev. 1832 (Nov. 2002); and
"Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and
New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking," 29 Yale ]. Int'l L.
(forthcoming Winter 2004). In April 2003,
Helfer presented "Preserving rhe Global
Genetic Commons: Intellecrual Property
Rights and rhe International Treaty on Plant
Generic Resources for Food and Agriculture"
ar a Duke University Law School conference
and ar rhe American Society of International
Law's Annual Meeting in Washington,
D.C. In March, he presented two papers
ar Cardozo Law School- "The UDRP and
International Lawmaking," and "Regime
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and
ew
of International
Intellectual
Dynamics
Property Lawmaking,"- rhe latter presented
as parr of Cardozo's intellecrual property
speaker series. In January, Helfer presented
"Human Rights and Inrellecrual Property :
Conflict or Coexistence?" at the Association
of American Law Schools annua l meeting
in Washington, D.C. Helfer also served as cochair of rhe International Law Weekend- West
conference held ar Loyola Law School.
PROFESSOR LAURENCE R. HELFER

BRYAN D . HULL,
along wi th
Professor Lary Lawrence of Loyola Law
School and Professor William McGovern of rhe
PROFESSOR

Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow
Richard L. Hasen claims a number of distinctions:
he earned both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in political
science; he held a clerkship following law school
with the Honorable David R. Thompson of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and he co-edits the peer-reviewed publication, Election Law Journal. Hasen's most unusual
distinction, however, is as the proud owner of a
voting machine used in the Florida 2000 notorious
presidential election, complete with its "hanging
chads." The purchase, on display in his office, was a
natural fit for Hasen, a nationally recognized
expert in election law and campaign finance regulation. Hasen, who joined Loyola's faculty in 1997
as a visiting professor and became a member of
the full-time faculty in 1998, is co-author of a leading casebook on election law and author of the
forthcoming The Supreme Court and Election
Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush
v. Gore (NYU Press 2003). Frequently quoted in the
New York Times, Washington Post, and other
publications, Hasen has taken his hand to direct
publishing of a web log (or "blog") devoted to
election law issues. (Check out www.electionlaw

.blogspot.com.) Earlier in his career, Hasen
worked as a civil appellate lawyer at the Encino
firm of Horvitz and Levy, and taught at the
Chicago-Kent College of Law. A member of the
advisory board of the Campaign Legal Center.
Hasen was recently named one of the "20 Top
Lawyers in California Under Age 40" by the Los
Angeles/San Francisco Daily Journal.
JOHN T. McDERMOTT

GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN

YXTA MAYA MURRAY

UCLA School of Law, published the contracts
casebook, Contracts and Sales: Contemporary
Cases and Problems (seco nd edition, Lexis/
Nex is Matthew Bender) .
'79 (William M. Rains
Fellow) has published "Economic Activity as
a Proxy for Federa lism: Intuition and Reason
in United States v. Morrison" in 18 Canst.
Comment. 563 (2002). H e also published, with
Professor Christoph er N . Ma y, Civil Procedu1·e:
Cases and Problems (Aspen 2002).

PROFESSOR ALAN IDES

"Professor Laurie Levenson inspired me to 'do
justice.' and that. above all else, is what I strive
to do as an Assistant United States Attorney.
I entered Loyola Law School in August 1991.
Like all first-year students, I found myself
enrolled in (ACJ)-Administration of Criminal
Justice. My teacher, Professor Levenson, a
woman of boundless energy and enthusiasm,
was obviously devoted to two things: her
students and fostering justice. It wasn't enough
to know what the law was; Professor Levenson
wanted us to care about the reason for the law,
and ultimately, whether it was fair.
After just a few weeks in Professor Levenson's
class, I fell in love with criminal law. As I read
case after case, Professor Levenson inspired me
to think about not just the rule, but whether
the rule was a just one ... whether application
of the rule in the specific instance was just...
whether application of the rule in other
instances would be just.
As I progressed in law school, Professor Levenson's door was always open. The semester that
I was working in the District Attorney's Office
as part of the late-Professor Hobbs' trial
advocacy class I came to her after 'losing' my
first trial. Acknowledging that I appropriately
felt bad at "losing." she directed my focus to
the process-did the criminal adjudication
process work properly? ... was justice done? ...
or thwarted? ... Why7... If justice was thwarted,
at what cost to the community?
The best thing about my job as an Assistant
United States Attorney is my obligation, above
all else. to 'do justice.' My ability to do that, I owe.
in large part. to Professor Laurie Levenson."

PROFESSOR LISA CHIYEMI IKEMOTO published
an essay, "Redefining Reproductive Freedom to
Build Multicultural Coalition," in the Berkeley
Women's Law Journal, 2002. In fall 2002 she
made two presentations. With activist/scholar
Ann Chea tham, Ikemoto presented "Participatory
Action Reseach and Development of the
Reproductive Freedom Agenda" at the UCLA
Schools of Public Health and Nursing. She also
addressed "Racism, Sexism and Heterosexism in
Law Schools" at the 2002 annual meeting of the
State Bar of California, in Monterey. Last March,
Ikemoto gave a plenary presentation on the
women's rights movement and intersecti onality
theory at a conference sponsored by Seattle
University. Last April, she participated as a speaker at the St. Louis University symposium on racial
disparities in health care. She also continued
her work as board chair of Asians and Pacific
Islanders for Reproductive Health, as an advisory
committee member of the Ca lifornia Women's
Law Center Breast Cancer Legal Project, as a
member of the Law School Admissions Council
Test Development and Research Committee,
and as a member of th e LACMA/LACBA Joint
Bioethics Committee.
KURT T. LASH
(Joseph Ford
Fellow) presented a paper entitled "Sources of
Constitutional Imerpretation" at the International
Law West conference at Loyola Law School
(Jan uary 2003 ). In March, Lash was a panelist
for the lunchtime presentation on "Law and
th e War in Iraq."

PROFESSOR

PROFESSOR LARY LAWRENCE (Harriet L. Bradley
Cha ir of Contract Law), along with Professor
Bryan Hu ll of Loyo la Law Schoo l and
Professor William
McGovern
of the
UCLA School of Law, has published the
contracts casebook, Contracts and Sales :
Contemporary Cases and Problems (second
edition ), published by Lexis/Nexis Matthew
Bender. Lawrence has also published Volumes
3 and 3A of Lawrence's Anderson on the
Uniform Commercial Code .
PROFESSOR DANIEL E. LAZAROFF (Leonard
E. Co hen Chair in Law and Econom ics) has
published the article, "Go lfers' Tort Liab ilitya Critique of an Emerging Standard ," in
Hastings Communications & Entertainment
L. ]. Lazaroff also served as an arbitrator for
the Tenth Annual Willem C. Vis International
Commercial Arbitration Moot in Vienna,
Austria, in April 2003.

PROFESSOR DAVID P. LEONARD (William M.
Rains Fellow) published "The Use of Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence to Prove Know ledge"
in 81 Nebraska L. Rev. 115 (2 002 ) a nd the
2003 Supplement to The New Wigmore: A
Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited
Admissibility. Leonard serves as vice-chairperson of the ABA Criminal Justice Section
Commi ttee on Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Ev id ence.

(William M.
Rains Fell ow), director of the Center for Ethical
Advoca cy at Loyola Law School, has published
A Student's Guide to the Federal Rules of
Crim inal Procedure (Tho mson/West 2003 );
the Handbook on Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (West 2003); California Crimin al
Proced ure (2002-2003), and "Detention,
Material Witnesses & The War on Terrorism,"
35 Loy. L. Rev. L.A . 1217 (2002 ). Levenson
continues to serve as a regular columnist for
the National Law Journal and the Los Angeles
Daily Joumal. She is a frequent speaker on
ethics a nd was a participant in the American
Jud icature Society Confere nce on Preventing
Wrongful Convictions. Levenson is th e 2003
recipi ent of th e Federal Judicial Center's John
Brown Scholarship Award for "Excellence in
Teaching" an d the Loyola Law School Student
Bar Associa tion's " Professor of the Year"
(Evening Division 2003 ).
PROFESSOR LAURIE L LEVE NSO N

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER N . MAY (James P.
Bradley Chair of Constitutiona l Law) and
Professor Allan Ides '79 have published tl1eir
book, Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems
(Aspen 2002). May just completed his 30th
yea r of full-time teaching at Loyola Law SchooL
H e join ed rh e faculty in the summ er of 1973, at
the inception of the Hon. Frederick ]. Lower's
'64 dea nship, after having worked for three
years with the San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation.
PROFESSOR THERESE H . MAYNARD' S article, " Law
Matters . Lawyers Matter. " was published
as part of a symposi um on corporate social
responsib ility, at 76 Tulane L. Rev. 1501
(2002 ), and her article, "Spinning in a Hot
IPO: Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business
as Ususal?"-originally published in 43 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 2023 (2002)- was reprinted
in Aspen Pu blishers' annua l Securities Law
Review, as well as the peer-edited journal,
Corporate Practice Commentator. In addition,
Maynard published a short article, "Spinning in
a Hot IPO : A Matter of Business Erhics," last
November in InSights: Corporate & Securities
Law Advisor. O ver rhe past yea r, Maynard has
spoken on numerou s occasions on issues related
ro th e corpora te governance reforms adopted
by Co ngress, as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act enacted in July 2002. Her speaking engagements on rhe topic included a CLE presentation,
"Ethica l Business Lawyers in a Post-Enron
World," made before a group of Orange County
alumni, in which she provided an overview of
th e SEC's new professional responsibility rules.

In addition, Maynard has spoken to various Bar
groups over the past year on the topic of "Lega l
Education for Business Lawyers: The Marriage
of Theory and Practice." She is curren tl y writing
a casebook, Mergers & Acquisitions: Cases and
Materials, to be published by Aspen Publishers,
Inc. During summer 2003, Maynard continued
to travel around the country as a national
lecturer for BARBRJ Bar Review, Inc.
is speaking
this September at a conference of the Law
Association for As ia and the Pacific in Tokyo.
McDermott is part of a panel of lawyers and
law professors from Japan, China and Korea.
The panel discusses the enforcement of foreign
judgments in business disputes.
PROFESSOR JOHN T. McDERMOTT

PROFESSOR GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN (Dean
Emeritus) published "Exploring Boundaries:
A Legal and Structural Ana lys is of the
Independence Principle of Letter of Cred it
Law," 119 Banking L. ]. 501 (2002) and
"Purchase Money Security Interests and
Revised UCC Article 9: Teaching an Old
Dogma New Tricks," 35 Uniform Commercial
Code L.]. 4 (2 003). McLaughlin continu es to
pub li sh Commercial Law Reports, a monthly
publication with Professor Neil Cohen, an d
a bimonth ly column, "Commercial Law,"
in the New York Law Journal, also with
Cohen. McLa ughlin lectured at a California
State Bar program on letters of credit and to
the Rotarians on the Knights Templar as the
first Multinational Corporation. His article,
"Standby Letters of Credit and Guarantees:
An Exercise in Cartography," was selected for
inclusion in an ABA CD-ROM en titl ed "25
Years of Fidelity and Security Law."
PROFESSOR YXTA MAYA MURRAY'S third novel,
The Conquest, was published by Rayo Press,
an imprint of Harper Collins Publishers. It
has been chosen for the "D iscover Great New
Writers" series of Barnes and Noble, and has
also been chosen as a recommended selectio n
by the independent bookseller's organization,
Booksense '76.

text was then used as the basis of a cybercourse which attracted over 1,200 participants
from more than 35 states and 64 countries.
Nockleby's revised text, Cyberprivacy, will
be published online by the Berkman Center
beginning October 2003. Noc kl eby also
published an article, "What's Wrong with a
National ID? " in last year's Loyola Lawyer
(Fall 2002). More recently, working with two
film directors who are also third -year Lo yola
Law School stu dents, Nockl eby ha s begun
creating and producing short fi lms on law. The
films are designed to surface iss ues of cultural
conflict in law, and focus attention on race,
class and gend er perspectives. T hus far, one
film, Stalking?, has been completed, and a
second on damages, Life's Worth, is nearing
compl etion. Nockleby gave a talk on "Privacy
and First Amendment Issues in Cyberspace" to
the UCLA Graduate School of Education &
Information Studies. He presented his paper,
"The Structure of Tort Argumentation," at a
Faculty Colloquium at Loyola Law School.
Nockleby is currently at work on a torts
textbook with Professor Duncan Kennedy of
Harvard Law School.
PROFESSOR SAMUEL H . PILLSBURY (J. Howard
Z iemann Fellow) published an article in the
Buffalo Criminal Law Review entitled "A
Pro bl em in Emotional Due Process: California's
Three Strikes Law." Pillsbury gave an address
entitled "The Rev. King and Our Ca ll to
Justice" as part of Loyola Law School's fourth
annual celebration of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
birthday, on January 15, 2003. For spring
semester 2003, he created a new class for the
Law School curriculum, "Public Speaking for
Lawyers," which focuses on developing speaking skills appropriate for a va riety of settings
outside the courtroom.

has co-written
(along with USC Professor Tom Griffith and
Stanford Professor Joe Bankman) Federal
Income Tax: Examples & Exp lanations (thi rd
edition) (Aspen 2002).
PROFESSOR KATHERINE T. PRATT

RHONDA M . REAVE'S art icle,
"There's No Crying in Baseball: Sports and
the Legal and Social Construction of Gender,"
will be reprinted in the fourth edition of Elsa
Kircher Cole's book, Sexual Harassment on
Campus: A Legal Compendium.
PROFESSOR

published
an on lin e textbook enti tl ed Privacy in
Cyberspace through the Harvard Law Schoo l's
Berkman Center fo r Law & Technology, at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/privacy/ (2002) . The

PROFESSOR

JOHN

JOHN T. NOCKLEBY

T.

NOCKLEBY

SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY

RHONDA M. REAVES

[Updates]

FLORRIE YOUNG ROBERT'S article,
"Let the Seller Beware: Disclosures, Disclaimers, and
'As Is' Clauses," appeared in the Spring 2003 issue
of 31 Real Estate L.]. 303 (2003 ). Roberts serves on
the Steering Committee for tl1e General Real Estate
Subsection of the Real Property Section of the Los
Angeles County Bar Association.
PROFESSOR

has been
appo inted to the California State Bar Insolvency
Law Committee and serves as its legislative
analyst for pending California leg islation.
Schechter is the author of the "Commercial
Finance Newsletter," a weekly current developments column published by Westlaw [d atabase
COMFINNL]. In December 2002, Schechter
spoke at the Financial Lawyers' Conference
program on the topic of " Recent Developments
in the Trustee's Avoidance Powers ." In
March 2003, he spoke at the Orange County
Bankruptcy Forum on "Recent Developments
in Commercial and Insolvency Law." In April
of 2003, Schechter spoke before the Amer ican
Bar Association on the top ic of "B usiness Tort
Issues Affecting Article 9 Transactions."
PROFESSOR DANIEL S. SCHECHTER

PROFESSOR DANIEL P. SELMI (Willi am M.
Rains Fellow) chaired a panel entitled "Fuel
Fights- Litigating Over Who Gets to Control
Vehicular Emissions in Ca lifornia" at the
2002 Environmental Law Conference held by
the State Bar Section on Environmenta l Law
at Yosemite. Selmi published "The Year in
Review-10 Cases from 2002" in the January
2003 issue of the California Environmental
Law Reporter. He also published a supplement to his chapter in the book, Taking Sides
on Takings (American Bar Association 2002) .
The supplement addresses the United States
Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Tahoe
Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency.
PROFESSOR THEODORE P. SETO recently published
three articles. The first, entitl ed "The Morality
of Terrorism, " appeared in 35 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1227 (2002); the second, "Preface: The

DANIEL S. SCHECHTER

DAVID C. TUNICK
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[Updates]

Profes.o;or Jay Dougherty lrl with alumnus j cffrc)· A. Sklar '011 11
from the firm Alschuler, G roo;sman, Srei n & Kahan.

"Professor Dougherty taught me copyright
law when I was a student at Loyola Law School
and he remains a friend to this day. Jay is a
tremendous teacher. He does not bombard
students with the Socratic method or lecture
ad infinitum. Rather. Jay uses his real world
experience to show students how and why
the law is relevant to their future practices. As
a business lawyer, I use the lessons that Jay
taught me on a daily basis. But perhaps the
best lesson that I learned from Jay is that you
can be cool AND be a lawyer. Jay is mellow,
relaxed and brilliant The modest expert, ready
to teach, or rock out on the guitar. I am grateful
for the opportunity to have been a student
of Jay Dougherty."

In addition to managing their career obligations as academics at Loyola Law School, the
husband and wife are also balancing the
rearing of twins: Samantha Elizabeth Seta
and Genevieve Danielle Seta who were born
on June 28, 2002.

Fundamental Problem of International Taxation "
(with Michael Lebovitz), was published in Loy.
L.A. Inti. & Camp. L. Rev. 529 (2001); the third,
"Reframing Evil in Evolutionary and Game
Theoretic Terms," appeared as a chapter in
Understanding Evil: An Interdisciplinary Approach,
(Breen, ed. 2003) and in abridged fom1 in the Loyola
Lawyer (2002).ln addition, on January 7, 2003, Seto
delivered a rwo-hour presentation entitled "A General
Theory of Nom1ativity" at a conference on Justice and
Evolution sponsored by the law faculty of the
University of Muenster; Germany. Seto's articles on
"The Morality of Terrorism" and "lntergenerational
Decision Making: An Evolutionary Perspective" made
tl1e Social Science Research Nerwork's "Top Ten"
Downloads for Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy,
Criminal Law, and International Law.
PROFESSOR MARCY STRAUSS, during the fall
of 2002, finished a draft of an article entitled
"Torture," which considers both constituti ona l
and policy arguments against the use of torture
during interrogation. The article will be published
in November 2003 in the New York Law Review
as the lead article in a symposium on terrorism. In
January 2003, Strauss spoke at me Association of
American Law Schools Conference in Washingron,
D.C. on the topic of me "First Amendment and
Anti-Discrimination Laws."
PROFESSOR PETER M. TIERSMA (Joseph Scott
Fellow) has published the articles: "The Linguist
on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics in
American Courts," in 78 Language 221 (2002)
(the offici a I journal of the Linguistic Society of
America) with Lawrence Solan of Brooklyn Law
School; "He a ring Voices: Speaker Id entification
in Court," {also with Lawrence Solan) in 54
Hastings L.j. 373 (2003); "Jury Questions: An
Update to Ka lven and Zeisel," appeared in 39
Criminal Law Bulletin 10 (2003); and "The
Language and Law of Product Warnings" in
Language in the Legal Process (J. Cotterill, ed.
2002). Tiersma was invited to speak last spring
about forensic linguistics for a conference at the
Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain.
Earlier during the 2002-03 academic year,
Tiersma made a presentation on "Law as Text"
to the faculty at Chicago-Kent College of Law;
and in February 2003 spoke about jury instructions
on causation before the annual meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of
Science in Denver, Colo. H e also submitted an
amicus brief to the Alaska Supreme Court (on
behalf of the Linguistic Society of America) in
a case cha ll enging the constitutionality of that
state's recently-enacted Official English law:
Kritz v. Alaskam for a Common Language.
Tiersma continues to work on the California
Judicial Counci l Task Force on Jury Instructions

and recently agreed to assist the judges of
Vermont in drafting a new set of pattern jury
instructions for that state (sponsored by the
ational Center for State Courts).
article, "Passive
Internet Websites and Personal Jurisdiction," has
been accepted for publication by the Oklahoma
City University School of Law's Law Review.

PROFESSOR DAVID C. TUNICK'S

PROFESSOR GEORGENE M. VAIRO wrote several
articles during the past year, including:
"Remedies for Victims of Terrorism," 35 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1265 (2002), which discussed
possible civil remedies for the victims of the
9/11 attacks; "Trends in Federalism and Their
Implications for State Courts," Trial (November
2002), which focus ed on developments at the
federa l .level that have affected the jurisdiction
of state courts; and "Thank You, John, " 70
Fordham L. Rev. 2191 (2002)-a tribute to
Dean John D. Feerick, who retired after 20
years as dean of Fordham Law School. Vairo
was the featured speaker at the UBS Warburg
Asbestos Litigation Conferences in February
and
ovember 2003, and presented a paper
on "Trends in Federalism and Their Implication
for State Courts" at the Roscoe Pound lnstimte for
State Court Judges in July 2002, and also spoke
at rwo American Law In titute-American Bar
Association (ALI-ABA) Advanced Federal Civil
Practice programs on summary judgment, Rule
11 and other sanctions tools, forum selection
problems, and federalism problems. In addition,
Vairo wrote six columns on forum selection issues
for the National Law journal, and revised her
chapters in Moore's Federal Practice on venue and
ren1oval. Vairo also participated in Death Ride,
which is a one-day, 130-mile bicycle event that
covers over 16,000 feet of climbing in five passes
of the Eastern Sierra Mountains.

presented a lecture
in Wilmington, North Carolina, to the judges
of the Fourth Circuit on "Current Trends and
Issues in First Amendment Law. " Williams is
presently in his second year as president of the
board of directors of the ACLU of Southern
California, and was named by the Loyola Law
School Student Bar Association as " Professor of
the Year" (Day Division 2003 ). •:•
PROFESSOR GARY WILLIAMS

graduated with distinction from Stanford
Law School in 1995. Prior to joining the Loyola Law
School faculty, Natapoff worked with the Office of the
Public Defender in Baltimore, Maryland, as assistant
federal public defender. She clerked for the Honorable
David S. Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Natapoff was also a judicial
clerk for The Honorable Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. She has served as Issues Director and Environmental
Coordinator for the National Rainbow Coalition in Washington, DC.
Her teaching interests include criminal law and criminal procedure.
is a Harvard Law School graduate where he
graduated cum laude. Tung joins the Loyola Law
School faculty from the University of San Francisco
School Of Law, where he has been since 1994. He
will be teaching Corporations and advanced corporate law courses, including securities regulation. Tung
also teaches in the areas of corporate reorganization
and international trade. Prior to joining the faculty, Tung practiced with
the international law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Los Angeles
and San Francisco. He was a law clerk to the Hon. Stanley A. Weigel in
the United States District Court in San Francisco, and in 1988-89 was
a Lecturer in Law at Peking University.

[.AajunctsJ

T

he clients of Moshe Kushman, a graduate of Loyola Law
School, circumnavigate the Pacific Rim-Los Angeles, Palo
Alto, San Francisco, Beijing, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore,
Sydney and Melbourne. A dedicated practitioner of the law,
the partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP seeks out the
corporate world's transaction hotspots: mergers, acquisitions, spinoffs,
business formations and restructurings. Kushman's clients, including
investment bankers and multinational corporations, frequently stand on the
threshold of complex, sometimes perplexing, cross-border financial transactions. Kushman assists with the structuring of such transactions in order
to enable the parties to achieve the optimal U.S. and foreign tax-efficient
results in light of the negotiated allocation of tax risk among the parties.

Tax Law Professor

I Moshe Kush man '87

The excitement of the global economy notwithstanding, Kushman's most
satisfying endeavor is teaching Income Taxation II at Loyola. The course
is a degree requirement for Loyola's three-year-old LL.M. program and a
key elective for law students interested in specializing in tax law. Kushman
leads his students ("And may God help them," he says) through 14 weeks
of advanced topics in U.S. federal income taxation.
Kushman derives great inspiration from standing before his class of
LL.M. candidates and law students and helping them to make sense
of a body of tax law that is, according to Kushman, "concatenated,
disjointed, arbitrary, unfair and capricious. " He often says, "To
teach is to learn twice." No doubt, Kushman's courses are mutually
inspirational. His students have the privilege of learning from a frequent
lecturer for the Tax Executive's Institute, Practicing Law Institute, and
Council for International Tax Education, as well as a member of the
Tax Planning Committee for the USC Law School Institute on Federal
Taxation. Kushman is also a contributing author for the Practicing Law
Institute's Federal Income Tax Seminars.
The notable list of speaking engagements aside, Kushman's true teaching
credential is his approach to reading the successive layers of revenue enactments that now comprise the Internal Revenue Code. Kushman reflects
felicitously upon the Code as a "love story" between the government and
taxpayers ... "but, to be sure, a story of unrequited love. " As his prospect for
a career in the practice of U.S. federal income taxation became more
prominent, Kushman determined to endure law school for the sake of
becoming a tax lawyer. Years later, he continues to be absolutely
delighted with the practice of tax law. When he speaks, Kushman's innate
appreciation for taxation bubbles to the surface, and words like cross-border
mergers, enterprise formations and restructurings come alive.
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A

southeastern European nation's
wartime looting of cultural treasures
stands exposed. The fate of precious
artwork hangs in the balance. The
tension of the characters is palpable. Yet, this
drama is not unfolding on the silver screenthis is the drama that colors the law practice
of Christine Steiner. Steiner, formerly assistant
general counsel of the Smithsonian and general
counsel of the J. Paul Getty Trust, is a major
name in art law.
Professor Steiner stands before a classroom
discussing an attempt by cat burglars to enter
the New York Metropolitan Art Museum
encased in a Greco-Asian statue of a horse. But
the episode is not from a case handled by
Professor Steiner. Instead, she is recapping the
plot from the "Thomas Crowne Affair" for the
students in her Art and the Law class. Her
students have the unfortunate pleasure of
issue-spotting while they watch the film.

Art and the Law Professor

I Christine Steiner

The distinction between Professor Steiner's practice and Hollywood's portrait of the art world
may not always be so blurry, but the similarities between her chosen field of law and the
subject matter of her classes are always clear. "My teaching enhances my practice, and my practice
informs my teaching," Professor Steiner quips. In the same way, Professor Steiner's love for
art- contemporary art, in particular-and her enthusiasm for her vocational immersion in
the art industry complement each other. The pleasant result of that symbiosis is that her work
environs are the masterpiece-speckled galleries and museums of the art world.
Professor Steiner enriches her Art and the Law class with both her legal acumen and appreciation
of art. "Through teaching, I am able to express my love for art in my language, the legal
language." Thus, students are given the opportunity to encounter an aesthetically pleasing area
of law, yet they also extensively study the minutiae of art law. A range of topics is covered,
including copyright law, contractual rights of artists, the ethics governing the collection and
retention of art, and the illegal export and theft of artworks. Professor Steiner's authority in this
area is exceptional; she is the general editor of the one book museum counsels keep in their back
pockets: A Museum Guide to Copyright and Trademark. Still, the conferring of practical legal
knowledge aside, Professor Steiner acknowledges that her true goal in teaching Art and the Law
may be to break down the isolation of law students and push them out into the world.
93i!o$'4•1!·1LAWYER)
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LAW IN CYBERLAND
Internet Law Professor

I James Jenal '95

usty streets, high noon, the tinny notes of
a player piano, and cyber squatters. To the
untutored attorney, each of these is indicative
of a w ild frontier: the Old West on one
hand, Internet law on the other. However, James Jenal
contends the Internet is not the "moral equivalent of the
Old West with respect to law .. . even trespass to chattels
is a viable cause of action."

D

For the fifth year, Jenal is teaching the class he
created-Internet Law and Technology. The class's
enrollment swelled with the dotcom boom and ebbed
during the subsequent cooling, yet a range of ripe
topics has the classroom full again. "Students want to
see how law and the Internet coincide," Jenal says. Issues
like cyber-terrorism and the Department of Defense's
Total Information Awareness Program, a program linking
government databases to construct a massive profile of
individuals, are drawing students to Jenal's classroom.
The O'Melveny & Myers counselor lectures on these
topics and also enhances the technological savvy of his
students-one week of the course is entitled "Electronic
Discovery & the Wired Courtroom."
The "wired " attorney is a concept Jenal virtually introduced to O'Melveny & Myers. Besides
creating the firm's original web site, Jenal and one other colleague pitched the idea of an Internet
law department to the firm. Soon afterward, the firm's Internet Law Practice Group was born.
Jenal handled the Central District's first anti-spam lawsuit, and he has become the firm's
connoisseur of Internet best practices, the safe proofing of the Internet for corporate use.
Jenal's motivation to start the cyber-law group was not merely his interest in the field; he knew
the quality of life at a big firm improved with the creation of " niche va lue. " He passes this
message on to his students: "Knowledge of the Internet is an inherent advantage for young lawyers.
It's an area where individuals fresh out of law school can go into a firm and be an authority."
Beware, cyber-terrorists, these sheriffs are pinned with a Juris Doctor.
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T

he Loyola course catalog reads: Civil Procedure II: Practice and Procedure, R 8:10-10:10,
Adjunct Professor Mike Stein. What unseen horrors lie behind such an ominous course
description? To the intrepid student the suspense is over quickly. Within the first few
minutes of class, Professor Stein tells his quavering students, "You were brave enough
to sign up for this class. Your reward is we will never talk about collateral estoppel, res judicata
or ancillary jurisdiction." Instead, Professor Stein guides students through a minute and hands-on
scrutiny of the process of moving a case through state court. Students have the opportunity to
draft a complaint, prepare a motion and conduct an actual deposition, all with an emphasis on
understanding and applying court rules and procedures to enable students to experience how law
is actually practiced. To enhance this practical skills emphasis, Stein invites other lawyers and
judges to speak to the class on a variety of subjects including client development, the comparison
of large and small firm practice, and fully understanding the judicial decision-making process.
Jurors from one of Professor Stein's trials advise students about what they liked and disliked about
the attorneys' presentations, and a lawyer who previously had his license suspended provides
a first-hand illustration of the grave importance of ethics.
Yet, the students' greatest reward is the opportunity to soak up Professor Stein's passion for the law.
He recounts his first visit to a courtroom. He was 14 at the time but in recalling the event almost
three decades later, his voice quakes with adolescent fervor. Professor Stein remembers the courtroom
vividly, he recalls the judge's name, but most of all he recalls the fiery banter
of the attorneys in their incomprehensible dialect. Paralyzed by awe, the
teenaged Stein was invited into the judge's chambers. There, surrounded
by the "beautiful" law books, the young man realized his calling. Today,
everything from hearing the bailiff call the courtroom to attention before
the beginning of an important trial to appearing at a quickly forgettable
status conference cause Stein to brim with the satisfaction in knowing that
he is toiling in the occupation he was destined to have.
Unsurprisingly, such passion has translated into a long and successful
career as a commercial litigator and trial lawyer at the firm of Tisdal &
Nicholson LLP. In their privileged position as his students, Professor
Stein's proteges experience the drama of that career vicariously. Only
hours after encountering a fresh twist in trial techniques in his practice,
Professor Stein proclaims to his evening class, "Ladies and gentleman,
there is a new way to skin a cat!" Thus, current knowledge is bequeathed
and the future attorneys are spared the agonizing feeling of holding an
exotic motion in their hands and asking a partner, "What does this thing
do?" Years later, former students still call Professor Stein and recount
their first harrowing deposition or court hearing, situations which Stein
confesses were the same experiences that caused him to endure sleepless
nights in his first few years of practice. However, the students often
continue their tales, explaining that a little angel resembling Professor
Stein sat upon their shoulders, guiding them to safety.

Civil Procedure II Professor

I Mike Stein
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Financial Aid resources are needed to assist our students.
An ideal gift, in support of Loyola Law School, would be the endowment of a named scholarship.
A scholarship can be established with a single gift or pledged over the course of five years.*
Make an impact on the future generations of lawyers-establish a scholarship at Loyola Law School.
For information, contact Kenneth Ott,
Office of Development: 213.7 36.102 5
LAW

•A scholarship can be endowed for a gift of $25,000.
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Continued from page 3 7

T

he narrow Wardlow majority
enters this new constitutional
territory cautiously. It does not
create a per se rule that flight upon
seeing a police officer alone can
constitute the basis for "reasonable
suspicion." Rather, its decision is said
to be based upon the particular facts
of the case before it. Flight is (along
with being in a high crime area and
perhaps the possession of an opaque
bag) merely a relevant factor in
reaching a common sense evaluation
of whether "reasonable suspicion"
actually existed. This led Wardlow
dissenters to interpret the majority as
having concluded that:
[while] the innocent explanations surely do not establish
that the Fourth Amendment
is always violated whenever
someone is stopped solely on
the basis of an unprovoked
flight, neither do the suspicious
motivations establish that the
Fourth Amendment is never
violated when a Terry stop
is predicated on that fact
alone. 528 U.S. at 136 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
In spite of this, however, the majority
opinion goes so far as to state
that "[h]eadlong flight- wherever it
occurs- is the consummate act of
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative
of wrongdoing, but it is certainly
suggestive of such." "Flight by its
very nature is not 'going about one's
business'; in fact, it is just the opposite."
This conclusion can be read as
inapposite to a principle which the
Supreme Court had recognized for
more than a century:

It is a matter of common
knowledge that men who are
entirely innocent do sometimes
fly from the scene of a crime
through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties,
or. .. as witnesses .... Innocent
men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury-not necessarily
because they fear that the jury
will not protect them, but
because they do not wish their
names to appear in connection
with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur
the popular odium of an arrest

and trial, or because they do
not wish to be put to the
annoyance or expense of
defending themselves. Alberty v.
u.s., 162 u.s. 499, 511 (1896).
It may, in fact, be arguably less
suspicious to run from a possible law
enforcement encounter in a high crime
area than to attempt to flee from the
presence of the police in less ominous
locations. In a high crime area, the
innocent bystander may rationally
fear that the officers have arrived to
deal with a presently existing danger,

or at least that the officers, fearing
danger, might be prone to draw and
use their weapons.
This may be especially true in some
minority-populated inner cities. "Black
leaders [have] complained that innocent
people [in predominantly black neighborhoods are] picked up in drug
sweeps .... Some teenagers [are] so
scared of the [police drug] task force
that they run even if they weren't
selling drugs." Numerous studies have
supported these concerns by demonstrating that the rate at which young
African American males are detained

and frisked and yet not arrested
may be considerably greater than the
equivalent rate for Caucasians.
olice use Terry stops aggressively
in high crime neighborhoods; as
a result, African Americans and
Latinos are subjected to a high number
of stops and frisks. Feeling understandably harassed, they wish to avoid
the police and act accordingly. This
evasive behavior in (their own) high
crime neighborhoods gives the police
that much more power to stop and
frisk. David A. Harris, Factors for
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Reasonable Suspicion: When Black
and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked,
69 Ind. L.J. 659, 681 (1994) .
The revelations of a major corruption
scandal surrounding the Los Angeles
Police Department's Rampart Division,
which had already received considerable national publicity by the time the
Supreme Court rendered its Wardlow
decision, provides an illustration of
the kind of neighborhood in which
Wardlow most likely will be applied.
Rampart is considered by the officers
who patrol it to be an area of high
crime and heavy drug trafficking.
Predominately Hispanic, it is only
three percent white and has a mean
income of less than half of that of Los
Angeles taken as a whole.

T

he allegations arising out of
the scandal suggest that the
inhabitants of this neighborhood have been subjected to police
behavior which would be highly
unlikely in a more affluent, whiter
community. This behavior allegedly
included the planting of evidence and
weapons, as well as the shooting
of unarmed suspects and innocent
bystanders. The revelations have been
such that there seems little doubt
that some reasonable and innocent
persons living under the "protection"
of the Rampart Division would not be
eager to be present during a police
investigation for fear of being swept
up indiscriminately by the police, or
worse, being caught in their crossfire.
As a consequence of Wardlow, it is in
just these neighborhoods that constitutional protection from random
intrusion may be at its weakest. In
reaching their conclusion, the members
of the Wardlow majority may have
opened themselves up to criticism that
they chose to treat rather cavalierly
the rights to be free from unreasonable
government intrusion amongst that
portion of the citizenry that is in the
weakest position to successfully seek
proper redress.
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Perhaps the socioeconomic background and status
of the Justices who populate our High Court makes
it difficult for some of them to understand why
many an honest, law-abiding citizen with nothing
to hide might prefer to avoid any contact with those
entrusted with the power to protect and serve.
Perhaps the socioeconomic background
and status of the Justices who populate our High Court makes it difficult
for some of them to understand why
many an honest, law-abiding citizen
with nothing to hide might prefer to
avoid any contact with those entrusted
with the power to protect and serve.
Whatever the reason, the majority
does appear less concerned than the
dissenters with the need to protect the
public from police whose threshold
test for the reasonableness of their
suspicions may be lower than should
be constitutionally tolerated.
f particular concern should
be the reality that flight, as
well as the alleged high crime
nature of an area, is a very subjective
concept. There are often conflicting or
ambiguous possible interpretations
of what constitutes flight, as well
as when it has actually occurred. Is it
"flight" every time evasive action is
taken in an apparent attempt to
avoid police contact? The ACLU
Amicus brief on Mr. Wardlow's behalf
pessimistically predicted:
To the typical officet; riding
away on a bike, entering a car
and driving off, or disappearing
inside a building, in response
to approaching officers is likely
to be seen as the equivalent of
"flight" or "running away," and

thus justify a seizure. If these
choices warrant a detention,
then the right to avoid police has
been reduced to a privilege only
to 'walk away' from the police
in an orderly manner. Brief of
Amicus Curiae of American
Civil Liberties Union et. al., at
16-17, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
u.s. 119 (2000).
This is analogous to the concerns that
have been voiced over the subjectivity
in defining an area as "high crime."
As Judge Kozinski cautioned, the
definition of a high crime or heavy
drug activity area is often established
by the highly personal conclusions of
the police, and is difficult to reduce to
a general test.
In attempting to establish a constitutionally acceptable definition of either
flight or " high crime area," neither
the officer's background nor experience
should be sufficient alone to supply
the basis for establishing reasonable
suspicion. This may be why the
Court in Terry wisely noted that
the "reasonable suspicion" officers
must articulate " becomes meaningful
only when it is assured that at some
point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate
the reasonableness ... "

This issue of judicial scrutiny is
particularly relevant when applied to
the issue of running from the police.
As the Michigan State Supreme Court
has concluded:
Certainly it is reasonable to
conclude that the defendant's
flight away from the vehicle
carrying the police officers might
reasonably have heightened the
officers' general suspicion that
the defendant must have had
something to hide and wished to
avoid contact with the occupants
of the vehicle. But heightened
general suspicion occasioned
by the flight of a surveillance
subject does not alone supply the
particularized, reasoned, articulable basis to conclude that
criminal activity was afoot that
is required to justify the temporary seizure approved in Terry.
People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d
451, 460 (Mich. 1985).

individually, when considered together
constituted truly suspicious behavior.
THE STOP

In both Sibron and Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 47 (1979), as well as in
Terry itself, the Supreme Court
expressed the concern that officers
should not be permitted to intrude
into constitutionally protected regions
based upon a mere suspicion or
hunch. In Brown, the unanimous
Court emphasized that to comply
with the Fourth Amendment, seizures
must either "be based on specific,
objective facts" or "be carried pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers."
imilarly, in Terry, the Court
noted that suspicion sufficient to
justify a "stop and frisk" must
not be merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."
"Rather, constitutionally sufficient

S

right and the fact that "[p]olice officers
are trained to be overly suspicious,
and often consider suspicious conduct
that is constitutionally protected." Brief
of Amicus Curiae of American Civil
Liberties Union et. al., at 15-16,
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
hen police officers stop
citizens to investigate past
crimes, they ate basing
their decisions on highly subjective
standards. This has in essence eliminated the reasonable person standard
for nonforcible, though intrusive,
searches and seizures. When courts
are confronted with such stops, they
must give conclusive weight to the
subjective decisions of the police
officers, in total disregard of the substantiating evidence deemed significant
in prior cases. Often officers' perceptions
of events can be affected by their
job-related values and expectations.
Harper, Robert Berkeley Harper,
"Has the Replacement of Probable

There are plenty of suspicious things
that people do every day that do not justify an
arrest, a search, or even a "stop and frisk."

The Terry Court recognized that:
"Even a limited search of the outer
clothing for weapons constitutes a
severe, though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening,
and perhaps humiliating experience."
Before permitting it, a high degree of
suspicion should be demanded.
"Reasonable suspicion" was supported
in Terry not merely by one act but
rather by a series of acts, each of which
though signaling innocence if viewed

suspicion must be grounded in facts
sufficient to support 'specific reasonable inferences' that justify such an
intrusion. Officers conducting a Terry
stop must be prepared to provide "a
particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity."
There are plenty of suspicious things
that people do every day that do not
justify an arrest, a search, or even
a "stop and frisk." Unfortunately, a
na rural tension exists between this

cause with Reasonable Suspicion
Resulted in the Best of All Possible
Worlds?", 22 Akron L. Rev. 13, 36.
The Wardlow dissenters, for example,
believed that the defendant's allegedly
suspicious conduct should have been
deemed a constitutionally insufficient
justification for the stop, let alone
the more intrusive pat-down which
immediately followed.
In part, their concern was an outgrowth
of the fact that the actual circumstances
99i!o$'4•l!·1LAWYER!

of the case were only sparsely provided.
We were never informed, for example,
whether any of the officers were in
marked or unmarked police vehicles.
Nor were we ever told whether there
were any police in uniform other than
the arresting officer himself. Nor do we
know how fast the patrol cars were
traveling or when the suspect was first
in a position to have noticed them.

That the Court even
reached the question
of the scope of
the frisk, however,
implies that the
(e)

maiority may not
have been troubled
by either the
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pat-down."

The latter point is the most important
unknown fact. If Wardlow had first
seen any of the other police vehicles,
then why would he have started
running only upon noticing the officers
in the fourth and final patrol car?
His failure to react (flee) immediately
upon observing any of the first three
vehicles would suggest that he may
not have been running from the police

presence. It at least casts doubt upon
the reasonableness of the detaining
officer's conclusion that Wardlow was
running away from them.
THE FRISK

Assume that Mr. Wardlow was
attempting to avoid the police and
that this constituted sufficient grounds
to stop him. Once they had stopped
him, the very first thing the officers
did was to pat down the bag he was
carrying. The justification for believing
that there might be a weapon from
which the officers would have to
protect themselves appears to have
come from a two-step process. First,
having run from the police in an area
known for drug trafficking, the runner
had revealed himself to be a narcotics
suspect. Second, it is reasonable to
conclude that narcotic suspects are
often armed and dangerous.

heavy drug trafficking nature of
the location and the suspect's attempted evasion. That Dickerson was thus a
drug suspect appears to be the only,
and again unstated, basis for the
officers' belief that he was armed and
posed a danger.

ickerson's unarticulated dicta
is a precursor to, and gains in
significance from the Wardlow
majority. Dickerson attempted to
walk, not run, away from the police.
Thus, running may not be required
the next time the Court evaluates
whether a suspect's evasiveness warranted a "stop and frisk."

suspect had attempted to evade them
in an area they claim is known
for heavy drug trafficking or other
criminal activity. As a prerequisite
to the authority to "stop and frisk,"
should not the police be required
to articulate more evidence of criminality in the suspect's behavior? If
no other suspicious circumstances
are required, then where else might
the logic of Wardlow apply?
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

When we consider how general
and easily equaled the objective
criteria justifying the police action in
Wardlow were, we are led to the

This approach appears to find
unarticulated support in the Court's
earlier handling of Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
There, officers observed Dickerson
walking in their direction immediately
after he had exited a known "crack
house." Upon noticing the police, he
appeared to change directions and
began walking towards an alley. It
was at this point that the officers
chose to stop and, without posing any
questions, frisk him.

T

he Court found that the search
exceeded constitutionally acceptable bounds because the officer's
manipulation of the eventually retrieved
package of drugs from inside the suspect's clothing had gone beyond the
scope of a valid frisk.
That the Court even reached the question
of the scope of the frisk, however,
implies that the majority may not
have been troubled by either the
"stop" or the initial "pat-down." The
only, and unspoken, grounds upon
which the police seemed to have based
their stop would appear to be the

Together, the two cases could represent
a formidable deviation from Supreme
Court precedent. Until these cases, the
right of an innocent bystander not
otherwise under suspicion, to simply
leave in order to avoid an undesired
and potentially intrusive government
encounter, had probably been felt by
many to be one of those inalienable
rights we take for granted.
This seems no longer to be the case.
Rather, in order to justify a Terry
"stop and frisk" the police may
now merely have to state that the

conclusion that the ruling may be
more than just another incremental
increase in the power of the state to
stop and question.
The majority appears to be advising
us that if we have nothing to hide, it
would be best to simply let the police
see whatever it is they are interested in
seeing. The Court, using the context
of high crime area flight, for the first
time has told us that the more we try
to keep private from police prying, the
more the government may have the
right to invade the very privacy we are
101i!o$'loJULAWYERI

attempting to protect. Police on the
streets and prosecutors in lower courts
may come to believe that the logic of
Wardlow can be expanded to include
furtive gestures other than flight. It
could prove to be merely the first of a
series of expansions condoned, if not
actively encouraged, by the Supreme
Court itself.
hose who suggest that the
Wardlow case could not possibly have such far-reaching
implications should be reminded that
the genius of our jurisprudence is the
ease with which our precedent can
evolve. A decision, which is first
applied to running is soon readily
expanded to other forms of would-be

concealment. It is exactly this manner
in which the Court has expanded
police powers in the Burger!Rehnquist
era of the past three decades.
In the criminal procedure area, the
Court has consistently carved out
modest exceptions to general prohibitions against unconstitutional police
practices only to incrementally, over
the course of the years, and even
decades, expand the scope of these
exceptions until they have become the
rules. Narrow exceptions to the
warrant requirement, the Miranda
warnings, standing requirements, the
scope of the exclusionary rule itself,
and many other principles have slowly
grown to swallow up most of the
original doctrines.
l!eileli·1LAWYE RI102

This pattern has become so common
that Justice Scalia, one of this procedure's foremost exponents, has been
on the lecture circuit suggesting that
since many of the so-called "general
rules" of constitutional criminal
procedure are really no longer the
"rules" at all, but have themselves
become merely narrow exceptions,
they should be recognized as such.
Among other issues the Justice noted:
The general rule is that a
search and seizure is unconstitutional unless a warrant
is first obtained. There are
exceptions that have been
created by our opm10ns,
exceptions to that supposed

rule for exigent circumstances
searches, car searches, stop and
frisk searches, searches incident
to arrest, school searches, searches of employee offices, etc.
Quite obviously it would be a
much more accurate description
of the law to say that a
warrant is generally required
to search a home and is sometimes required elsewhere. But we
continue to say that warrantless
searches are generally illegal.
Perhaps because it makes us
feel better about ourselves.
Justice Antonin Scalia, Sixth
Annual Burns Lecture, May 5,
1998, Loyola Law School
(Los Angeles).

ustice Scalia is, of course, correct
when he says that just such a
pattern can be observed in the
Court's slow but dramatic expansion of "stop and frisk." From a
narrow exception created to allow
officers to stop and pat down only
those they have reasonable and
particularized reasons to suspect of
being armed and dangerous, the rule
has expanded to become the primary
justification for a multitude of other
types of intrusions, now including the
seizing of those who run from police
presence in high crime areas.

J

More recently, in U.S. v. Arvizu, 122
S.Ct. 744 (2002), the Court may have
again expanded the application of

"reasonable suspicion" by c1t1ng
Wardlow as precedent for upholding
an automobile stop. At about 2:15
p.m. on the afternoon of January 19,
1998, in a "remote portion of rural
southeastern Arizona" a bout 30 miles
from Mexico and the town of Douglas,
Arizona (population 13,000), a border
patrol officer observed a Toyota minivan traveling legally on a canyon road
at 50 to 55 miles per hour. There were
two adults, the male driver and a
female passenger, in the front seat
and three children in the back. The
road was unpaved beyond the 10-mile
stretch leading out of Douglas and
is rarely traveled on, except by
local ranchers and forest service
personnel, as it leads into a National
Forest. Arrests of smugglers had

occasionally taken place in the general
area. The officer grew suspicious
because the driver had slowed down,
stiffened his posture, and failed to
acknowledge the law enforcement
officer's presence after apparently
sighting him. The patrolman testified
that drivers in the area habitually
"give us a friendly wave."
Deciding to follow the vehicle, he ran
a vehicle registration check, which
revealed nothing untoward or unusual
except that the address of the owner
was in a neighborhood known,
according to the officer, for heavy
drug trafficking and alien smuggling.
(It is perhaps a fair surmise that the
neighborhood so described may not
be the sort of place where giving an
officer a "friendly wave" was the
most likely reaction to a patrol vehicle
pulling up alongside a local motorist.)
As a result of this information, however,
as well as the driver's behavior, the border patrolman pulled over the minivan.
After consent to search was obtained
{later unsuccessfully disputed by the
defendant at trial), a duffel bag filled
with marijuana was discovered.
inth Circuit panel, in a
unanimous opinion authored
by Judge Reinhardt, found the
stop and consequently the subsequent
search unconstitutional as a result
of insufficient reasonable articulable
suspicion. Judge Reinhardt postulated
that while "conduct that is not necessarily indicative of criminal activity
ma y, in certain circumstances, be
relevant to the reasonable suspicion
calculus," "factors that have such a
low probative value that no reasonable
officer wo uld have relied on them to
make an investigative stop must be
disregarded as a ma tter of law."
Similar to what Justice Stevens noted
in his Wardlow dissent about flight,
the Court of Appeal found that the
fact the driver of the minivan had
slowed down upon seeing the police
vehicle, stiffened and failed to make eye
contact were all common examp les of
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human nature and easily susceptible
of innocent, non-criminal explanations.
It was thus inappropriate for this or
any reasonable officer to have considered them as elements in a "reasonable
suspicion calculus."

Judge Kozinski and others have
cautioned against. We are left to ask
whether there is thus no longer a need
for "a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity."

separate opmwns from any of the
Wardlow dissenters. Yet the decision
may itself soon be cited as precedent
for potentially new and ever more
expansive bases for stops in a multitude
of different contexts.

n overturning this Ninth Circuit
decision, the Court held that the
driver's behavior was unusual
enough in its context to constitute
legally sufficient reasonable suspicion
to the local officer. The Court first
stated that when making determinations of what constitutes sufficient
reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts
must look to the "totality of the
circumstances" of each case. The
Court reiterated that simply because
each of numerous stated reasons for a
stop may be more susceptible to an
innocent than an illicit explanation,
it does not mean that when taken
together they cannot constitute reasonable suspicion. More controversial,
however, is the context in which the
Court reached the conclusion that the
courts must allow "officers to draw on
their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that
might well elude an untrained person."
While in Wardlow and Dickerson, for
example, efforts to avoid potential
physical contact with law enforcement
were legitimate factors in reaching
"reasonable suspicion," here the attempt
to avoid eye contact was a reasonable
element in validating the stop.

Additionally, the Court's consideration of a suspect's home address as a
factor in reaching reasonable suspicion
is a variation on the norm. Until this
case, the inferences of criminality
which courts have sometimes allowed
to be drawn from high drug trafficking
areas were limited to situations in
which the suspect was actually present
in one at the time the officers observed
him engaging in other suspicious
behavior. Judicial valid ation of the
stop in Arvizu may have given us reason
to fear that it will prove easier for an
inhabitant to leave a "hood " than to
escape its legal stigma. (Like Hester's
scarlet "A," once so branded, its
recipients wear it whence they travel;
though this time upon the bumper,
rather than the breast. )

CONCLUSION
I am not suggesting that it is inevitable,
or perhaps even probable, that the
Wardlow case will result in turning
the entire logic of the law of privacy
on its head and make the act of
attempting to exercise one's rights
justification for invading them.
However, Wardlow's deviation from
precedent is a potential first step.
Based merely upon the nature of the
area and the attempt of an otherwise
unsusp1c10us individual to evade
the police, the holding of Wardlow
(particularly when combined with
unarticulated dicta of Dickerson and
the implications of Arivzu), empowers
law enforcement to "stop and frisk."
It seems but a short step to apply
this same logic to other forms of
furtive conduct.

I

Ignoring concerns such as the potentially
overactive nature of police imaginations, Chief Justice Rehnquist, for a
unanimous Court, added that due
weight must always be given "to factual
inferences drawn by resident judges
and local law enforcement officers."
Giving such deference to local officers
may in the long run prove the correct
course, but it must also be acknowledged that to do so increasingly
surrenders aspects of the right to privacy
to the very police subjectivity that
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The Arvizu opinion may prove an
anomalous consequence of the site of
the stop (a djacent to a border) and the
date of its issuance (only four months
after the foreign terrorist destruction
of the World Trade Center and the
attack on the Pentagon). These factors
could account for the absence of

hat would happen, for
example, if a trial court
judge is confronted with
the case with which we began this
article? An officer observes the driver
of a motor vehicle whom he has just
pulled over because of a broken

W

it must be remembered that police
behavior on the streets and
decisions by trial courts often exist
for years (if not decades) before
review by the nation's High Court.

taillight, in an area known for drug
trafficking, make a furtive attempt to
stuff a brown paper bag beneath the
passenger seat.
In the trial court, the defense moves to
suppress the search on the grounds
that the officer lacked probable cause to
retrieve and open the bag. The prosecution, however, argues that under the
rationale of . Wardlow the suspect's
having attempted to hide the bag from
the officer's view was sufficient evidence
that the suspect was trying to hide
something of a criminal nature.
A trial court might conclude that the
suspect's conduct was a furtive gesture
much like running. Wardlow could
thus be seen as furnishing not merely
reasonable suspicion, but probable
cause justifying the search. In fact, it is
not out of the question that the
Wardlow majority might itself agree.
Even if one were prepared to concede
that no Supreme Court case may ever
condone this Orwellian syllogism (a
concession which may not be justified),
it must be remembered that police
behavior on the streets and decisions
by trial courts often exist for years (if
not decades) before review by the
nation's High Court.

If this could happen, how far does this
strange logic take us? Given judicial
acquiescence to such an example of
law enforcement suspicion, the average
officer on the street may interpret this
as justification for a whole new class of
stops and searches. How long before the
Fourth Amendment can be explained
only through Alice's looking glass? •!•

Stanley A. Goldman is professor of law
at Lo yo la Law School. Goldman joined
the Loyola faculty after serving as a Los
Angeles County deputy public defender.
His scholarship is principally in the area
of crimina l procedure. Goldman is a bar
review lecturer in Ethics, Criminal Law,
Criminal Procedure, and Trusts and Wills,
and serves as a national television and radio
commentator on criminal law matters.
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you knew about Religion
and the Constitution

Continued from page 53
effect of abridging religious freedom.
For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a
compulsory school attendance law
had the effect of interfering with the
desire of Amish parents to remove
their children from public school after
the eighth grade. Applying the strict
scrutiny test, the Supreme Court held
that the state had to exempt the Amish
from the law, unless the state could
prove that denying the exemption was
the least restrictive means of pursuing
a compelling state interest. In Yoder,
although Wisconsin did have a compelling interest in educating children, the
Court held that such an interest would
be adequately served by the vocational
training the children would receive in
the Amish community. Accordingly, the
Constitution required that the Amish be
exempted from the otherwise generally
applicable attendance law.
y the 1990s, however, the
Court had moved away from
Yoder's strict scrutiny test, and
toward the same kind of "equal
treatment" analysis it was developing
for the Establishment Clause. The
watershed year was 1990, when
the Court handed down its decision in
Employment Division v. Smith. In
Smith, Galen Black and Alfred Smith
were fired from their jobs as drug
counselors after it was discovered that
they had ingested peyote at a ceremony
of the Native American Church. They
were denied unemployment benefits on
the grounds that they had engaged in
work-related misconduct. The plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming
that application of the unemployment
statute in their case unjustifiably
burdened their right to practice their

B

religious beliefs. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected their claim and held
that neutral and generally applicable
laws, in all but the narrowest of
circumstances, do not require strict
scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause. As long as such laws applied
to everyone, the effect of the law on
religious exercise was irrelevant.

The current state
of the law actually
is quite clear and
easily applied.

a--.--oof his leads to a number of
remarkable conclusions. First
of all, it means that if a city
or county bans the consumption of
alcohol, the Free Exercise Clause will
not protect one's right to consume
wine at Holy Communion or at Seder.
It also means that the Free Exercise
Clause really does nothing at all. The
Equal Protection Clause already protects
us from discrimination on the basis
of religion, and the Court had long
prohibited religious discrimination
as a forbidden form of governmentimposed religious establishment. After
Smith, whatever was unique about
the Free Exercise Clause was read out
of the Constitution.
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MISCONCEPTION #4: THE
COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE
REGARDING THE RELIGION
CLAUSES IS A MESS
Some might conclude, given the above
analysis of the Court's current approach
to religious liberty, that the Court's
approach to these issues is a mess.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The current state of the law actually is
quite clear and easily applied.

Indeed, it was the Court's convoluted
case law prior to the 1990s that was a
mess. During this time, the Court
seemed to want to simultaneously
treat religion as both specially protected
and specially forbidden. The Court's
approach to school aid was especially
confusing: The government could not
provide equal aid to religious and
non-religious schools if the aid was a
globe or a map. Equal provision of
schoolbooks, however, was allowed.
This left legislators wondering what
to do about atlases. Likewise, although
the Court's approach to the Free
Exercise Clause seemed to promise
substantial protection, in fact, the
Court almost invariably ruled against
religious objectors.
y the 1990s, substantial criticism
was leveled at the Court from
both the left and right, demanding
clear guidelines regarding the appropriate
relationship between church and state.
The current Court has complied.

B

This provides us with either an occasion
to give thanks or to reflect on the old
adage that one should be careful what
one wishes for. •!•

Kurt T. Lash is professor of law and W. Joseph
Ford Fellow at Loyola Law School. Lash, who
joined the faculty in 1993, ser ved as law clerk
to the Honorable Robert R. Beezer of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Ci rcuit. Lash's scholarship is principally in the
area of constitutional law, law and religion,
and freedom of speech.
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Congress and the

"en• Force' • ment

d
wor .
of equal protection:

what's in a

~

group, or reflect real differences between
it and the rest of society. In short, suspect
class status is a blunt tool that may not
suit all occasions. But that fact does not
mean laws about that group never
reflect animus. In those cases, Congress
should be able to step in.

Continued from page 63
The real-world effect of this theory
would be to allow Congress to ensure
the equal treatment of such groups,
which may potentially be such victims,
which the Court may hesitate to bestow
the potentially far-reaching status of
"suspect class." Courts may have good
reasons for such hesitancy; suspect class
status subjects every law about that
group to strict scrutiny, even though, for
example, laws singling out the mentally
retarded may actually benefit that

By explicitly allowing for Congress to
give meaning to perhaps the vaguest
phrase in the Constitution-"equal
protection"-this approach would recognize that the drafters intended for
Congress to have a significant role in
guaranteeing 14th Amendment rights,
beyond that of the courts, with their
wide but still limited institutional
competence. At least with regard to
equal protection, a concept that really has
no uniquely "legal " meaning, that role,
as a matter of institutional competence,

10th Amendment arguments would
have the same goal-a restriction of
national power, they would run along
distinct, "uncoordinated" paths.

Continued from page 83
she has a fundamental right to use
marijuana for the relief of pain, nausea,
etc. The essential question would be
whether this right, perhaps framed
somewhat differently, can be traced to
our traditions, history, or customs, or
be seen as implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. As a separate argument
premised on the 10th Amendment, the
defendant might also assert that
the regulation of "medical use" is a
matter beyond the scope of the
commerce power. Under the current
juris prudence the question would be
whether medical use is properly characterized as an activity that is "truly
local" or "truly national." Regardless
of how this conflict is resolved, the
concept of retained rights would play
at best a marginal role in the process.
Thus although the standard 9th and

An argument based on the coordination
between the 9th and 10th Amendments
avoids some of the doctrinal pitfalls of
the standard model. There is no need
for a judge to determine whether and
under what standards a right may be
deemed fundamental or whether an
activity is truly local or truly national.
Under the coordinated model, the
people, speaking through their
respective states, define which rights
they choose to retain. Turning to
the given facts, the people of the
hypothetical state exercised their
10th Amendment reserved powers to
assert a 9th Amendment retained right
for the medical use of marijuana.
There is no need to explore the
vagaries of tradition, history, custom,
or the concept of ordered liberty. The
right is constitutionally protected,
i.e., retained, because the people of
the state say it is. Nor is there a
need to draw bright line distinctions demarcating the scope of the
commerce power.

must include the power to determine
what "equality" really is. •!•

William D. Araiza is professor of law at Loyola
Law School; he joined the Loyola facu lty in
1995. Araiza clerked for the Honorable William
Norris of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and for the Honorable David
Souter of the United States Supreme Court.
Araiza has contributed to several texts on
administrative and international law and is the
co-editor of a casebook on constitutional law.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
The "congruence and proportionality standard was first
enunciated in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Boerne dealt with a statute justified as an enforcement of
the due process clause, but since then the Court has used the
same standard to review federal laws justified as means of
enforcing the equal protection clause. See, e.g ., Bd. of
Trustees v. Kimel, 528 U.S. 52 (2000).
See City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985) (denying suspect class status to the mentally
challenged, yet striking down a law as reflecting animus
against that group).
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hese observations do not
establish that the coordinated
model is better than the standard model or that we must completely
abandon the latter. The contrast does
suggest, however, that the coordinated
model frames the constitutional conflict
in relatively swift and certain strokes,
deflecting somewhat the "pick and
choose" critique that is sometimes
directed at substantive due process
and which is equally applicable to the
new commerce clause jurisprudence. So
the coordinated model does at least
have some initial benefits. Of course,
the framing of the conflict does not necessarily resolve it. Like all constitutional
rights, the retained rights are not likely
to be considered absolute. We must
consider, therefore, whether this initial
fast start can be sustained for an entire
race or whether it soon trips over its
own feet. First, however, let's consider
whether the start itself is a false one.
A MODEST DEFENSE OF THE
COORDINATED MODEL
This proposed regime of "reserved
powers retained rights" -which I will
refer to as "retained rights-appears
to place the states over the national
107I!•$1•JULAWYERI

government, creating a topsy-turvy
constitutional world in which state
law trumps the exercise of federal
power. In the familiar constitutional
world, valid federal law trumps state
law to the contrary. A constitutional
interpretation that runs afoul of this
principle is not likely to survive an
evening's parlor chat. But as the astute
reader has already surmised, the key
word in our definition is "valid." And
to be valid a federal law must be the
legitimate product of an enumerated
power and consistent with applicable
constitutional limitations. So to sah
that the coordinated 9th and 10t
Amendments violates federal supremacy
begs the very question that the amendments seek to resolve, namely, whether
the federal enactment transgresses a

state of affairs, however, should not
foreclose the possibility of another,
somewhat more fluid approach in
which the resolution of such power
conflicts is less certain. For example,
in our medical use hypothetical, while
the national government may have a
strong interest in prohibiting interstate commerce in marijuana, the
people of a state have an equally
strong claim to shield themselves and
their fellow residents from excruciating
but unnecessary pain. Which of these
incommensurate interests is to prevail?
Need the Constitution foreclose the
possibility of allowing the people of a
state to assert a retained privilege or
immunity from federal intervention
under all circumstances? Madison's
theory of counteracting ambitions (or

It is certainly not designed to provide
a metes and bounds guide to the
resolution of such problems. One
would hope, if a court ever proceeds
with this theory, that a more definitive
approach will be discovered through
the incremental common-law process
of case-by-case adjudication that begins
with the unassuming principle that
at least under some circumstances the
retained right should prevail.

retained right. If so, the federal law
is not valid; and the Supremacy Clause
is of no import.

power) would seem to suggest that the
constitutional hierarchy should not be
so rigid. Indeed, to deny the possibility
of a retained rights trump is to eliminate
a key countervailing force to excessive
exercises of centralized power.

powers. Since state governments are
the traditional and exclusive means
through which the people exercise
their reserved powers, one characteristic of a retained right is that it must be
created through some apparatus of
state law. A private group cannot,
therefore, use the reserved powers to
create a retained right. Another characteristic is that the exercise of
reserved powers is such that it can be
characterized as a right of the people,
not merely a structural impediment to
federal power, i.e., a retained right is
an individual right, not a state right.
Next, since we are talking about
creating retained rights through exercise
of the reserved powers, it would seem
to follow that a retained right is

till, although an application of
the coordinated model would
not technically run afoul of the
Supremacy Clause, the model itself may
subvert the basic structure of our constitutional system by creating a black
hole in the supremacy matrix. This, of
course, assumes a certain state of
affairs, namely, one in which the
national sovereign must always prevail
over contrary state law despite what
may appear to be legitimate spheres of
intersecting power and interest
between central and local authority.
Our familiarity with that hierarchical

S
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SOME TENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
Assuming there is some legitimacy to
the coordinated model (or some interest
in it), we must then consider the
potential factors that might go into
determining when the assertion of
a retained right should (or might)
prevail over contrary federal law.
Given the tentative nature of this
inquiry, what follows is merely
suggestive of possibilities and directions.

s an initial matter, we must
develop a definition or at least
an understanding of what we
mean by a retained right. Here are
some preliminary thoughts on that
point. Our premise is that retained
rights are created by the people
through the exercise of their reserved

something that must be affirmatively
established, and which will not be
inferred from silence. The people
must assert themselves. One might
also demand that the retained right
achieve a certain status under the
hierarchy of state law. Perhaps it
should be embodied in the state
constitution, or adopted through a
process of higher lawmaking. Finally,
retained rights, being products of
state action, can not violate other
provisions of the Constitution, such
as the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause or the prov1s10ns
of the 14th Amendment.
As to the clash between federal power
and retained rights, we might be
tempted to adopt an ad hoc balancing
test through which to compare the
relative weights of the federal and
state interests. The benefit of such a
test is ease of description. Weigh one
interest against another and explain
the result. Yet balancing is more likely
to create a doctrinal morass than it is
a coherent body of precedent. To
begin with, the interests to be balanced are likely incommensurate.
How, for example, does one balance a
federal interest in regulating interstate
sales of marijuana and the reserved
power interest in providing relief
from pain? Any choice between
the two would have to be based
largely on subjective factors or policy
considerations having no anchor in
the Constitution. Moreover, the
balancing test seeks to answer the
wrong question. Although the practical
conflict may be between a federal
"interest" and a state "interest," that is
not the constitutional conflict. The
constitutional conflict is between
countervailing exercises of power,
both of which in the abstract have a
claim to constitutional legitimacy.
The initial task, therefore, is to measure
these assertions of constitutional
legitimacy in the real world context in
which they arise and to determine
which has the stronger claim to legitimacy under the circumstances.
109i!ow]ULAWYERI

One way to undertake this measurement
might be to examine federal power
and retained rights along a "counteracting" continuum of descending and
ascending constitutional authority, the
goal being to determine at what point
the constitutional strength of one
might overwhelm the relative constitutional weakness of the other. I realize
that such an approach is somewhat
mechanical, but working our way
through this continuum may shed
some new light on how to think about
conflicts between federal power and
retained rights. For present purposes,
I will assume that there are four key
points on the continuum, beginning
with the apex of federal power and the
nadir of reserved powers, and ending
with the nadir of federal power and
the apex of the reserved powers.
he first point on our continuum
includes those exercises of the
federal power that are premised on the literal language of an
enumerated power-a regulation of
commerce among the states, the coining
of money, the creation of a post office
or postal road, and the like. Here the
federal authority is overwhelmingly
predominant, if not exclusive. This is
so because when Congress operates
within the unaided text of a granted
power, it exercises precisely that
power and only that power that
the Constitution specifically confers.
By contrast, the reserved power
within this realm is limited at best.
The reason is simple. One can not
reserve that which has been granted.
Hence, there is no reserved power
vehicle through which to assert
a counteracting retained right. As a
consequence, the standard model of
federal supremacy can be applied
without reference to the coordinated
9th and 10th Amendments. Federal
law trumps state law to the contrary,
including any purported assertion of
a retained right.
At the second point in our continuum,
the exercise of federal power depends
l!o$'loi!-1 LAWYERI110

on the coupling of an express grant
of authority with the Necessary and
Proper Clause. That clause vests
Congress with the authority to undertake measures "for the carrying into
Execution" of the enumerated powers.
In other words, relying on the literal
language of the clause, Congress may
adopt measures designed to assist or
facilitate the national government in
executing its enumerated powers.
Congress could, for example, regulate
the intrastate sale of a product to
facilitate regulation of the interstate
market, or Congress could provide for

of the presumption. Certainly, a
pretext to fac ilitate should be treated
as such and move the federal action
lower on the continuum of power.
oving to the third point on
the continuum, the connection between the granted
power and the act1v1ty regulated is
proximate and not facilitative. The
statute at issue in United States v.
Lopez, (1995) provides a good example.
See 514 U.S. 549. The regulation of
gun possession in a school zone was
said to be proximately related to various

M

Congress operates within the unaided
text of a granted power, it exercises precisely
that power and only that power that the
Constitution specifically confers.

the purchase of mines to ensure an
adequate supply of a certain metal for
coins, or condemn property for the
construction of a post office, and so
forth. Given that these exercises of
authority are not literally within the
scope of the underlying enumerated
power, there may well be a greater
residuum of power reserved under the
10th Amendment and ava ilable for
the assertion of a retained right.
Certainly, there is no presumption of
federal exclusivity. Yet, given the
structural need to allow the federal
government the ability to execute its
granted authority in a meaningful and
effective manner, any counteracting
retained right will be on a relatively
weak footing. Of course, given the
constitutional conflict, the federal
government might be expected to
establish at least a reasonable basis for
characterizing its action as facilitative,
and a court could find degrees of
facilitation that may alter the strength

aspects of interstate commerce, but
was not in any fashion designed to
assist Congress in the actual regulation
of anything interstate. Authority over
such proximately connected activities
is not granted by the text of any
enumerated power and not literally
within the scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. As a consequence,
such matters fall squarely within the
expected and promised, albeit nebulous, range of the reserved powers.
One can say that the very purpose of
the 9th and 10th Amendments was to
prevent the undermining of liberty
within this "ungranted" territory in
which Congress sometimes roams.
Thus a retained right created within
this terrain should carry a strong presumption of constitutional legitimacy.
Perhaps the national government
could rebut that presumption by
establishing a tight proximate relationship between the activity regulated
and some matter within the plenary

authority of Congress. Or the national
government could argue that the
proximate connection actually does
facilitate the exercise of a granted
power, convincing the Court to reverse
the presumption, essentially moving the
conflict back into the second category.
Otherwise the presumption of legitimacy should favor the retained right.
inally, at the bottom of the scale,
federal power is non-existent
and even in the absence of a
retained right the federal law must
fall. Just as the reserved powers have
no legitimate application at the first
point of our power hierarchy, federal
power has none in the last.
The critical realm in our continuum is
the realm that embraces the second and
third points, where the presumption
of legitimacy shifts from the exercise
of national power (point two) to the
protection of a retained right (point
three ). There is no certain line of
demarcation between these two
points. A loose "facilitation" starts to
look like more like a proximate connection, and as a connection becomes
more clearly proximate, it may also
be more properly characterized as
facilitative. Nonetheless, the continuum
at least provides an initial take on the
relative constitutional strengths of
the counteracting ambitions of federal
and reserved power. If, after careful
analysis, the counteracting ambitions
are in equipoise, i.e., somewhere in
between the second and third points
on the continuum, the only recourse
may be a statutory construction that
either avoids the conflict or pares it
down to a minimal abrasion.
Let's briefly revisit the medical use
hypothetical. The "medical use" right
was affirmatively created through "a
proper resort" to a state's initiative
process, a clear exercise of reserved
powers. Whether its status in the hierarchy of state laws is constitutionally
adequate cannot be resolved, since it
is unclear whether or to what extent

such status might matter for these
purposes. I will assume that as an
initiative measure, the status of the
right to medical use is satisfactory.
Next, we must consider whether this
retained right violates any applicable
constitutional principle aside from
federal supremacy. one occur to me,
though if the retained right were
limited to residents or if it included
a durational residency requirement
there could be potential Article IV and
14th Amendment issues to contend
with. Assuming that is not the case,
the state's provision for medical use
would appear to be a retained right
of constitutional stature.
There is, of course, a conflict between
this retained right and the CSA. The
question is where that conflict falls on
our continuum. The CSA's proscription
of possession is not a regulation of
interstate commerce. Congress may
regulate possession, if at all, only if
necessary and proper to facilitate the
regulation of some interstate activity
or if it bears a proximate connection
with interstate commerce. Assuming
that Congress does have some power

the only recourse
may be a statutory
construction that
either avoids the
conflict or pares
it down to a

to determine precisely where to place
this conflict, and therefore how to
resolve it, but it should be clear what
questions need to be considered:
Does the prohibition of possession
facilitate the regulation of interstate
commerce? If so, how and to what
degree? Is the prohibition necessary to
accomplish Congress's interstate ends
or merely collateral to those ends?
Would an exception that protects
the retained right undermine the
facilitation? Has Congress considered
such an exception? Assuming either
no or minimal facilitation, what, if
any, is the proximate connection
between possession and interstate
commerce? Has Congress examined
the factual basis for any claimed
proximate connection? Is there a
proximate connection between medical
use and interstate commerce? Has
Congress considered that proximate
connection? Obviously, these questions are not dispositive, but they
should indicate the nature of the basic
inquiry when a court is called on
to accommodate federal power with
a retained right.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This returns us to a question
ducked earlier. Should a "retained
right" ever be allowed to supplant
otherwise constitutional federal
legislation? I don't know. I believe
I've shown that allowing a retained
right to operate as counteracting
ambition to federal power may well
serve high principles of constitutional structure and liberty. Whether
it will undermine other important
constitutional values remains to be
seen. I look forward to a dialogue
examining the possibilities. •!•

minimal abrasion.
to regulate the possession of marijuana,
the confl ict between the CSA and the
retained right must fall either into
the second or the third points of the
continuum or directly between them.
We do not have enough information

Allan Ides '79 is professor of law and Willi am
M. Ra ins fellow at Loyola Law School.
Ides served as a law clerk to the Honorabl e
Clement F. H ay nsworrh, Jr. , chief judge of
the United States Coun of Appea ls for th e
Founh Circuit and for the Honorable Byron
R. White, associate justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Hi s scholarship is principally
in the area of constitutional law.
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[Quintessential Loyola]
The 50s - In 1950, tuition at Loyola had risen to $450 a year.
QUOTATIONS ON LAW & LOYOLA

"When I'm ta lking to a jury, I try to
co mmunicate so th at there a re two o r
th ree po ints people can get o ut of it.
It's not a lways, ' If it doesn't fit, you
mu st acquit,' but it's something they
ca n remember. I tell peop le th ere are
three keys to success : prepara ti on,
preparation, and preparati on. "
-johnnie L. Cochran Jr. '62

"Al l of us must work to turn aro und
the public's perception of our
profession. We live in interesting
times. Rather than fall into a
comfort zone, I hope my students
w ill judge themsel ves on th e effo rt
th ey make in making our society and
our world a better, mo re just, and
less dangero us place to be. "
- Georgene M . Vairo

Professor of Law and Wilham M. Rams Fr:llow

The '60s - In 1964, Louis Burke '26 was appointed a Justice
of the California Supreme Court, the first graduate of Loyola Law
School to sit on the High Court of California.

The '70s - By

1973, the Loyola graduating class numbered
350 students and the size of the Law School library collection had
expanded to 156,600 volumes, up from 38,500 volumes only a
decade earlier. In 1976, Father Donovan's health began to fail and
he passed away at the age of 86. Thomas V Girardi '64 recalls that
on an average day at the Law School, you might find a California
Supreme Court Justice, a nun and a homeless person all sitting on
a bench waiting to see Father Donovan. He was truly remarkable
in the breadth of his caring.

The '80s

- In 1981, Otto M. Kaus '49 was appointed a Justice
of the California Supreme Court, the second graduate of Loyola
Law School to sit on the High Court of California. In 1984,
Merrifield, South Hall (rededicated in 1989 as Donovan Hall) and
the Chapel were completed.

Law School faculty voted to require
all Loyola students, beginning with the 1994 entering class,
to contribute 40 hours of uncompensated legal service to the
disadvantaged in Southern California.

- H on. Frederick J. Lotuer, Jr. '64

- Robert W. 8 enso11

Pro frssor o f Uw

SO YEARS AGO
Students take studying
serious~ in the Loyola Law
School Library in 1953.
During this period in the Law
School's history, the downtown
Los Angeles campus was
located at another site,
on Grand Avenue.

- George C. Garbesi
Professor Ememius

" Lo yola was the beginn ing of an
exciting adventure; rescu ed us from
mediocrity; changed us from nobod y
to someone; delivered us into to a new,
exciting world; gave us understanding
a nd a bility to comprehend it; made
us a part of a high ca ll ing; a nd,
a llowed us to participate as if equ als
in th at workplace where the grea test
o f intellects past and present
struggle to achieve justi ce."
- David Daar '56

The '90s - In 1992, the

"As a practicing attorney you must
protect and guard you r repu tation.
One key is to remembe r to never
bo rrow your cli ent's consc ience.
Your reputation as a la wyer is
built up slowly over tim e. It ca n be
damaged or even destroyed in a
matter of minutes, say in a telephone
call or a letter o r an e- ma il. "

"Th e excitin g thin g abo ut law
is that it ca n be a powerful
instrument to do so mething a bout
th e socia l and environmenta l
cri sis the world is in . Some lawyers
a re lucky eno ugh to have jo bs in
which they take their consciences co
the office w ith them and work
for social justice every day. "

" Father Donovan: I don't reca ll hi s
formal title; but remember him vividly
as a person. H e once chastised me
for wearing shorts when I was at school
on a Saturday to procure books
fro m my office."

IN 2003

With the onset of the new
millennium, stu~ng the
law is taken as serious~ as
50 years ago, yet students
have the benefit of new tools
aiding them in the study of
law; name~. the trusted
laptop computer.

"My not-so-hidden agenda, which I
announce at the beginning of my classes,
is to have my srudems lie awake at night
worrying about the people with whom
my courses are concerned: children and
people with mental disa bilities. Idea lly,
some of the srudents will decide to dedicate their legal careers to representing
these and other disenfranchised people.
But at a minimum, I hope to make aU
my srudems unpopular at dinner parties
and family reunions, because they will
no longer be satisfied with 'sound bite'
descriptions of social problems or
with simplistic solutions."
- Jan C. Costello
Pro fessor o f Law

His favorite saying to prospecti ve
students was, "What makes you
th ink you want to be a lawyer?"
However, after graduation he
became a student's strongest
advocate and helped to obtain
jobs for many graduates.
-Roger M . Sullivan '52
on Father j oseph j. Donovan, S.J. Foundmg Regent
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Loyola now offers rigorous post-graduate
training leading to the degree of Master of
Laws in Taxation. Our goal is to provide
the kind of advanced tax education that
students, in the past, have traveled to
New York, Washington, or Florida to obtain.
Admission is competitive.
All courses in the LL.M. program are
offered in the evening. The course
schedule is structured to enable students
to complete the program part-time by
attending one evening per week for three
years. Alternatively, full-time students can
complete the program in one year.

Affiliated Corporations
Bankruptcy Taxation
Corporate Taxation I & II
Criminal Tax Practice and Procedure
Employee Pensions and Benefits
Estate and Gift Taxation I & II
Estate Planning
Honors Tax Research
Income Taxation II & Ill
Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates
International Taxation I, II, & Ill
Partnership Taxation I & II
State and Local Taxation
Tax Aspects of Business Planning
Tax Policy
Taxation of Corporate Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Reorganizations
Tax Practice and Procedure
Taxation of Intellectual Property
Tax-Exempt Organizations
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For further information
regarding Loyola's
Tax LL.M . Program, call
the Adm issions Office
at 213 .736 .1024 or
visit our w eb site at

LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL LOS ANGELES
Ranked 1 tth in the Nation for most-cited junior faculty. (Leiter 2002)
Ranked 12th in the Nation in books published by major legal publishers. (Leiter 1999)

•

••
Ranked 9th in the Nation, immediately behind NYU and Yale, in the amounts spent
annually on acquisition of books and computer-based information. (ABA 2003)
Ranked Uth in the Nation for its Advocacy program. (US News 2003)

42°d most-cited general law review in US. (Doyle 2003)
Cited last term by the US Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
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